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October 2004] The Illusion of Law 
"Every way of seeing is always a way of not seeing; every insight is a 
blindness." 
- Alfred North Whitehead1 
"The evolution of ideas has its own laws . . . .  " 
- Friedrich A. von Hayek2 
"Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual 
forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past 
decades." 
- Milton Friedman3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
3 
This Article is about some of the schemas and scripts that form and 
define our lives. It is about the knowledge structures that shape how 
we view the world and how we understand the limitless information 
with which we are always confronted. 
This Article is also about the "evolution of ideas" underlying 
corporate law and all of modern policymaking. It is about the ways in 
which schemas and scripts have influenced how policy theorists, 
policymakers, lawyers, and many others (particularly in the West) 
understand and approach policymaking generally and corporate law 
specifically. It is about both the invisibility and blinding effect of those 
schemas. It is about the battle over those schemas and the prizes of 
victory. And, finally, it is about how the now-dominant schemas 
render us the "unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have 
been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades." 
This Article takes as its starting point the notion that human 
behavior is influenced by features in our environment, and within us, 
of which we are largely unaware - our "situation."4 Our situation is 
not fixed; it is both malleable and, more importantly, manipulable. 
Some of the most important features of our interior situation are 
1. Alfred North Whitehead (as quoted by Stephen Klineberg, a favorite undergraduate 
professor for one of us, at http://www.rice.edu/sallyport/2003/winter/features/aprized 
reputation/page4.html). 
2. Interview by Thomas W. Hazlett with F.A. Hayek (May 1977), in The Road from 
Serfdom: Foreseeing the Fall, REASON, July 1992, at 28, 34, available at http://reason.com/ 
hayekint.shtml. 
3. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine - The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33 [hereinafter Friedman, 
Friedman Doctrine]. 
4. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 
(2003) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 
(2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character] . 
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knowledge structures - the categories, schemas, and scripts through 
which we interpret and respond to the world around us.5 
Insofar as the situation affects our behavior, there is immense 
value in influencing it. This opportunity results in a significant, largely 
unseen, competition over our conceptions of the world, of the groups 
and institutions within it, and of ourselves. We argue that our positive 
and normative understandings of all of law and policymaking are in 
fact subject to just that sort of competition. Our hypothesis is that 
large commercial interests are best suited to succeed in this 
competition over our situation, and that therefore our laws and 
policies are biased in their favor. 
That is only half of it. Policies that purport to be in the public 
interest, but that actually serve primarily the interest of the most 
powerful, risk being delegitimated.6 This Article examines how the 
schemas and scripts behind our laws manage, through illusion, to 
legitimate institutions, outcomes, policies, and laws that, in fact, reflect 
the situational power of large commercial interests. It is important to 
underscore at the outset that this Article does not contemplate a 
nefarious sleight-of-hand artist intentionally seeking to manipulate us 
and our worlds. Though some readers may be tempted to erect such a 
straw man,7 to do so would be to misapprehend our arguments and 
misconstrue our evidence. The competition over our knowledge 
structures is a process akin to the familiar invisible hand of markets. 
The illusion is the handiwork, neither of an individual mastermind nor 
even a vast, elaborate conspiracy, but of a situational magician - an 
assertion that should take on meaning as the Article develops. 
We begin our discussion in Part II with the dominant knowledge 
structures underlying modern policymaking, describing the emergence 
of what we term the "meta script" of policymaking - or the schemas 
that frame our approach to policy analysis today. Part III turns to the 
law regulating large commercial interests - specifically, corporate law 
- and examines the emergence and dominance of the new "macro 
script" of corporate law. It examines the schemas that identify and 
5. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 103 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & 
Hanson, Categorically Biased] . Loosely, categorization and categories refer to the 
classification of elements, experiences, instances, arguments, persons, places, things, and so 
on into groups. Schemas and scripts refer to the application of prior knowledge to those 
groups permitting predictions and inferences about the items categorized. For a far more 
detailed definition and analysis of knowledge structures, see id. at Part II. 
6. Cf TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 102-12 (1990) (describing need for 
perceptions of fairness in maintaining law's legitimacy). 
7. Some of the motives behind that temptation are described in related work. See, e.g. , 
Hanson & Y osifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at 328-43; Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, 
Naive Cynicism: Some Mechanisms of Dispositionism and Other Persistent Attributional 
Errors in Policy Debates (work in progress, on file with authors). 
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legitimate the purpose of the law. Parts IV and V highlight the signs of 
illusion in those schemas and then begin to unveil the situational 
magician behind those illusions. Corporate law works, as all illusions 
work, by relying on a set of schemas that guide our attention and 
inferences and play into our intuitions and motives.8 Yet the outcome 
and response that this Article suggests is neither so benign nor light­
hearted as that of a magic show. While its analysis is concentrated on 
corporate law, the Article's implications reach each of us, from law 
student to legal scholar, citizen to policymaker, and reveal something 
unsettling: all of us are susceptible to schematic sleight-of-hand, tricks 
that render us vulnerable to dangerous illusion. Where many have 
heretofore tended to see magic, this Article reveals the illusion of law 
and some of the unseen mechanisms that make it possible.9 
This project's larger ambition, it should be noted, is not to 
encourage disillusionment with the purported goals of the law, but to 
provide insights that help tailor our means and to narrow the gap 
between our ends and our outcomes. 
II. THE META SCRIPT OF POLICYMAKING 
This Part begins with a stylized history of the emergence of what 
we call the summary meta script that currently dominates policy 
analysis.10 The goal here is not to offer a detailed scholarly account of 
8. Given our thesis and the influence of our own nascent schemas, we acknowledge a 
similar danger that we may be tempted to see illusion where none exists. Just as audience 
members who want to see magic are putty in the magician's hands, a skeptic may see illusion 
even when magic exists. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Theorizing Illusion: The Laws 
Behind Our Laws (work in progress, on file with authors) (hereinafter Chen & Hanson, 
Theorizing Illusion]. We acknowledge that risk but proceed out of concern for the greater 
risk posed by the other side of two-headed coin. If there is illusion at work - as we believe 
history, social science, and market practices all indicate there may be - then it will not be 
discovered absent a dose of searching skepticism. 
9. In this Article, we will be attempting to redescribe and connect familiar ideas in 
unfamiliar ways. Our schemas are moved often by the choice of words, language, frames, 
and metaphors and the ability of those factors to guide our attention and inferences. See 
Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1174-218. Thus, in our effort to 
demonstrate that the familiar and comforting magic of law is really illusion, we will, more 
than we otherwise would, rely heavily on the precise words and arguments that legal scholars 
and judges themselves have used. 
To some of our readers our analysis will be, like the magician's trick, disappointing when 
revealed. To many other readers our analysis will feel threatening. Our greatest difficulty, 
we expect, will be overcoming the subconscious urge that many readers will understandably 
have to minimize that threat, as well as the tremendous psychological burden of proof that 
now must be overcome by anyone hoping to demonstrate that our system is built largely on 
illusion. See authorities cited supra note 7. Given the tenacity with which magicians protect 
their secrets, see Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8 (discussing the 
unmasking of and efforts to ostracize the "Masked Magician"), and the motive that even 
audience members have to see magic, persuasively revealing such an illusion and the tricks 
behind it is sure to be difficult and may simply be impossible. 
10. In separate work, we provided an initial schematization of the law - an attempt, 
like any schema, to make our complex world manageable. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically 
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Biased, supra note 5, at 1249. We divided the law into levels, like categories, so that we might 
better understand them (see Figure below). The first and "highest" level of the law we 
labeled the meta level. The ideas, concepts, and conclusions generated at the meta level we 
call the meta schemas or meta scripts. Meta schemas are general, in that they inform our 
approach to, and understanding of, all areas of law and policy. The conventional view that 
legal rules should focus on efficiency concerns, leaving "distributional" issues for the "tax­
and-transfer system," is an example of a meta script. See infra text accompanying notes 467-
485 (briefly discussing the distribution versus efficiency debate). See generally Ronald Chen 
& Jon Hanson, Distribution versus Efficiency: Missing the Taste of the Pie (work in 
progress, on file with author) (examining that debate in detail) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, 
Distribution versus Efficiency). 
Contract 
Law 





The macro level involves specific areas of the law, such as corporate law, property law, or 
tort law - the divisions found on the covers of casebooks, treatises, and on the pages of law 
school course catalogues. Insights at the macro level are those that relate to the entire body 
of an area of law. These macro scripts make sense of an area of law, helping determine what 
disputes are resolved by it, what its goal or purpose is, and to what extent the given area of 
law overlaps or interacts with other areas of law. Macro scripts also can inform how 
individual cases should be resolved - which leads to the third schematic level of law. 
The micro level is where the law is applied in specific doctrinal areas to specific cases and 
disputes. Thus, for example, within tort law, micro scripts include everything from battery to 
defamation to products liability. In corporate law, the micro level comprises questions 
involving the duty of loyalty, self-dealing, shareholder voting, shareholder suits, control 
transactions, and so on. 
This schematization of the law into meta, macro, and micro levels provides a framework 
for our analysis in this Article and others to follow. In other work now in progress, we are 
testing our illusion-of-law hypothesis by comparing the micro scripts to the macro script of 
corporate law, Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas 
of Corporate Law Doctrine - Part I (work in pr�gress, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
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all the historical forces that have given shape to our current policy 
scripts. Rather, it is to highlight the ideas that are commonly said to 
have informed, or even caused, the changing tides in policymaking 
over the past quarter century. Section A picks up where the now­
dominant meta schemas were first gaining credibility and a meaningful 
foothold in policymaking circles. 
A. The Emergence of the Summary Meta Script'1 
Travel back in time to the early 1970s, a time when corporate 
CEOs were talking openly and often about their commitment to social 
responsibility,12 when inflation rates were reaching record heights, and 
Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of 
Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Corporate Law Doctrine - Part II (work in progress, on 
file with authors) (hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas II], by comparing the 
meta scripts within a given legal theory, Chen & Hanson, Distribution versus Efficiency, 
supra, by comparing the macro scripts across two areas of law, Ronald Chen, Client Primacy, 
Shareholder Primacy: The Invisible Hand of Corporate Law and the Ethics of Corporate 
Counselors (work in progress, on file with authors), and by comparing the meta schemas of 
various legal theories, Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8. In other work, 
pretheoretic schemas (that is, schemas presumed by the theory as opposed to proven by it) 
regarding the forces behind human behavior and attributions of causation, responsibility, 
and blame have been closely scrutinized. See, e.g. , Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra 
note 4; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4; Adam Benforado, Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity & Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 
(forthcoming fall 2004) (hereinafter Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales]. That 
work indicates that the dispositionist schemas of almost all laws and legal theories are, 
indeed, "deeply captured" by large commercial interests. Dispositionism - which includes 
the "illusion of choice" and the "illusion of individualism" - plays an integral part in the 
illusion of law. 
This Article focuses primarily on the dominant meta schemas of policymaking and the 
dominant macro schemas of corporate law. Clearly the meta schema is one of the most 
valuable elements of our situation inasmuch as it seems likely to have the broadest influence 
over how we think about and approach all policies and policymaking. This Article also 
examines the macro schema of corporate law because, of all areas of law, it is difficult to 
think of one that would be more significant to corporations. If there is illusion to be 
discovered in our policy schemas, and if magic is any guide, one of the best places to look for 
it will be in the meta level of policymaking and the macro level of corporate law. 
As we predicted in a previous article, and as this Article confirms, separating our 
analysis into these levels - and analyzing closely the knowledge structures that shape our 
understanding of these levels - helps us to see illusion where we once had seen magic and 
to see the trick where we might never have looked for it. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically 
Biased, supra note 5,  at 1239-52. 
1 1 .  By "summary meta script" we mean to refer to the terse conclusion of the more 
detailed argument or script that leads to it. The conclusory version has, as we will argue, 
become a powerful script in itself - a script that seems automatically to activate the 
presumptions associated with the longer rendition. At both the meta level and the macro 
level, we will examine the evolution of each summary script and its mutually reinforcing 
relationship with its more detailed partner. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 135-143. For reasons that we explore in 
subsequent work, the language of social responsibility has very recently gained some 
momentum in corporate America. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: 
Testing the Promises of Shareholder Primacy (work in progress, on file with authors) 
[hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Testing Shareholder Primacy] (summarizing the increasingly 
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when a lingering recession was pushing unemployment rates up and 
consumer confidence down.13 It was a time when that combination of 
inflation plus recession, stagflation, bedeviled not only the United 
States but also several other western economies, including Britain's.14 
In the United States, Jimmy Carter's popularity ratings tracked the 
economy's performance. His promise to stimulate jobs through greater 
government spending flopped. True, spending went up, but employ­
ment rates didn't.15 With an energy crisis contributing to his woes, 
Carter implored Americans to change their ways: " [T]his is the 
greatest challenge our country will face during our lifetimes. "16 Indeed, 
Carter explained, it was the "moral equivalent of war."17 He then 
warned Americans of what lay ahead on their then-current path in 
these apocalyptic terms: 
We will feel mounting pressure to plunder the environment. We will 
have a crash program to build more nuclear plants, strip-mine and burn 
more coal, and drill more offshore wells than we will need if we begin to 
conserve now. Inflation will soar, production will go down, people will 
lose their jobs. Intense competition will build up among nations and 
among the different regions within our own country. 
If we fail to act soon, we will face an economic, social and political 
crisis that will threaten our free institutions. 
But we still have another choice. We can begin to prepare right now. 
We can decide to act while there is time. 18 
glaring evidence that shareholder primary is not delivering on its promise to increase social 
welfare); see also infra text accompanying notes 336-350 (briefly describing some of the 
trends and crises). McDonald's, for instance, has recently published an extensive social 
responsibility report. See M cDONALD'S CORP., M cDONALD'S WORLDWIDE CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2004), http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/values/socialrespons/ 
sr_report.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). For an account of the recent crises that helped lead 
to that report, see Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 10, at Part III. 
13. Between 1970 and 1975, for example, the inflation rate rose from 5.7% to 9.1 % and 
the unemployment rate rose from 4.9% to 8.5%. See ECON. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
376, 400 (1999), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy00/pdf/1999_erp.pdf; see also William 
Schneider, An Insider's View of the Election, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1988, at 29, 31 
("[C]onsumer confidence dropped 33 percent after the 1973 surge in oil prices."). 
14. See, e.g. , N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 750 (2004); JERRY z. 
MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET 380 (2002) (describing a rise in inflation in western 
Europe frQill about 1 % in 1960 to 3.7% during the years 1961 to 1969, to 6.4% in the years 
from 1969 to 1973 before it "then shot up to over 10 percent per annum from 1973 to 1979"); 
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 445 (2002); ECON. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 
13, at 450-51 .  
15. Although the unemployment rate did fall from 8.5% in 1975 to 5.8% in 1979, it 
quickly rose again to 7.1 % in 1980. See ECON. REPORT OF T HE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, 
at 376. 
16. Jimmy Carter, The President's Proposed Energy Policy, National Television 
Address (Apr. 18, 1977), in 43 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 418, 418 (May 1, 1977). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 419. 
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And with that, Carter hoped Americans would join him in conserving 
energy and sacrificing many of the comforts to which they had grown 
accustomed. 
In England, meanwhile, conditions were probably worse. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, as England was becoming just a 
country and not "The Empire," its economy, like its character, was 
being transformed. Its major industries were nationalized and a 
comprehensive welfare system was put in place.19 For a time, this 
socialist democracy had seemed the best of all worlds: a luxurious 
safety net, a planned and thriving economy, and a voting populace. 
But it was not to last. By the early 1970s, the economy was, under 
Labour Party leadership, unraveling.20 And when the energy crisis 
landed, it struck what would be the final blow to the Labour Party's 
grip on power.21 Nationwide strikes, including most prominently the 
coal strike, led to what historians call the "Winter of Discontent."22 
Labour's Prime Minister, James Callaghan, sat at the helm, like Carter 
did in the United States, seemingly powerless and rudderless against 
the economic onslaught.23 
Now jump ahead a few years. Portions of the world looked very 
different - as did their leaders. Jimmy and James had both been 
trounced by voters, and in their place were two very unlikely heads of 
state. In the United States, Ronald Reagan ushered in "Morning 
Again in America,"24 while Margaret Thatcher became the first 
woman prime minister in England's history.25 The two new leaders not 
only looked different, they were different from their predecessors -
19. See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS 25-26 
(1998). 
20. See id. at 96. 
21. It was not until 1997 - nearly three decades later - that a Labour Party candidate 
was elected Prime Minister. But this was, even by their own account, a radically different 
Labour Party - "New Labour" - with the young, party-reformer Tony Blair in the lead. 
See LABOUR PARTY, TONY BLAIR, HISTORY OF THE LABOUR PARTY, at http://www.labour. 
org.uk/historyofthelabourparty (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). 
22. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 104-05. 
23. See id. 
24. Lou Cannon describes Reagan's famous reelection advertisement, which stated: 
It's morning again in America. Today, more men and women will go to work than ever 
before in our country's history. With interest rates at about half the record high of 1980, 
nearly two thousand families today will buy new homes, more than at any time in the past 
four years. This afternoon, sixty-five hundred young men and women will be married, and 
with inflation at less than half of what it was four years ago, they can look forward with 
confidence. It's morning again in America. And under the leadership of President Reagan, 
our country is stronger, and prouder, and better. Why would we ever want to return to 
where we were less than four short years ago? 
LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 512-13 (1991). 
25. See MARGARET THATCHER, THE PATH TO POWER (1995). 
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each brazenly jettisoning conventional policies and actively promoting 
a new agenda. 
The economies in both countries, after some very painful economic 
and political struggles, were turning around. Inflation rates were 
coming down and employment rates were going up, and the rudder 
and engine of success seemed firmly in place.26 Indeed, the two 
countries displayed such a dramatic transformation that other 
countries still sinking into the quicksand of stagflation began looking 
to Reagan and Thatcher and their unconventional approach for a 
solution. Countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America 
began mimicking the practices of the United States and Britain.27 Even 
countries that had violently rejected capitalism altogether were 
changing course and transforming themselves through mostly 
nonviolent revolution to come into line with the emerging model.28 A 
world that had been divided by seemingly immutable categories and 
boundaries was lumbering and then soaring toward convergence.29 
So what changed in the interim? In the United States, what 
explains the bridge between Iranian hostages, gas lines, and an 
ineffective, do-good, peanut-farming president, on one hand, and the 
fall of the "evil empire," a growing economy, and a can-do, movie-star 
president on the other? In Britain, what explained the leap between a 
lagging economy built on nationalized industry and a complacent, 
deal-making, gray-headed socialist on one hand and a revitalized 
market-centered economy set free by a fiery blonde "Iron Lady" on 
the other? Across the globe, what changed to transform two moribund 
economies into two burgeoning economies that were the marvel of 
and model for much of the world? In brief, what changed was the 
meta script. 
When Thatcher stepped into power, she strode confidently, 
doubtless about how to steer her country toward success. She carried 
new ideas and a firm determination to implement them. In the words 
of two authors who studied her rise: 
Margaret Thatcher knew exactly what she thought. Government was 
doing too much. "We should not expect the state," she declared not long 
after taking office, "to appear in the guise of an extravagant good fairy at 
26. See, e.g., ECON. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 3. 
27. See generally YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, ch. 5 (describing the "crisis in 
confidence" that led countries to follow the lead of the U.S. and Britain toward market­
based economies). 
28. See id. at 187. 
29. We summarize an important example of that convergence - that is, in the macro 
script of corporate law - and examine some of its causes and effects in other work. See 
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: False Starts in the Races for Corporate 
Law (work in progress, on file with authors) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, False Starts]; 
Chen & Hanson, Testing Shareholder Primacy, supra note 12. 
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every christening, a loquacious companion at every stage of life's 
journey, and the unknown mourner at every funeral." She wanted to 
replace what she called the "Nanny State" and its cradle-to-grave 
"coddling" with the much more bracing risks and rewards of the 
"enterprise culture. "30 
1 1  
Ronald Reagan was cut from the same ideological cloth.31 Indeed, 
it was his ideological hankering, more than his Hollywood 
background, that made him stand out: 
Reagan was [initially] regarded as outside the mainstream of American 
politics, a genial figure from the far right. He was an ideologue using a 
vocabulary made obsolete by [Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. He talked 
about rolling back government and] cutting programs; he promoted free 
enterprise and celebrated the magic of the market. That was 
understandable if one was a spokesman for General Electric . . . .  But 
surely that was not the kind of rhetoric that was expected of a president 
of the United States.32 
In short, Thatcher and Reagan were kindred spirits.33 They both 
embraced and made famous a version of what would become the 
modern (post-Keynesian) summary meta script: "markets good; 
regulation bad." 
But the success of these leaders did not turn on their creative 
genius. They were not peddling their own ideas. Rather, their success 
resulted from their effectiveness as de facto spokespeople for the 
scholars generating the ideas upon which the meta script was based. 
As new replaced old in the political arena, a revolution was taking 
place within economics, with scholars like England's John Maynard 
Keynes and his American student John Kenneth Galbraith supplanted 
30. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 108. 
31.  As Lou Cannon writes: 
Reagan's principal mission in the presidency, or so he thought, was to rein in a government 
he considered an obstacle to economic opportunity and human liberty. His complaint that 
the federal government had 'overspent, overestimated and overregulated' changed iittle 
over the years, but the audience for this message grew steadily larger during the 1970s. 
CANNON, supra note 24, at 819 (quoting Lou Cannon, Reagan Announces, Urges Strength at 
Home, Abroad, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1979). 
32. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 329. As Murray Weidenbaum, Reagan's 
first chairman of his Council of Economic Advisers, explained, "As we see it, the most 
appropriate role for government economic policy is to provide a stable framework in which 
private individuals and business firms can plan confidently and make their own decisions." 
See GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY 
DILEMMA 2 (1984) (quoting Murray L. Weidenbaum, Economic Policy for 1982, Address 
Before the National Ocean Industries Association (Mar. 8, 1982)). 
33. As Lou Cannon writes, at their first meeting "[Reagan and Thatcher] hit if off 
immediately, talking for more than an hour about the need for economic reform in Britain 
and the United States." CANNON, supra note 24, at 464. Reagan and Thatcher shared a 
belief that, in Reagan's words, "people will stay free when enterprise remains free." Id. 
(quoting President Ronald Reagan, Remarks Made During Margaret Thatcher's Visit to 
Washington D.C. (Feb. 26, 1981)). 
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by the competing ideas of Friedrich von Hayek of the "Austrian 
School" of economics and Milton Friedman and other members of his 
"Chicago School." 
Hayek's ideas, many of which were contained in readable and, as it 
turns out, widely read books such as The Road to Serfdom, eventually 
won him the Nobel Prize in Economics.34 For most of the twentieth 
century, however, Hayek found his ideas relegated to the distant 
periphery of economics and beyond the pale for policymakers.35 But 
Hayek, who labored in the vast shadow of Keynes, was undeterred by 
obscurity and pursued his thesis with the confidence and energy of 
someone whose ideas were changing the world. Perhaps he was 
prescient. In any event, his perseverance paid off. 
By making the invisible hand visible, Hayek's conclusions, which 
had once seemed obviously wrong, have become our obviously correct 
starting point. Thus, when Lawrence Summers, Harvard University's 
current President, teaches economics these days, he teaches students 
that '"the single most important thing to learn from an economics 
course today . . .  is the view that the invisible hand is more powerful 
than the [ un ]hidden hand. Things will happen in well-organized efforts 
without direction, controls, plans. That's the consensus among 
economists. That's the Hayek legacy. "'36 And that legacy is why 
Vernon Smith, the 2003 Nobel Laureate in Economics, calls Hayek 
"the leading economic thinker of the 20th century,"37 and why one 
writer recently referred to the twentieth century itself as the "Hayek 
Century."38 
It was on Hayek's pro-market and anti-regulatory conclusions that 
Margaret Thatcher based her agenda. Hayek, she left no doubt, was 
her visionary. On a visit to the Conservative Party's research 
department, for instance, one of the members was extolling the virtues 
34. See, e.g. , FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948) 
(hereinafter HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER); F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY 
NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY (Augustus M. Kelley 1964) (1937); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); FRIEDRICH A. VON 
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
35. Interview by Thomas W. Hazlett with F.A. Hayek, supra note 2, at 29 ("But within 
the economics profession it is no secret that Hayek was an academic outcast, a throwback, a 
marginal character whose ideas had been neatly disproven to all reasonable men in the 
scientific journals of his day."). 
36. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 150-51 (quoting Lawrence Summers). 
37. Vernon L. Smith, Reflections on Human Action after 50 Years, 19 CATO J. 195, 208 
(1999). 
38. John Cassidy, The Hayek Century, HOOVER DIG., Summer 2000, http://www­
hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/003/cassidy.html#top; see also MULLER, supra note 
14, at 384 ("All in all, the 1980s and 1990s were a Hayekian moment, when his once untimely 
liberalism came to be seen as timely."). 
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of a middle course between right and left when she, according to one 
report, "brusquely interrupted him"39 and 
reached into her briefcase and pulled out . . .  Hayek's The Constitution of 
Liberty. She held it up for all to see. "This," she said sternly, "is what we 
believe." She slammed it down on the table and then proceeded to 
deliver a monologue on the ills of the British economy.40 
In her various books and memoirs, Margaret Thatcher has, since her 
years as prime minister, continued to echo her allegiance to Hayek's 
ideas.41 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Ronald Reagan was 
singing from the same hymnbook. Reagan had read and absorbed 
some of Hayek's work.42 And like Hayek, who saw the market as a 
marvel, Reagan touted the market's "magic." In a speech early in 
his presidency, Reagan urged his audience to place their faith in 
that magic: 
We who live in free market societies believe that growth, prosperity, 
and ultimately human fulfillment, are created from the bottom up, not 
the government down. Only when the human spirit is allowed to invent 
and create, only when individuals are given a personal stake in deciding 
economic policies and benefiting from their success - only then can 
societies remain economically alive, dynamic, prosperous, progressive 
and free. 
Trust the people. This is the one irrefutable lesson of the entire 
postwar period contradicting the notion that rigid government controls 
are essential to economic development. 
The societies which have achieved the most spectacular, broad-based 
economic progress in the shortest period of time are not the most tightly 
controlled, nor necessarily the biggest in size, or the wealthiest in natural 
39. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 107. 
40. Id. ; see also JOHN RANELAGH, THATCHER'S PEOPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF 
THE POLITICS, THE POWER, AND THE PERSONALITIES ix (1991) (recounting the same 
anecdote). 
41. See, e.g., MARGARET THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 12-13 (1993) 
(stating that "Hayek's powerful Road to Serfdom" had "left a permanent mark on my own 
political character, making me a long-term optimist for free enterprise and liberty"); id. at 
618 (calling "Adam Smith . . .  the greatest exponent of free enterprise economics till Hayek 
and Friedman"); MARGARET THATCHER, THE PATH TO POWER 50 (1995) ("(T]he most 
powerful critique of socialist planning and the socialist state which I read at this time, and to 
which I have returned so often since [was] F.A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom . . . .  ") . 
42. When asked about which "thinkers or writers most influenced [his] conduct as a 
leader, as a person," Reagan put Hayek near the top of his list. See ROWLAND EVANS & 
ROBERT NOVAK, THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 229 (1981); see also MARTIN ANDERSON, 
REVOLUTION 164 (1988) (writing that Reagan had "read and studied the writings of some of 
the best economists in the world, including the giants of the free market economy - Ludwig 
von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman"). 
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resources. No, what unites them all is their willingness to believe in the 
magic of the market place.43 
Perhaps even more important, Reagan surrounded himself with 
advisors who were themselves versed in Hayek's work and devoted to 
advancing the same free-market agenda. They were the group of 
economists from the University of Chicago, where Hayek had been in 
residence during the 1950s.44 Among them was Milton Friedman, 
whose career, in many ways, resembled Hayek's.45 
Though initially marginalized by the macroeconomic views of 
Keynes and Keynesianism, Friedman emerged as America's, and 
perhaps the world's, best-known free marketeer. Like Hayek, he 
would later win the Nobel Prize in Economics, and authored 
numerous popular books espousing his views, such as Free to Choose46 
(co-authored with his wife, Rose Friedman) and Capitalism and 
Freedom.47 As those titles suggest, Friedman embraced two central 
premises as the foundation for policymaking: markets good; regulation 
bad. Those were, more generally, the premises of the Chicago School: 
43. Ronald Reagan, The Magic of the Market Place: We Cannot Have Prosperity 
without Economic Freedom, Remarks at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Board of 
Governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Sept. 29, 1981), in 48 
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 34 (Nov. 1, 1981). The metaphor of market as God is quite 
common, as is the belief that one need only have faith in the market to begin enjoying its 
benefits. See Harvey Cox, The Market as God: Living the New Dispensation, ATLANTIC, 
Mar. 1999, at 18 (describing the "business theology"); infra note 71 (providing example from 
Schwarzenegger); see also Thomas Frank, The Rise of Market Populism, NATION, Oct. 30, 
2000, at 13 (describing the growing faith in market populism during the 1990s). 
44. Note that Hayek was not actually in the economics department, which prided itself 
on mathematical rigor and productivity. Jerry Muller describes the situation as follows: 
Whether because of the notoriety of The Road to Serfdom or because economists viewed his 
work on monetary theory as outdated, Hayek found it difficult to find a job at an economics 
department at a major American university. After failed overtures to a number of 
institutions, the chairman of the University of Chicago's Committee on Social Thought 
worked out an unusual arrangement by which Hayek became professor of social and moral 
science there, his salary paid by a private American foundation, the Volker Charities Fund. 
MULLER, supra note 14, at 369 (footnote omitted) .  
45. Friedman and Hayek began sharing and debating ideas in  the late 1940s through 
"the most influential society you have never heard of - the Mont Pelerin Society, . . .  [an] 
association of laissez faire thinkers" brought together in Switzerland by Hayek. George F. 
Will, Milton Friedman at 90: Man of the Century, HOOVER DIG. , Fall 2002, http://www. 
hooverdigest.org/024/will.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004); see also YERGIN & STANISLAW, 
supra note 19, at 126-27. For a complete history of the Society and its influence, see R.M. 
HARTWELL, A HISTORY OF THE MONT PELERIN SOCIETY (1995). George Stigler's 
autobiography includes a photograph of himself, Aaron Director, and Milton Friedman. 
Beneath it, the caption reads: "(W]earing (their] conservative hats' at the first Mont Pelerin 
Society meeting in 1947." Stigler's caption includes this quip from Stigler: "The Society 
might better have been called the 'Friends of Friedrich Hayek."' GEORGE J. STIGLER, 
MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 1 16 (1988). 
46. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980). 
47. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
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The Chicago economists believed, in practice, in a very small number 
of theorems about the way decision makers allocated resources and the 
ways these allocations led to prices. They trusted in markets and the 
effectiveness of competition. Left to their own devices, markets 
produced the best outcomes. Prices were the best allocators of resources. 
Any intervention to change what markets, left alone, would achieve was 
likely to be counterproductive. For the Chicago economists, the 
conclusions for government policy were clear: Wherever possible, private 
activity should take over from public activity. The less government did, 
the better.48 
15 
More efficiently, Friedman himself recently summarized the view 
of the Chicago School as "a strong belief in minimal government and 
an emphasis on free markets as a way to control the economy."49 In a 
video version of "Free to Choose," Friedman summarizes the lessons 
of Chicago-School economics with the aid of a pencil. He asks how it 
happened that "literally thousands of people [from all over the world] 
cooperated to make this pencil. People who don't speak the same 
language, who practice difference religions, who might hate one 
another if they ever met . . . .  What brought them together and induced 
them to cooperate to make this pencil?"50 What Hayek described as a 
marvel, Friedman called "magic": 
It was the magic of the price system . . .  that brought them together and 
got them to cooperate to make this pencil so that you could have it for a 
trifling sum. That is why the operation of the free market is so essential, 
not only to promote productive efficiency, but even more to foster 
harmony and peace among the peoples of the world.51 
It should not be any surprise that Friedman's career was also 
highly connected with Hayek's, a point that he recently highlighted in 
his memoirs,52 or that Friedman is hailed as one of the most influential 
intellectuals of his day.53 But the important lesson, from our vantage 
point, is that the source of the Thatcher and Reagan revolutions 
was, at its core, a revolution in the meta script. Milton Friedman, 
speaking of Reagan and Thatcher's success, puts the lesson in the 
following terms: 
48. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 146. 
49. COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BA TILE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (PBS 2002). 
50. Free to Choose: Vol. /: The Power of the Market: The Pencil Story (PBS television 
broadcast, Jan. 11 ,  1980), http://www.ideachannel.com/FreeToChoose.htm (last visited Oct. 
9, 2004). 
51. Id. 
52. See MILTON & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, Two LUCKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 333 (1998); see 
also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
53. See, e.g. , Will, supra note 45 (celebrating Friedman "as America's most 
consequential public intellectual of the twentieth century"). 
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[B]oth of them faced similar situations. And both of them, fortunately, 
had exposure to similar ideas. And they reinforced one another. Each 
saw the success of the other. I think that the coincidence of Thatcher and 
Reagan having been in office at the same time was enormously 
important for the public acceptance, worldwide, of a different approach 
to economic and monetary policy.54 
Thomas Sowell, economic historian at the Hoover Institute, similarly 
attributes the dramatic changes of the late twentieth century to a 
dramatic change in visions: 
The 20th Century looked for many decades as if it were going to be the 
century of collectivism . . . . Anyone who would have predicted the 
reversal of this trend . . .  would have been considered mad just a dozen 
years ago. Innumerable factors led to [the reversal], not the least of 
which was the bitter experience of seeing "rational planning" degenerate 
into economic chaos and Utopian dreams turned into police-state 
nightmares. Still, it takes a vision to beat a vision . . . .  An alternative 
vision had to become viable before the reversal of the collectivist tide 
could begin with Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the 
United States. That vision came from many sources, but if one point in 
time could mark the beginning of the intellectual turning of the tide 
which made later political changes possible, it was the publication of The 
Road to Serfdom by Friedrich A. Hayek.55 
And so it was that the world was more or less transformed by a new 
meta script. 56 
54. Interview by PBS with Milton Friedman (Oct. 1, 2000), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_miltonfriedman.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
55. Thomas Sowell, A Road to Hell Paved with Good Intentions, FORBES, Jan. 17, 1994, 
at 60. 
56. Nineteen Nobel Prizes have gone to economists who are more or less associated 
with the Chicago School. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 19, at 149. As further 
evidence of the meta script's influence, a number of think tanks that espouse an explicit 
commitment to the summary meta script are consistently ranked as among the most cited in 
the United States. See Fairness in Accuracy and Reporting, Think Tank Monitor, at 
http://www.fair.org/reports/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) (ranking think tanks by 
annual citations in the media). For example, the Heritage Foundation (ranked third in 2002), 
see id., states on its website: "We believe . . .  in individual liberty, free enterprise, limited 
government, a strong national defense, and traditional American values." The Heritage 
Foundation, About the Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org/About/about 
Heritage.cfm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). The fourth-ranking American Enterprise Institute, 
see Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Citation of Think Tanks in Media, at http://www. 
fair.org/extra/0307/thinktanks2002.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2004), states that it "is 
dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of freedom - limited 
government, private enterprise, vital cultural and political institutions, and a strong foreign 
policy and national defense . . . .  " The American Enterprise Institute, About AEI, at 
http://www.aei.org/about/filter./default.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). And the sixth-ranking 
Cato Institute, see Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Citation of Think Tanks in Media, at 
http://www.fair.org/extra/0307/thinktanks2002.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2004), is similarly 
explicit in its mission "to broaden the parameters of public policy debate to allow 
consideration of the traditional American principles of limited government, individual 
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Today, simply listening to the pronouncements of policymakers, 
we come face to face with evidence that the summary meta script 
permeates the policy apparatus. Reagan was by no means the last 
president to embrace the basic tenets of the meta script. In Bill 
Clinton's 1995 State of the Union Address, he elaborated the "New 
Covenant"57 of government policymaking. He complained about the 
extent to which moneyed interests seemed to exert more than their 
fair share of influence in Washington, a problem that he felt was 
getting worse: 
Three times as many lobbyists are in the streets and corridors of 
Washington as were here 20 years ago. The American people look at 
liberty, free markets and peace." The Cato Institute, About CATO, at http://www.cato.org/ 
about/about.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). 
It bears noting that even those think tanks, commentators, scholars, and policymakers 
that seem much less committed to the truth of the meta script are nonetheless tremendously 
influenced by it. At the risk of overgeneralizing, "centrists" tend to accept the meta script 
but see failure in markets and solutions in regulation more readily than do "conservative" 
proponents of the meta script. Their burden of proof in favor of regulation is lower than that 
of their libertarian counterparts. Compare BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE 
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE 30 (1998), noting that 
[ t ]he rhetorical trope that less state action should be the rule to which one recognized 
exceptions only as necessary was widely adopted by more progressive liberals as well, 
although (not surprisingly) they tended to find necessity with far more frequency than did 
their individualist counterparts. 'State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be 
a good,' declared Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1881. 
For example, the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (a cooperative 
effort between the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute) has issued a 
number of reports analyzing regulation and providing recommendations for how to improve 
the regulatory process. See AEI-Brookings Joint Center, Welcome to the A EI-Brookings 
Joint Center, at www.aei.brookings.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). Such reports begin with 
the premise, as in the meta script, that regulation can be terribly costly and therefore must 
be justified rigorously. In recent testimony, the Center's Directors observe that 
[a ]!though regulations often have no direct fiscal impact, they pose real costs to consumers 
as well as businesses. Regulations aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment 
alone cost over $200 billion annual or about 2% of GDP. Yet, the economic impact of 
federal regulation receives much less scrutiny than the budget. 
How to Improve Regulatory Accounting: Costs, Benefits and Impacts of Federal Regulations: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res., and Regulatory Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 51-40 (2003) (Joint statement of Robert W. 
Hahn and Robert E.  Litan, Directors, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies), 
http://www.aei.brookings.orgipublications/abstract.php?pid =317. 
Meanwhile, even "progressives," in order to have influence or even an audience, are 
constrained by the power of the meta script to frame their arguments largely in terms of 
failed markets. See infra text accompanying notes 57-62. 
57. In Clinton's 1995 State of the Union address, he explained that the 
New Covenant is a new set of understandings for how we can equip our people to meet the 
challenges of the new economy, how we can change the way our Government works to fit a 
different time and, above all, how we can repair the damaged bonds in our society and come 
together behind our common purpose. We must have dramatic change in our economy, our 
Government and ourselves. 
President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 1995), http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
usa/infousa/facts/speeches/clinton/95-1.txt [hereinafter 1995 State of the Union Address]. 
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their capital and they see a city where the well-connected and the well­
protected can work the system, but the interests of ordinary citizens are 
often left out.58 
Picking up other elements of the meta script, this New Democrat59 
then explained the need to disempower regulators and empower 
individuals through private, decentralized, market systems: 
The New Covenant approach to governing is as different from the old 
bureaucratic way as the computer is from the manual typewriter. The old 
way of governing around here protected organized interests; we should 
look out for the interests of ordinary people . . . .  
The old way dispensed services through large, top-down, inflexible 
bureaucracies. The New Covenant way should shift these resources and 
decisionmaking from bureaucrats to citizens, injecting choice and 
competition and individual responsibility into national policy. 
The old way of governing around here actually seemed to reward 
failure. The New Covenant way should have built-in incentives to reward 
success.60 
It is not, of course, the case that Clinton felt that all regulation is bad 
or that all market outcomes are desirable.61 But what seems clear is 
that the meta script played a significant role in anchoring his policy 
perspective and in the trajectory of his policy agenda.62 
58. Id. 
59. For a thorough description of how the Democratic Party's agenda was transformed, 
beginning in the mid-1980s, to include such goals as the elimination of "big government" and 
welfare reform, see KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS: THE POLITICS OF 
LIBERALISM FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON passim (2000). 
60. Id. 
61. For example, in his 1996 State of the Union address, Clinton put it this way: 
We know big government does not have all the answers. We know there's not a program 
for every problem. We have worked to give the American people a smaller, less bureaucratic 
government in Washington . . . .  The era of big government is over. But we cannot go back to 
the time when our citizens were left to fend for themselves. Instead, we must go forward as 
one America, one nation working together to meet the challenges we face together. Self­
reliance and teamwork are not opposing virtues; we must have both. 
President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou96.htm#budget. 
62. Even in circumstances in which governmental regulation was deemed appropriate, 
the meta-schematic presumptions in favor of decentralization and individual choice still 
carried considerable weight: 
[W]e need to get Government closer to the people it's meant to serve. We need to help 
move programs down to the point where states and communities and private citizens in the 
private sector can do a better job. If they can do it, we ought to let them do it. We should get 
out of the way and let them do what they can do better. 
1995 State of the Union Address, supra note 57; cf Steven Croley, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 827-29 (2003) 
(comparing Clinton's approach to Reagan's, including the fact that "the Clinton order 
embodied both the substantive and procedural aspects of the Reagan orders - imposing 
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Our current president is often more explicit in his adherence to the 
meta script. In a speech honoring Milton Friedman for his life's work, 
for instance, President George W. Bush observed that Friedman's 
"vision has changed America and it is changing the world"63: 
Milton Friedman has shown us that when government attempts to 
substitute its own judgments for the judgments of free people, the results 
are usually disastrous. In contrast to the free market's invisible hand, 
which improves the lives of people, the government's invisible foot 
tramples on people's hopes and destroys their dreams. 
He has never claimed that free markets are perfect. Yet he has 
demonstrated that even an imperfect market produces better results than 
arrogant experts and grasping bureaucrats. But Milton Friedman does 
not object to government controls solely because they are ineffective. His 
deeper objectives flow from a moral framework. He has taught us that a 
free market system's main justification is its moral strength. Human 
freedom serves the cause of human dignity. Freedom rewards creativity 
and work, and you cannot reduce freedom in our economy without 
reducing freedom in our lives.64 
Bush notes that Friedman's "viewpoint was once controversial, as was 
Milton Friedman, himself"65: 
When he began his work, the conventional wisdom held that capitalism's 
days were numbered. Free market systems were thought to be unsuited 
to modern problems. Today we recognize that free markets are the great 
engines of economic development. They are the source of wealth, and 
the hope of a world weary of poverty and weary of oppression.66 
As Bush observes, events that have unfolded as far away as Chile, 
Russia, Sweden, and China "demonstrate that the rest of the world is 
finally catching up with Milton Friedman."67 And, illustrating the meta 
script's applicability to all policy areas, Bush notes that Friedman "has 
creatively applied the power of freedom to the problems of our own 
country, and in the process he has become an influential social 
reformer," shaping policies ranging from "national security" 
(Friedman was "the intellectual godfather of our all-volunteer army") 
to "educational reform."68 
cost benefit criteria for major rules and designating OMB as the central overseer and 
clearinghouse for agency rulemaking"). 
63. President George W. Bush, Remarks in Tribute to Milton Friedman (May 9, 2002), 
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In light of President Bush's high regard for Friedman and the 
power of the basic markets-good, regulation-bad in our culture, it is 
little surprise that they were main themes in Bush campaign ads. In 
one television ad, "Healthcare: Practical Vs. Big Government," the 
voters are encouraged to see the choice between Bush and Kerry as 
the choice between free markets and regulation: 
On healthcare . . .  
President Bush and our leaders in Congress have a practical plan: 
Allow small businesses to join together to get lower insurance rates big 
companies get. 
Stop frivolous lawsuits against doctors. 
Health coverage you can take with you. 
* * * 
The Liberals in Congress and Kerry's Plan: 
Washington bureaucrats in control. 
A government-run healthcare plan. 
1.5 trillion dollar price tag.69 
Another theme of the campaign is ownership and building an 
"ownership society," or, in other words, a society that relies more on 
markets and less on government.70 In one advertisement President 
Bush explains: 
69. Healthcare: Practical vs. Big Government (Bush-Cheney '04 television advertise­
ment, Fall 2004), http://www.georgewbush.com/KerryMediaCenter/Read.aspx?ID=3512 (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2004) (script), http://www.georgewbush.com/News/MultiMedia/Player.aspx? 
ID=1018&T=5&PT= (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) (video). 
70. President Bush wasn't the only one promoting the meta script. Senator Kerry also 
proved a strong adherent, at times appearing to compete with President Bush over who was 
the most fervent believer. As the Kerry-Edwards "Plan for America" made clear, the 
triumphs of the 20th century were as much about free markets as about democracy: 
"Throughout the 20th century, America's most trusted and reliable allies were the 
democracies of Europe; together, the two sides of the Atlantic ensured that democracy and 
free markets prevailed against all challenges." JOHN KERRY & JOHN EDWARDS, OUR PLAN 
FOR AMERICA: STRONGER AT HOME, RESPECTED IN THE WORLD 34-35 (2004), available at 
http://www.johnkerry.com/pdf/our_plan_for_america.pdf. And as Kerry also made clear, his 
goal was to "[i]mplement regulatory reforms that are pro-market and pro-consumer." The 
Kerry-Edwards Plan to Foster a Climate for America's Businesses to Create Good-Paying 
Jobs, available at http://www.johnkerry.com/pdf/pr_2004_0804.pdf [hereinafter Kerry­
Edwards Plan). 
The Kerry Plan promoted both the "markets good" and "regulation bad" sides of the 
meta script, arguing, "Too often, the Bush Administration has used regulatory reform to bail 
out corporations rather than promote true competition. As a result, regulations are standing 
in the way of efficiency improvements in many industries that would benefit consumers and 
businesses. As president, John Kerry will implement regulatory reforms that use market­
based incentives while protecting the environment and consumers against abuses." Kerry­
Edwards Plan, supra; see also Jacob M. Schlesinger & John Harwood, Kerry Pitches Pro­
Business Side Of His Platform, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at Al ("Mr. Kerry called himself a 
Democrat who 'respects the laws of economics, and how money works, the psychology of the 
marketplace, the importance of confidence and fiscal responsibility."'). 
Thus, even the virtues of regulation were cast in light of the power of markets. As Kerry 
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One of the most important parts of a reform agenda is to encourage 
people to own something. Own their own home, own their own business, 
own their own health care plan, or own a piece of their retirement. 
Reforms that trust the people, reforms that say government must stand 
on the side of people. Because I understand if you own something, you 
have a vital stake in the future of America.71 
21 
argued, "Our economic strategy recognizes that government does not create jobs or produce 
economic growth. Free markets, honest competition, America's entrepreneurial sprit 
and hard work do that. But the right public policies can foster an environment that 
makes strong growth and job creation easier, and the wrong policies can hurt. 
We understand that the right policies can promote an economic climate that will lay the 
foundation for private sector investment, foster vigorous competition, and strengthen the 
foundations of an innovative economy." KERRY & EDWARDS, supra, at 62. 
That devotion to the meta script was no change in policy, but a natural extension of the 
faith in markets and suspicion of government that had characterized the Clinton years. See 
infra text accompanying note 57-62. As one reporter described the Kerry campaign: "Fiscal 
responsibility and deficit reduction, hallmarks of the Clinton years, are bedrock orthodoxy 
in the Kerry camp, too . . . .  So is faith in the private sector's powers to generate prosperity. 
Job creation will come from corporate America, not government, once the right incentives 
and subsidies are in place, the war room says. In fact, the Clinton-era god of deficit reduction 
and private-sector supremacy is also worshiped in the Kerry camp." Louis Uchitelle, 
A Kerry Team, A Clinton Touch, N.Y. nMES, March 28, 2004, § 3 at 1. Kerry's approach to 
student loans was an apt illustration of the way in which the meta script informed his 
approach even to minor campaign issues. As the Kerry touted: "I believe in free 
markets, and I believe Congress shouldn't be setting profits for banks. We need a market­
based auction where banks get student loan business based on their ability to offer the best 
service at the lowest price." See Press Release, John Kerry Website, Kerry Statement on 
Student Loans, (Apr. 27, 2004), at http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/releases/pr_2004_ 
0427a.html. 
71. The ad is entitled "Ownership." See Ownership (Bush-Cheney '04 television 
advertisement, Fall 2004), http://www.georgewbush.com/News/Read.aspx?ID=3208 (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2004) (script). 
The rising star of the Republican Party, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, makes his 
allegiance to the Friedman meta scripts at least as evident as President Bush does. When 
campaigning for Governor, Schwarzenegger wrote this in the Wall Street Journal: 
I have often said that the two people who have most profoundly impacted my thinking on 
economics are Milton Friedman and Adam Smith. At Christmas I sometimes annoy some of 
my more liberal Hollywood friends by sending them a gift of Mr. Friedman's classic 
economic primer, "Free to Choose." What I learned from Messrs. Friedman and Smith is a 
lesson that every political leader should never forget: that when the heavy fist of government 
becomes too overbearing and intrusive, it stifles the unlimited wealth creation process of a 
free people operating under a free enterprise system. 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, My Economic Policy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2003, at A20, available 
at http://www.opinionjoumal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=ll0004058 (Sept. 24, 2003) .  
Schwarzenegger went on to describe California's woes as  the predictable consequences of 
deviating from the Friedman prescription. And he concluded his analysis with this promise: 
"Our state will prosper again when we commit ourselves in California to 'Free to Choose' 
economics. This means removing, one by one, the innumerable impediments to growth­
excessive taxes, regulations, and deficit-spending. If we do this we will bring California back 
as the untarnished Golden State." Id. 
Then, in his keynote speech at the Republican National Convention, Governor 
Schwarzenegger brought thrills to the crowd by sounding the same themes: "If you believe a 
person should be treated as an individual, not as a member of an interest group, then you are 
a Republican. If you believe your family knows how to spend your money better than the 
government does, then you are a Republican." Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Keynote 
Speech at the Republication National Convention (Aug. 31, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/ 
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Given the key role the presidents play in shaping and legitimating 
the work of administrative agencies,72 it makes sense that even 
"regulators" the "invisible feet". are today eloquent 
spokespeople for the pro-market, anti-regulation schema.73 For 
example, Michael Powell, Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, echoes the meta script when he describes the objective of 
the FCC: 
[A well structured market policy] allows market forces to calibrate 
pricing to meet supply and demand. Consumers get the most cost­
efficient prices and enjoy the benefits of business efficiencies. 
The result for consumers is better, more cutting edge products, at 
lower prices. 
Contrary to the classic bugaboo that markets are just things that favor 
big business and big money, market policies have a winning record of 
delivering benefits to consumers that dwarfs the consumer record of 
government central economic planning. Thus, if you are truly committed 
to serving the public interest, bet on a winner and bet on market policy. 74 
In short, markets are good, and have the ability to deliver benefits that 
dwarf anything that "government central economic planning" could 
deliver. Powell once summed up his faith in the market's magic this 
way: "My religion is the market."7 5 
2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/31/gop.schwarzenegger.transcript/index.html. Indeed, the most 
memorable line of the speech was probably a Reaganesque call to faith in the magic of 
markets: "Now, there's another way you can tell you're a Republican. You have faith in free 
enterprise, faith in the resourcefulness of the American people and faith in the U.S. 
economy. And to those critics who are so pessimistic about our economy, I say: Don't be 
economic girlie-men."  Id. 
72. See Croley, supra note 62, at 821-22 (describing the heightened procedural and 
substantive intervention of Presidents in regulatory process, beginning with Ronald 
Reagan's pursuit of a deregulatory agenda); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: 
Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 
569-88 (2003) (summarizing the key role played by the President in legitimating agency 
activity that otherwise appears undemocratic). 
73. Of course, the fact that recent presidents have more or less embraced one or another 
version of the meta schemas for policymaking may simply reflect popular conceptions, which 
the regulators' views likely also reflect. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) 
("Citizens vote for a president based almost wholly on a perception of the difference that 
one or another candidate might make to general governmental policies."); Mark Seidenfeld, 
Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 429, 486 (1999) (explaining that voting turns on voter perceptions of candidates' 
general ideologies); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 ,  1568-69 (1992) (same). 
74. Chairman Michael K. Powell, Consumer Policy in Competitive Markets, Remarks 
Before the Federal Communications Association (June 21,  2001), at http:l/www.fcc.gov/ 
Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp106.html. 
75. Paul Davidson, FCC Chief Powell Believes in Free Market, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 
2002, at Bl, available at http:l/www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/02/06/fcc-powell.htm. 
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Similarly, Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner of the Federal Trade 
Commission, described how the meta script had captured the 
imaginations of the Commissioners of the FTC: 
Although we may differ on the facts of individual cases, all of my 
colleagues agree that the objective is to maximize efficient outcomes. We 
all start in the same place and we are all trying to do the same thing. This 
broad consensus is a great demonstration of the power of ideas and, in 
my view, has made an immense contribution to consumer welfare. 76 
It is no exaggeration that policymakers today "all start in the same 
place" - from the viewpoint of the summary meta script and its 
presumption that markets are good and regulation is bad.77 
B. The Meta Script: Elaborating the Summary Script 
The previous Section provided a brief account of the power of a 
new meta script - but only the summary version of that script. We 
have yet to explore the full version of the meta script. This Section 
elucidates some of its key details. 
1. Austria's Basic Script 
Hayek, together with other members of the Austrian School, laid 
the foundation for the meta script. But the cornerstone, they claimed, 
had been placed by Adam Smith himself: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to 
employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and so to direct 
that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society 
as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring 
the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only his 
own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for 
the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
76. Thomas B. Leary, The Federal Trade Commission and the Defense of Free Markets, 
Speech to the David T. Chase Free Enterprise Institute (Oct. 7, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speeches/leary/willimantic.pdf (last updated Aug. 15, 2003). 
77. James Boyle has recently described how, " [o]ver the last 25 years, . . .  the influential 
'Chicago School' of lawyers and economists" has transformed antitrust law with the same 
sort of consumer-welfare based markets-are-good and regulation-is-bad arguments that we 
have been describing. See James Boyle, Missing the Point on Microsoft, SALON, Apr. 7, 2000, 
at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/04/07/greenspan/index.html. And as Boyle goes 
on to illustrate, "[t]his point of view has no less a supporter than Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan." Id. 
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frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it.78 
The Austrians built around that famous invisible hand metaphor, 
supplementing it with arguments that were easy to grasp and hard to 
refute. 
To allocate resources in a society efficiently, Hayek explained, a 
great deal of information or knowledge must be brought to bear on 
the process.79 To know who is best able to work for whom, and what 
products are most desired, and how the various factors of production 
should be mobilized, is to know more than any single individual or 
entity can possibly know.80 Because of that imperfect knowledge, 
institutions of the state that attempt centrally to plan the movements 
of society's scarce resources are certain to perform poorly, no matter 
how well intentioned their efforts. 
Markets are a different story.81 Markets rely on prices, and prices 
carry the information that any one institution could otherwise not 
obtain. If a resource is particularly highly valued, its price will reflect 
that. If one person is better suited for a job than another, wages will 
ensure that the former gets the position.82 If more leather is needed 
quickly to make shoes and furniture, then the promise of profits will 
automatically stimulate its production. At no time does a central 
planner need to understand why resources are moving as they are or 
attempt to anticipate how their movements ought to change next 
week.83 The market, as Hayek put it, is a "marvel": 
The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, 
without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of 
people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity 
could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the 
material or its products more sparingly; that is, they move in the right 
direction.84 
The allocation of resources through regulation is, Hayek would 
add, destined for failure: 
The government should certainly cease doing a great many things it does 
now. In that sense it depends upon the government ceasing to do things, 
78. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 
Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). 
79. See HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 77-91. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. at 92-108; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (Augustus M. 
Kelley 1966) (1931) (hereinafter HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION]. 
83. See HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODt;CTION, supra note 82. 
84. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY 15 (Institute for 
Humane Studies, Inc. 1945) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY]. 
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and then that would open the possibility for other developments which 
you cannot guide and direct. Take the general complaint about British 
entrepreneurs being inefficient, lazy, and so on. All of this is a result of 
institutions. You would soon drive out the inefficient entrepreneur if 
there was more competition. And you would soon find that they would 
work hard if it was in their interest to do so. It is the set of institutions 
which now prevails which creates the new attitudes which are so 
inimitable to prosperity.s5 
Thus, even the detailed script is extremely simple. Central planners, 
no matter their noble intentions and no matter how good their plans 
may look on paper, have neither the knowledge nor the incentives 
they would need to bring together the unique and hidden preferences 
of millions of people,s6 and the unique and hidden costs of potential 
suppliers.s7 
As noted above, people had a difficult time appreciating the 
soundness of that script because of an ill-informed distrust of 
institutions that move because of greed and an ill-placed faith in 
institutions that purport to be motivated by a concern for our well­
being.ss The institution's motive is, according to this view, essentially 
an illusion. 
85. Interview by Thomas W. Hazlett with F.A. Hayek, supra note 2, at 33-34. 
86. This argument against regulation and for markets turns in part upon the 
dispositionist view of consumers - a conception that is widely held but deeply flawed. See 
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4, passim; see also Jon Hanson & 
Adam Wright, In the Driver's Seat: Why Promoting Dispositionism Is Good for Business (in 
progress) (on file with authors) (describing in some detail how the dominant dispositionist 
conception of the human actor is good for, and thus promoted by, large commercial 
interests). 
87. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, when awarding him the Nobel Prize, 
offered this summary of Hayek's work: 
The Academy is of the opinion that von Hayek's analysis of the functional efficiency of 
different economic systems is one of his most significant contributions to economic research 
in the broader sense. From the mid-thirties he embarked on penetrating studies of the 
problems of centralized planning . . . . He presented new ideas with regard to basic 
difficulties in "socialistic calculating", and investigated the possibilities of achieving effective 
results by decentralized "market socialism" in various forms. His guiding principle when 
comparing various systems is to study how efficiently all the knowledge and all the 
information dispersed among individuals and enterprises is utilized. His conclusion is that 
only by far-reaching decentralization in a market system with competition and free price­
fixing is it possible to make full use of knowledge and information. 
Press Release, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of 
Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1974 (Oct. 9, 1974), 
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/press.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). 
88. Hayek has suggested a related reason why we fail to appreciate the marvel of the 
market and the danger of regulation: pride of ownership. According to Hayek, had a benign 
human hand and intent directed market outcomes, we would celebrate those outcomes. But 
because we do not associate the outcomes with benevolently designed institutions, we do not 
trust the outcomes. In Hayek's words, "(I]f it were the result of deliberate human design, 
and if the people guided by the price changes understood that their decisions have 
significance far beyond their immediate aim, this mechanism would have been acclaimed as 
one of the greatest triumphs of the human mind." HAYEK, THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN 
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And that leads to a final element of the script: the illusion, 
according to the meta script, is not dangerous only because it will lead 
to inefficient allocations of society's resources. The magician is far 
more frightening than a cross-hatched triangle on a graph labeled 
"dead-weight loss." According to the meta script, what is at stake is 
our freedom. And, as depicted in Figure 1, the tendency to rely on 
apparently well-meaning "planners" is the very tendency that, in 
Hayek's terms, sends us blithely down "the road to serfdom." 
FIGURE 1."Now ALL FREEDOM IS GONE" 
Nn one OP?9$� the lectder's plan • . • 
lt wOi.ild bl!' suiddi:!; new secret police ore 
rvlh!est. Ability to h:m:e obedience o!wt:iys 
bettiffle$, h' No; l virtue in the "planned 
stomc" Now di freedQm is gone. 
Source: HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM (cartoon) 13 (1945).89 
SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 15. Instead, because it happens invisibly, the whole apparatus is 
vastly undervalued. 
89. The cartoon version of Road to Serfdom appeared first in Look magazine's February 
6, 1945 issue. It was reprinted numerous times, including once by General Motors in their 
"Thought Starters" series. See http://www.mises.org/TRTS.htm. This provides some 
indication of the popularity of Hayek's ideas and the extent to which he and others 
promoted them. Hayek also published an abridged version of The Road to Serfdom in an 
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2. Chicago's Elaborations 
27 
For the most part, Milton Friedman and other members of the 
Chicago School found the Austrian School's meta script fully 
persuasive. They, too, presumed market outcomes trustworthy and 
regulations or governmental interventions suspect. If anything, the 
Chicago School economists simply added to the persuasiveness of the 
two elements by making more compelling arguments about how 
markets find and exploit all opportunities for gains to trade and how 
regulations and their unintended consequences often make matters 
worse. A classic example emphasized by Chicago Schoolers is the 
problem black markets. Attempts to prohibit certain trades often lead 
only to the costly creation of hidden markets, not to a meaningful 
change in behavior. Through black markets one can witness the 
difference between the welfare-reducing effects of regulatory coercion 
and the welfare-enhancing effects of markets.90 
Consistent with the lessons of black markets is a broader message 
endorsed by the Chicago School: for almost any problem, markets 
have a solution. From consumer misinformation to externalities and 
from innovation to discrimination, no force would lead more quickly 
to an effective solution than the combined forces of markets.91 
Competition drives participants either to develop solutions or to be 
driven out of business by those who do. This dynamic, like that 
described in lay evolutionary scripts, leads toward superior institutions 
and outcomes. In the case of the market's natural selection process, 
consumer preferences determine winners and losers.92 Ever more 
efficient allocations and forms emerge, not because of the intentions 
of the parties, but because of the power of the process, which ratchets 
extremely successful Readers' Digest article. See http://www.hayekcenter.org/friedrich 
hayek/hayekfftrts.html. Finally, the authorized editions of The Road to Serfdom have been 
published in several dozen languages. Id. 
90. Friedman recently had this to say about why black markets are desirable: 
Well, the black market was a way of getting around government controls. It was a way of 
enabling the free market to work. It was a way of opening up, enabling people. You want to 
trade with me, and the law won't let you. But that trade will be mutually beneficial to both of 
us. The most important single central fact about a free market is that no exchange takes 
place unless both parties benefit. The big difference between government coercion and 
private markets is that government can use coercion to make an exchange in which A 
benefits and B loses. But in the market, if A and B come to a voluntary agreement, it's 
because both of them are better off. And that's what the black market does, is to get around 
these artificial government restrictions. 
Interview by PBS with Milton Friedman, supra note 54. 
91. A popularized summary of many of those arguments can be found in Milton and 
Rose Friedman's book, Free to Choose, which was prepared in conjunction with a PBS 
television series of the same title. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE, supra 
note 46. For information about the video series, see http://www.freetochoose.net (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2004). 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 222-228 (describing evolutionary scripts). 
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in only one direction. As Friedman explains, "competition does not 
protect the consumer because businessmen are more softhearted than 
bureaucrats or because they are more altruistic or because they are 
more generous, but only because it is in the self-interest of the 
entrepreneur to protect the consumer."93 
From that logic, it follows that whatever the market produces is, on 
the whole, what makes consumers better off.94 As Friedman retorted 
when someone complained of the wastefulness of the almost countless 
options provided to consumers, 
If consumers really preferred one model [of Chevrolet] at a lower price 
than forty-seven models, GM would be foolish not to meet their desires. 
There are forty-seven models because that is what consumers want. 
That's what the critics really complain about - that under capitalism, 
consumers get what they want rather than what the critics think they 
should have.95 
Like Hayek, Chicago Schoolers, particularly Friedman, believe 
that the distinctions between markets and regulation go beyond 
matters of mere efficiency. Human freedom turns on the existence of 
private property and capitalism - on more markets and less 
regulation. Friedman summarized the point in an interview this way: 
"What we've really been talking about all along is freedom. Although 
a number of my proposals would have the immediate effect of 
improving our economic well-being, that's really a secondary goal to 
preserving individual freedom."96 In short, "capitalism is a necessary 
condition for political freedom. "97 
Of course, none of this really needs reviewing. The elements of the 
meta script and the perceived connection between markets and 
freedom represent the current consensus among policymakers - the 
93. MILTON FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE 165 (1983) 
(hereinafter FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES]. 
94. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE, supra note 46, at 222 ("There will 
always be shoddy products, quacks, con artists. But, on the whole, market competition, when 
it is permitted to work, protects the consumer better than do the alternative government 
mechanisms that have been increasingly superimposed on the market."). 
95. FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, supra note 93, at 50-51 .  
96. Id. at 57. In a recent interview about his role in  Chile and Pinochet's regime, 
Friedman emphasized that although he was consulted by the authoritarian dictator, his 
message to Pinochet "was that freedom was a very fragile thing and that what destroyed it 
more than anything else was central control; that in order to maintain freedom, you had to 
have free markets, and that free markets would work best if you had political freedom." 
Interview by PBS with Milton Friedman, supra note 54. 
97. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 10; see id. at 8 
("economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political 
freedom"); see also FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE, supra note 46, passim 
(arguing that the well-intended attempts to regulate markets have failed and how prosperity 
and, more important, freedom, depends upon placing more faith in markets). 
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starting points from which most policy discourse departs, if it deviates 
at all.98 
But the Chicago School did more than simply reiterate and 
reinforce the meta script. It also offered new, significant support for 
the conclusion that regulation was often harmful. The basic rendition, 
recall, located the problem for regulators at their lack of information.99 
From there, it was easy to conclude, as many had, that regulators 
would be inept. Chicago added a key argument, supported by 
suggestive evidence, that regulators would be not only inept, but also 
systematically biased. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Chicago School economists began to look 
at regulation with the sort of suspicion that the meta script counsels. 
George Stigler, noticing that lawmakers and regulators seemed not to 
take the advice of professional economists while claiming to be acting 
in the "public interest," decided it was time to truly test the public­
interest claim. That is, he began to suspect that illusion was at work. 
To investigate whether this was the case, he knew that he had to 
ignore the rhetoric of regulators and look solely at "the actual effects 
of economic regulations. "100 Instead of listening to what the helmsman 
said about where he intended to steer the regulatory ship, Stigler set 
out to look at the compass, hoping from that to determine what was 
moving the ship. 
What he found was striking: regulations, while purportedly 
promulgated for the benefit of consumers, appeared to be serving the 
interests of the regulated producers, be they individual firms, or 
industries, or occupational groups. 101 Most significantly, regulations 
that appeared to provide little or no benefit to the public nonetheless 
served as barriers to entry for producers, thus raising their prices and 
profits. From that evidence, Stigler began his search for the underlying 
causes of regulation and pioneered what would later be known as the 
"economics of regulation" and "public choice."102 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 58-77. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 79-87. 
100. STIGLER, supra note 45, at 115. 
101. Id. at 1 16-18. 
102. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to 
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 359 (1974) [hereinafter 
Stigler, Free Riders]; George J. Stigler, Supplementary Note on Economic Theories of 
Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 137 (1975); George 
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); 
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (1989); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of 
Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (providing 
a brief review of some of the early studies); Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 
8 (same); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4 (same); Steven P. Croley, Theories 
of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (same). 
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Stigler summarizes the theory and his findings as follows: The 
"general theory of the behavior of governments"103 is that "groups 
possessing political influence use the political process effectively to 
increase their incomes."104 As he laments, "no matter how 
disinterested the goal of public policy, the policy is bent to help 
politically influential groups at the cost of the less influential."105 
Assuming all that is true, there is still the question of what makes 
for "political influence." There is a vast literature devoted to exploring 
that very question.106 Further, there is a consensus - though by no 
means total agreement - that several variables can play an important 
role, including how narrowly defined an individual's or group's 
interest is; how much the individual or group has at stake; what 
resources are available to the individual or group; the presence of 
economies of scale for the individual or group; and, if a group is 
involved, how well its members are able to cooperate to advance their 
shared end.107 According to the consensus view, a group's ability to 
coordinate well will depend on some of those same variables and the 
number of members of the group.108 
Generally, those sorts of considerations help make sense of much 
of the evidence that the Chicago scholars collected. That evidence 
suggested that producers, sellers, industries, or commercial interests, 
and not consumers or the public, are the prime beneficiaries of 
regulation. Thus, Milton Friedman begins the "regulatory capture" 
story as follows: 
All of these [regulatory] interferences with the market are justified as 
protection of the public interest, but, in fact, they endanger the public 
interest. In the absence of regulation and protection, we are told, we 
would be exploited and overcharged for shoddy service and unsafe 
products, degrading the quality of our lives and jeopardizing our 
safety.109 
103. STIGLER, supra note 45, at 115. 
104. Id. at 120. 
105. Id. at 119. 
106. The classics include MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965), and RUSSEL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1982). 
107. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8; Stigler, Free Riders, supra 
note 102, at 360-62; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1776-77 (1975) (describing tendency of 
regulators to favor well-organized interests). 
108. Much more could be said about the public-choice literature, but an elaborate 
exegesis would do little to advance our thesis here, in part because our argument does not, as 
we will make clear below, depend heavily on the conclusions of that literature. In any event, 
we do provide a more fulsome review of public-choice literature in work now in progress. 
Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8. 
109. FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, supra note 93, at 26. 
October 2004] The Illusion of Law 31 
According to Friedman, however, the exact opposite is closer to the 
truth. It is not the public, but the regulated industry that most 
determines the contours and contents of the regulation. And those 
industries often use the regulation as a means of protecting themselves 
from the consumer-welfare-enhancing discipline of the market. As 
Friedman puts it: 
[I]t's in the clear and immediate interest of the regulated industry or 
industries to either neutralize the effect of that agency or use it to their 
advantage. Since the interest of an industry is direct and focused, it will 
spend a lot more time, money and energy to accomplish its goal than the 
public will to protect its interests. The public's interest is diffuse . . . .  A 
consumer-protection agency might work for a brief period of time, but 
after the initial, faddish interest in the project dies down, the producers 
will move in with pressure for exemptions and other special rulings. 1 10 
Even the strongest critics of the market and the warmest supporters of 
government will agree that these organizations have become the servants 
of those they were supposed to protect the public from. Yet there is now 
a demand for a federal consumer-protection agency. We never learn.I l l  
This antiregulatory conclusion contributes immensely to  the larger 
meta script. If the very institutions created to protect against powerful 
interests end up serving those interests, the effort to regulate has only 
increased the harmful power. And the case for relying more on 
markets and less on regulation seems greatly enhanced. 
It is important to recognize that scholars still debate which interest 
will exert the most influence over the regulator and which regulators 
will be most and least vulnerable to the competition.112 For now, 
though, we want only to highlight two features of regulation that the 
Chicago School helped us to see and about which there is very little 
debate. First, there is much to be gained from achieving influence over 
regulators, and, second, for that reason, there is a great deal of 
competition between potentially interested parties over the form of 
regulation. 1 13 
C. From the Meta Script of Policymaking to the Macro Script of 
Corporate Law 
It is worth noting that a great deal of the work that made Hayek 
and Friedman famous, and that was implemented through Thatcher 
and Reagan, had to do with macroeconomic issues involving rates of 
110. Id. at 23. 
1 11. Id. at 22. 
1 12. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8. 
1 13. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at 202-85 (introducing and 
summarizing same evidence consistent with the "deep capture" hypothesis). 
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growth, money supply, stagflation, and so on.114 The message from 
Austria and Chicago was simple: stop attempting to manage the 
economy bureaucratically through money-supply manipulations and 
price controls; instead, be stingy with money supply and allow market 
pressures to drive the economy. 
What made the new scripts particularly powerful is that the simple 
principle of markets good, regulation bad could be applied easily to 
virtually any policy issue. With this simple knowledge structure 
activated, those who held it began, often automatically, to see issues 
through its lenses.1 15 And the pro-market, anti-regulatory vision 
quickly altered thinking in virtually all policy contexts. There 
emerged, for instance, a robust new mindset regarding microeconomic 
issues, and new fields of study, including "law and economics." 
That leads us to the macro script of corporate law, developed by 
legal economists and, again, reflecting the same sorts of categorical 
thinking that many believe led to, among other things, the fall of the 
Soviet Union. That the macro script of corporate law closely 
resembles the meta script of policymaking (and, as we'll see, shares 
many of the same elements) is no coincidence. It reflects the success of 
a simple, attractive, and efficient way of thinking about the world and 
its institutions. It is also unsurprising that the same individual most 
responsible for promoting the policymaking meta script in the United 
States would be one of the first to promote the current macro script of 
corporate law. Nor does it come as a surprise that the macro script 
shares a similar summary version: let the business people pursue their 
profits without interference from others. 
We turn now to the macro script of corporate law. In our analysis 
we remain aware of parallels between the macro script and the more 
general meta script of policymaking. We argue that the familiarity 
with the meta script, and the legitimacy with which we hold that script, 
1 14. Hayek, for instance, wrote a great deal early in his career on business cycles and on 
the perils of monetary expansion. See, e.g. , F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY NATIONALISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL STABILITY (Augustus M. Kelley 1964) (1937); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 
MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (Augustus M. Kelley 1966) (1933); HAYEK, 
PRICES AND PRODUCTION, supra note 82; FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST, 
AND INVESTMENT (1939). Friedman was to pick up the same themes and run with them in 
his influential work on monetarism. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, THE OPTIMUM 
QUANTITY OF MONEY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1969); MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE 
CONSUMPTION FuNCTION (1957); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A 
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1963); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA 
JACOBSON SCHWARTIZ, MONETARY STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (1970); MILTON 
FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, MONETARY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM (1982). 
115. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5 (discussing schema 
activation and application). 
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plays an important role in facilitating acceptance of the dominant 
macro script of corporate law.116 
III. THE MACRO SCRIPT OF CORPORATE LAW 
A. The Emergence of the Summary Macro Script 
As we describe below, the emergence of large commercial 
enterprises and the corporate form that facilitated that emergence 
were met with considerable trepidation and resistance.1 17 It was not 
simply that the business corporation was "new," though that may have 
been sufficient cause for many to worry. 1 18 It was also that the 
aggregations of wealth and concentrations of interests made possible 
by the corporate form seemed a fairly obvious threat to our 
burgeoning democracy.119 
1 .  The Early Legal-Academic Debate 
We pick up the debate over corporations and the corporate form 
as it emerged in legal-academic circles in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The famous exchanges between Columbia's Adolph Berle 
and Harvard's Merrick Dodd on the nature of the corporation mark 
the real beginning of the modern corporate law debate.120 Both shared 
a worry about corporations, but differed in the source of their concern. 
116. Because of that familiarity and the legitimacy that accompanies the meta script, we 
believe that the arguments comprising the macro script for corporate law elicit less scrutiny 
than they otherwise would. For example, just as most of us know, drawing upon the 
restaurant script, what to do with menus and when to pay the bill, the familiarity of the 
policymaking meta script primes us to accept the corporate law macro script. See infra text 
accompanying note 314. Insofar as the script is viewed as legitimate, eliciting positive 
affective response, the acceptability of the macro script will be even more automatic. See 
Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5,  at 1 174-1211 (describing numerous 
determinants and conditions of schema use). 
1 17. See infra text accompanying notes 504-552. 
1 18. Cf Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting 
Dispositions in the Perceptions and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 1427, 1428 (1996) (describing various qualitative factors that influence risk 
perceptions, including perceptions that the risk is new, unknown, and could create harm well 
into the future). 
1 19. See infra text accompanying notes 504-539. 
120. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931) (arguing that corporate managers should focus on shareholders) [hereinafter 
Berle, Powers in Trust]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1 145 (1932) (arguing that corporate managers should be 
attentive not just to shareholders, but to all stakeholders); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom 
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (responding to 
Dodd) [hereinafter Berle, Note on Trustees] .  Other scholars have described the evolution in 
more detail. See, e.g., C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
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In 1931, Berle focused on the problem of managerial discretion faced 
by contributors of capital.121 He stressed the danger inherent in the 
fact that a shareholder holds only "an infinitesimal claim on massed 
industrial wealth"122 and is therefore "helpless to do anything with it or 
about it, except to sell for what the security markets will let him 
have."123 The shareholder's claim is thus "entirely in the hands of" 
managers. 124 In light of the collective-action problem faced by 
shareholders and the power exerted by managers, Berle described the 
protection of shareholders as the critical challenge facing corporate 
law - protecting shareholders from managers who might attempt to 
"transfer corporate wealth and power to themselves."125 By framing 
the challenge in that way, Berle's work implicitly downplayed many of 
the problems that had loomed large in erstwhile criticisms of 
corporate practices and, in effect, laid the groundwork for what would 
become the profit-first (or profit-only) norm animating corporate 
theory. 
Berle joined with Harvard economist Gardiner C. Means to write 
what would become their magnum opus, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.126 Their argument, cited heavily to this day,127 was 
that the "managerial revolution" had effectively removed power from 
the sea of faceless shareholders and placed it into the hands of a small 
number of managers. "The separation of ownership from control 
produces a condition where the interest of owner and of ultimate 
manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks 
which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear."128 
Berle's normative argument in favor of defending shareholders 
was bolstered as well by his positive claim that courts were then 
exhibiting "a new willingness to use their equitable powers to force 
directors, or indeed any group that dominated a corporation, to 
exercise the powers granted to them not only for their own benefit, 
121. See Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 120, at 1049 ("[T]he thesis of this essay [is] 
that all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation . . .  are 
necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as 
their interest appears."). 
122. Berle, Note on Trustees, supra note 120, at 1370. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Wells, supra note 120, at 88. 
126. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
127. A Westlaw search (allrev - 6128103) for "Berle Is Means" yielded 960 documents. 
When limited to after 612811998, the search yielded 286 documents within the last five years 
- fifteen more than a search for "Ronald Is Chen or Jon Is Hanson" produced in that same 
five-year period . 
128. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 126, at 6. 
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but for 'the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest 
appears. "'129 
Merrick Dodd framed the corporate law problem in terms more 
familiar to his audience, emphasizing the threat posed by corporations 
to nonshareholders. Where Berle worried about the power dynamics 
within the corporation, Dodd focused on the power dynamics between 
corporations and the rest of society. Arguing that corporate law 
should "protect the nation from corporations,"130 Dodd redescribed 
the corporation as 
an institution directed by persons who are primarily fiduciaries for the 
institution rather than for its members. That lawyers have commonly 
assumed that the managers must conduct the institution with single­
minded devotion to stockholder profit is true; but the assumption is 
based upon a particular view of the . . . nature of business as a purely 
private enterprise. If we recognize that the attitude of law and public 
opinion toward business is changing, we may then properly modify our 
ideas as to the nature of such a business institution as the corporation 
and hence as to the considerations which may properly influence the 
conduct of those who direct its activities.131 
Where Berle sought to remedy the problems created by the separation 
of ownership and control, Dodd sought to take advantage of them.132 
Dodd did not disagree that shareholders needed special protection;133 
he argued simply that their vulnerability was not unique: " [I]t is 
undesirable, even with the laudable purpose of giving stockholders 
much-needed protection against self-seeking managers, to give 
increased emphasis at the present time to the view that business 
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their 
stockholders. "134 
129. Wells, supra note 120, at 88 (quoting Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 120, 
at 1049). 
130. Wells, supra note 120,at 87 (discussing Dodd, supra note 120). 
131. Dodd, supra note 120, at 1 162-63. 
132. Professor Wells describes Dodd's argument as follows: 
If directors could have new duties to shareholders imposed on them, could they not equally 
well assume duties to other groups that also had a stake in the corporation? So long as 
ownership and control were one, it made no sense to argue that the 'control' should treat 
owners as only one of many constituencies. With the separation of ownership from control it 
became possible to imagine those controlling corporations taking on responsibilities to 
groups besides owners. 
Wells, supra note 120, at 91-92. 
133. See Dodd, supra note 120, at 1 147 ("The present writer is . . .  in sympathy with Mr. 
Berle's efforts to establish a legal control which will more effectually prevent corporate 
managers from diverting profit into their own pockets from those of stockholders, and 
agrees with many of the specific rules which the latter deduces from his trusteeship 
principle."). 
134. Dodd, supra note 120, at 1 147-48. 
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Dodd's normative case also had an important positive component. 
He noted that there appeared to be a growing public consensus that 
corporations should be run for the good of society, and not simply the 
corporation's shareholders.135 For instance, Dodd described the 
actions and noted the words of prominent corporate leaders such as 
General Electric President Gerard Swope, who proclaimed that 
"organized industry should take the lead, recognizing its responsibility 
to its employees, to the public, and to its stockholders."136 
At least in the short run, Dodd's arguments for a broader 
constituency "won" the debate, in part because Berle himself began to 
register concern about the growing concentration of commercial 
enterprise.137 In his book with Gardiner Means,138 Berle conceded that 
the increasing concentration of business meant that directors would 
"have responsibilities not only toward their stockholders but also 
toward 'the workers, the consumers, and the State. " '139 
With that intellectual consensus in place, it was not long before 
corporate spokespeople became vocal proponents for the broader 
view of the corporation - or of the duties of managers and directors. 
According to Harwell Wells's historical analysis, 
At least one other group, oddly enough, also agreed that corporations 
wielded great power across broad swathes of American life: corporate 
leaders. As in the 1920s, so in the postwar era, renewed corporate success 
led many business executives back to the ideal of business statesmanship. 
At least in public pronouncements, few corporate leaders failed to make 
a nod to their firms' "social responsibilities."140 
And so it was that in 1933 David Rockefeller, like Gerard Swope 
before him, implicitly endorsed Dodd's social perspective of corporate 
management, rejecting Berle's shareholder perspective: " [T]he old 
concept that the owner of a business had a right to use his property as 
he pleased to maximize profits, has evolved into the belief that 
ownership carries certain binding social obligations."141 
135. Id. at 1 148. 
136. Id. at 1 155 (quoting GERARD SWOPE, THE SWOPE PLAN 22 (1929)). 
137. Actually, in the very short run, Berle denied the significance of Dodd's positive 
claims by describing Dodd's examples as "the exceptions rather than the rule." Berle, Note 
on Trustees, supra note 120, at 1372. Berle asserted that "[t]he industrial 'control' does 
not . . .  now assume responsibilities to the community; his bankers do not now undertake to 
recognize social claims; his lawyers do not advise him in terms of social responsibility. Nor is 
there any mechanism now in sight enforcing accomplishment of his theoretical function." Id. 
at 1367. In fact, he indicated that the perception of socially responsible managers was a 
motivated "illusion," id. at 1371, born of "a pious wish," id. at 1368. 
138. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 126. 
139. Wells, supra note 120, at 94 (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 126). 
140. Wells, supra note 120, at 100 (footnote omitted). 
141 . Id. at 100 (quoting HERMAN E. KROOS, EXECUTIVE OPINION: WHAT BUSINESS 
LEADERS SAID AND THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, 1920s-1960s, at 52 (1970) ). 
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Two decades later, Berle graciously conceded defeat: 
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. 
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate 
powers were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd 
argued that these powers were held in trust for the entire community. 
The argument has been settled . . .  squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's 
contention.142 
37 
While conceding the battle, Berle had yet to surrender the war: he 
hopefully and, it turns out, presciently qualified his concession with 
the words, "at least for the time being."143 That was the state of the 
corporate law debate in the early 1960s. 
2. The Resurgence of Shareholder Primacy 
As we summarized above, somewhere during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the intellectual tide in policymaking circles began to shift. 
In this country, the arguments of Chicago Schoolers were gaining 
momentum in all policy arenas. 144 And, given his confidence in the 
meta script and his general productivity, it is not surprising that Milton 
Friedman himself would weigh in with a macro version of the pro­
market, anti-regulation meta script in the corporate context. 
Friedman's bottom line was the bottom line: market participants 
should worry about one thing - serving the interests of shareholders, 
which meant succeeding in the market, which meant maximizing 
profits. 145 According to Friedman, the maintenance of a free society 
requires that there be "one and only one social responsibility of 
business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game . . . .  "146 
The same tide that carried the Chicago School meta script to real­
world prominence during the Reagan era (and since) also helped to 
carry Friedman's renewed intellectual case for shareholder primacy 
and profits - the macro script of corporate law.147 It was not long 
142. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University, quoted in 
RICHARD EELLS, CORPORATION GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY 29 (1956). 
143. Id. 
144. The ascendancy of those ideas reflected many elements of a larger process of "deep 
capture." See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at Parts V-VI. 
145. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133-34; Friedman, 
Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 32. 
146. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133. 
147. See Wells, supra note 120, at 124 ("Although Friedman's was a lonely voice in 1970, 
over the rest of the decade legal scholars would join the attack on corporate social 
responsibility, also using economic theory to throw doubt on the proposals offered by 
[proponents of corporate responsibility] ."). 
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before prominent legal scholars began to echo and reinforce 
Friedman's shareholder primacy rationale. 148 For the next three 
decades, that view gained increasing traction among intellectuals.149 
Even commentators who perceived that the broader notion of 
corporate law was still strong observed that the shareholder primacy 
norm appeared poised for dominance.150 
For example, then-Chancellor (now-Professor) William Allen 
argued in 1992 that the shareholder primacy norm was experiencing a 
resurgence, which he predicted gathering forces would only 
strengthen: 
Each of the two dominant social trends that will exert potentially 
transformative power on corporate governance in the years immediately 
ahead - the evolution of a truly global economy and the continuing 
growth, and coming dominance, of institutional shareholders - is more 
consistent with the property conception of the corporation than with the 
entity conception. 
148. Indeed, around the same time that Friedman was writing on corporate law, Yale 
Law School Dean Eugene Rostow was applying the pro-market, anti-regulation meta­
theoretic schema to corporate law. Like Friedman, Rostow argued that the social­
responsibility view "ignored the economic justification for business in the first place" and 
that the superiority of the profit-maximization norm had been scientifically proven: 
The economist has demonstrated with all the apparent precision of plane geometry and the 
calculus that the quest for maximum revenue in a competitive market leads to a system of 
prices, and an allocation of resources and rewards, superior to any alternative, in its 
contribution to the economic welfare of the community as a whole. 
Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in 
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 63 (Edward s. Mason ed., 1959). As Wells 
observes, 
Rostow's complaint highlights a factor worth noting in the late-1950s early-1960s debate 
over corporate social responsibility: it was rarely conducted in economic terms. In an era 
with only a rudimentary economic theory of the firm, critics of the corporation focused on its 
social or political role to the neglect of its economic function. 
Wells, supra note 120, at 109-10. 
149. According to Wells, "economic analysis [became] an important element in debates 
over corporate social responsibility" in the 1970s, but "not until the late 1980s would it win 
the field." Wells, supra note 120, at 110. In 1991, the emerging dominance of shareholder 
primacy is exemplified by the fact that legal-economist Jonathan Macey could open an 
article with the following assertion: 
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and directors of both public and 
closely held firms owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone. Directors 
and officers are legally required to manage a corporation for the exclusive benefit of its 
shareholders, and protection for other sorts of claimants exists only to the extent provided 
by contract. 
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 
23, 23 (1991). 
150. E.g. , William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 276 (1992). 
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As the world becomes a fiercer place for American business, 
corporate management is forced increasingly to consider financial 
performance at every stage. Thus, evolving global markets encourage 
efficiency and value-creating management. These developments tend to 
push shareholders, as residual risk bearers, back towards the center of 
thinking about the enterprise. Creating shareholder value, for example, is 
increasingly a financial measure that is used internally in the making of 
corporate capital budgeting decisions. Indeed while the law seems to 
have ringingly endorsed a managerialist or entity orientation, full-bodied 
statements of the managerialist philosophy appear now to be rather out 
of fashion, even among members of senior corporate management. 
Today the talk is more likely to be about creating shareholder value than 
about social responsibility.151 
In retrospect, Allen's predictions appear prophetic. 
3. "The End of History" 
At the turn of the millennium, Professors Hansmann and 
Kraakman proclaimed that " [ t ]here is no longer any serious 
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to 
increase long-term shareholder value."152 As if it were the inevitable 
and ultimate outcome of an evolutionary process, 153 they hailed the 
global convergence toward that basic model of corporate law as "The 
151. Id. at 279 (footnote omitted). 
152. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). By picking up the debate with Merrick Dodd and Adolph Berle 
and quickly proceeding through the Carter and Reagan eras to the "End of History," this 
Article may at first glance suggest that the competition over the meta and macro scripts 
guiding our understanding of the corporate form did not begin until the 1930s. In fact, the 
competition began long before that. We extend our discussion of the historical context 
below. See infra text accompanying notes 502-552. Until then, our discussion may be 
misleading in another way. By focusing on the dominant schemas shaping our approach to 
policymaking and corporate law, this Article may also suggest that no alternative scripts 
remain on the policy and legal landscape today and that everyone fully embraces the 
dominant meta script of policymaking and the macro script of corporate law. That is not our 
position. In fact, it is impossible to miss the growing anticorporate movement taking shape in 
the United States and around the world. Recent documentaries, including "The 
Corporation," "Fahrenheit 9/1 1," and "Supersize Me" are salient examples of that trend. 
There are now and have long been competing scripts for corporate law and 
policymaking. Our contention is not that the dominant script has fully vanquished the "social 
responsibility" script and other alternative scripts. Our contention is that a competition 
exists at all times among competing scripts and that, often, it is possible to identify a more 
or less dominant script or collection of scripts. At this point, our focus is on describing the 
logic behind the currently dominant meta script of policymaking and macro script of 
corporate law. 
153. The underlying theory and evidence for that perspective is provided in HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996). See, e.g., id. at 22 (explaining why 
"(i)t is reasonable to expect that, over the long run, cost-minimizing forms of organization 
will come to dominate most industries"). 
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End of History for Corporate Law."154 As Professors Hansmann & 
Kraakman observe: 
All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be 
organized and operated to serve the interests of society as a whole, and 
that the interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social 
calculus than do the interests of any other members of society. The point 
is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there 
is convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the 
pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers 
strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, 
only to those interests.155 
Despite its early successes, Dodd's view of corporate law now 
appears to be the clear loser, at least among intellectuals.156 Even 
154. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, at 439; see also MARINA v. N. WHITMAN, 
NEW WORLD, NEW RULES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 
(1999) (describing the transition from "managerial capitalism," in which managers were 
given a great deal of discretion with company assets, to "investor capitalism," in which 
managers have been constrained to pursue profits). 
Other scholars have been somewhat reluctant to accept fully Hansmann and 
Kraakman's international convergence claim. Mark Roe, for example, observes that in 
countries where product markets are not competitive, a norm of profit maximization may 
not, because of the ills of monopoly practices, promote social welfare. See Mark J. Roe, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2063, 2080 (2001). According to Roe's analysis, this limitation on the profit norm 
corresponds with actual practice, as countries with a less (more) competitive marketplace 
tend to have corporate laws that less (more) rigorously promote shareholder primacy. Id. at 
2069-70. Roe notes, however, that "[a]s Europe's product markets have become more 
competitive, its demand for, or at least tolerance of, shareholder primacy institutions has 
also increased." Id. at 2079. 
Similarly, Professor Roe and Lucian Bebchuk argue that "path dependence" will act as a 
significant impediment to convergence. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory 
of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 155 
(1999). Drawing upon the regulation-is-bad element of the meta script, they describe how 
"initial ownership structures" can affect both "subsequent ownership structures" 
("structure-driven path dependence") and "subsequent structures through their effect on the 
legal rules governing corporations" ("rule-driven path dependence"). Id. at 129. 
We discuss Professor Roe and Bebchuk's insightful work in greater detail in a related 
article. See Chen & Hanson, False Starts, supra note 29. 
155. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, at 441 (emphasis added). 
156. There are, to be sure, some corporate law scholars who continue to challenge 
elements of shareholder primacy. For the most part, however, their work remains 
preliminary and marginal. Possible exceptions include the fascinating work on the team 
production theory of corporate law by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, see, e.g. , Margaret 
Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999), on director primacy by Stephen Bainbridge, see, e.g. , Stephen Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003), on 
the need for "corporate transparency" by Cynthia Williams, see, e.g. , Cynthia A. Williams, 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1197 (1999), and on progressive corporate law by Kent Greenfield, see, e.g. , KENT 
GREENFIELD, THE BEGINNING OF HISTORY FOR CORPORATE LAW: PROGRESSIVE IDEAS 
FOR CONTROLLING CORPORATE POWER (forthcoming). 
Blair and Stout do not dispute that "the idea of shareholder primacy has become 
increasingly popular among academics . . . .  " Blair & Stout, supra at 326. They advance an 
alternative macro script, however, that they believe better explains the overall structure of 
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though Berle conceded defeat after twenty years of debate, his vision 
has now emerged the clear winner.157 As Harvard economist Michael 
Jensen recently concluded, shareholder primacy enjoys an impressive 
pedigree, finding support in "200 years of research in economics and 
finance."158 The following Section examines some of the intellectual 
underpinnings of this dramatic turnaround. 159 
corporate law as well as its application - a "team production" model in which the 
corporation is a nexus of contracts, both explicit and implicit, and the board acts as an 
independent "mediating hierarch" for all constituencies. In terms that seem to vindicate 
Dodd's earlier positive claims, see supra text accompanying notes 130-136, Blair and 
Stout write: 
If corporate law is not designed primarily to protect shareholders - if, instead, it is designed 
to protect the corporate coalition by allowing directors to allocate rents among various 
stakeholders, while guarding the coalition as a whole only from gross self-dealing by 
directors - then the rules of corporate law begin to make more sense. 
Id. at 321 (emphasis omitted). 
The recent focus on shareholders is, they argue, not a sign that directors are only 
concerned with shareholders, but a temporary consequence of "changing economic and 
political forces that have improved shareholders' relative bargaining power vis-a-vis other 
coalition members." Blair and Stout, supra, at 327. We hope to discuss in more detail Blair 
and Stout's important thesis and evidence in our future work. 
157. If it had ever lagged in the first place. Of the 1950s, a time when it appeared that a 
broader notion of the corporation was dominant, Wells notes, "Corporate leaders spoke of 
the corporation's new responsibility, but none seemed ready to abandon the profit­
maximizing and shareholder-primacy norms that had guided their actions for many years." 
See Wells, supra note 120, at 101. 
158. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 14 BANK AM. J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2001, at 8-9. 
159. It is important to recognize that the convergence, and much of the scholarship 
celebrating it, occurred during the late 1990s - a time when, by some fairly salient 
measures, the American economy and American corporations were thriving. Proponents of 
the dominant schema have, it seems, been less vociferous or bold in their claims in recent 
years, owing largely, we believe, to the recent crises in corporate America, the faltering and 
sluggish economy, and the heightened perception of terrorist threats and of America's 
unpopularity in the world. Cf Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5 (describ­
ing the factors that lead people to engage in schema search and to think "bottom up"). 
Outside of legal academia, numerous books have been published about the corruption 
and destructive hubris of our profit-centered system. See, e.g. , ANDY KESSLER, WALL 
STREET MEAT (2003); BARBARA LEY TOFFLER & JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL 
ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN (2002); LEON 
LEVY & EUGENE LINDEN, THE MIND OF WALL STREET: A LEGENDARY FINANCIER ON 
THE PERILS OF GREED AND THE MYSTERIES OF THE MARKET (2002); FRANK PARTNOY, 
INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
(2003); MIMI SW ARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2002). Within legal academia, the crises have, we believe, given 
greater voice to creative scholars, such as William Bratton and Kent Greenfield, who are 
generally outside the mainstream corporate law literature and who have long been quite 
skeptical of the sorts of knowledge structures or discourse within it. See, e.g. , William W. 
Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of 
Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law 
Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001). 
Although it is impossible to say what the long-term effects of these crises and of this sort 
of scholarship will have, it is clear that now is a fruitful time for progressive critics of 
corporate law. Indeed, several law journal symposia have recently been devoted to the issue. 
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B. The Macro Script: Justifying the Summary Script 
In this Section, we elaborate upon corporate law's summary macro 
script of shareholder primacy - that is, profit maximization is good 
and social responsibility is bad - and examine the more detailed 
version of the corporate law macro script. The macro script constitutes 
a series of arguments that help to support, and have facilitated the 
dramatic ascendancy of, the summary script.160 
1 .  Friedman's Shareholder Primacy Script 
In our elaboration of the macro script, we give special attention to 
the arguments of Milton Friedman. We do so for several reasons - all 
of which reveal the unseen power of schemas. First, it was Friedman, 
as much as anyone, who fostered the intellectual emergence of the 
meta script of policymaking, which, we believe, itself helped to make 
the corporate macro script so dominant. Second, Friedman's early case 
for shareholder primacy was a seminal turning point in corporate legal 
theory. And third, Friedman's original rendition, although refined by 
subsequent legal-academic scholarship, provides the basic script 
(including implicit presumptions and intellectual anchors) with which 
proponents of the now-dominant view of corporate law begin.161 As 
See, e.g., Symposium, Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export?, 70 GEO . WASH. 
L. REV. 867 (2002); Symposium, Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law, 35 
U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 523 (2002); Symposium, Enron and Its Aftermath, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
671 (2002); Lessons From Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. 
REV. 663 (2003); Socio-Economics and Corporate Law Symposium: The New Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1 187 (2002). 
160. It would be an understandable mistake to assume that the summary version of the 
corporate macro script is a derivative of the fuller version of the corporate macro script. The 
relationship between the elaborate and refined arguments and the summarizing conclusion is 
one of mutual reinforcement. And, if anything, the refinements discussed in this Section 
came after the summary version was more or less accepted by those scholars who generated 
the refinements. The refinements do, however, help to legitimate the summary schemas and 
persuade those who are initially dubious. 
161. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 679 (1986) (citing 
Friedman's New York Times essay and calling it "[p]erhaps the most notable justification of 
the strict profit-maximizing goal"); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means 
and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003) ("Milton Friedman's 
famous essay [on] corporate responsibility remains the classic statement of the shareholder 
primacy model."); Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: 
Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation,  84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 195, 1 196 (1999) (explaining that Friedman's piece 
" [c]halleng[ed] the prevailing views of the time in an important and then-controversial 
article"); Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2002) (attributing to Friedman the early version 
of shareholder primacy); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. 
L. REV. 283, 289-90 (1998) (observing that Friedman "popularized the claim that the 'one 
and only . . .  social responsibility of business' was to increase its profits"); Roe, supra note 
154, at 2065 & n.2 (noting that "[s]hareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the 
appropriate goal in American business circles" and citing "the famous essay by Milton 
October 2004) 
Mark Roe describes, 
Friedman's perspective 
circles . . . .  "162 
The Illusion of Law 43 
"Although aggressive when it appeared, 
is now mainstream in American business 
Friedman, it is important to note, was writing when Dodd's view of 
the corporation was at its apex and corporate managers and judges 
believed that social responsibility was an important corporate 
constraint, if not the sole end of corporations.163 To Friedman, the very 
notion of corporate social responsibility was not just wrong, but 
dangerously wrong: 
The businessmen believe that they are defending free enterprise when 
they declaim that business is not concerned "merely" with profit but also 
with promoting desirable "social" ends; that business has a "social 
conscience" and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing 
employment, eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution and 
whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of 
reformers. In fact they are - or would be if they or anyone else took 
them seriously - preaching pure and unadulterated socialism. 
Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual 
forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past 
decades.164 
Elsewhere, Friedman put the point more tersely: "Few trends could so 
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the 
Friedman"); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate 
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1862 (2003) ("One of the most enduring characteristics of 
modern American corporate law is its shareholder-centered vision of managerial duties, 
pointedly expressed by Milton Friedman, according to which corporate managers are agents 
of shareholders and must manage the corporation in ways that maximize the profits of their 
principals."). 
162. Roe, supra note 154, at 2065 n.2. Another example from a recent Symposium, 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?, at Cornell Law School demonstrates 
the power of Friedman's script, both in the United States and abroad. Professor Yoshiro 
Miwa of the University of Tokyo opens his article by recalling: 
Professor Friedman's rebuttal to the social responsibility of corporate directors came to 
mind when I received an invitation to participate in this conference. When I first 
encountered Professor Friedman's position as an undergraduate in the late 1960s, my first 
reaction was surprise. At that time, most Japanese economists agreed that corporate 
directors have a fiduciary obligation that extends beyond their shareholders. For years I 
disagreed with Professor Friedman's argument . . . .  
Three decades have now passed since my initial exposure to Professor Friedman's 
argument against corporate social responsibility, and I have changed my position. Today, 
whenever I face an argument in support of "corporate social responsibility," I immediately 
respond with several questions . . . .  
Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful, Though Maybe 
Not Irrelevant, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1227, 1227-28 (1999). Professor Miwa goes on to recite 
verbatim Friedman's queries demonstrating the inability of businessmen to determine what 
is in the social interest. See infra text accompanying note 173 (Friedman quotation). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 135-142 (providing a few examples); Friedman, 
Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 32 (describing the creation of G.M.'s "public-policy 
committee"). 
164. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 33. 
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acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than 
to make as much money for their stockholders as possible. "165 
Friedman's apparent indignation stems from his starting 
assumptions that all corporate assets belong to shareholders. Any 
investment of those assets toward ends other than profit - like 
"spending someone else's money for a general social interest"166 - is 
tantamount to "taxation without representation. "167 "The whole 
justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by 
the stockholders is that the executive is an agent serving the interests 
of his principal. This justification disappears when the corporate 
executive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for 'social' 
purposes. "168 
Don't misunderstand. It's not that Friedman does not care about 
pollution, unemployment, or other social ills. One of Friedman's 
important themes was that the longstanding debates among those who 
worry about the harmful effects of profit-seeking institutions on 
society were for naught. The purported tension or conflict between the 
good and bad effects of profit-seeking were themselves illusion -
mere figments of misguided, if well-meaning, imaginations. All 
stakeholders (employees, consumers, lenders, suppliers, neighboring 
communities, and so on) are better off, on net, if profit is the sole 
corporate goal, leaving the protection of stakeholders' interests to the 
private markets and governmental institutions specifically designed to 
protect those interests. With respect to private forms of protection, 
Friedman argued that profit-maximization helps eliminate various 
forms of discrimination, not because discrimination is immoral, but 
because discrimination is unprofitable: 
A businessman or an entrepreneur who expresses preferences in his 
business activities that are not related to productive efficiency is at a 
disadvantage compared to other individuals who do not. Such an 
individual is in effect imposing higher costs on himself than are other 
individuals who do not have such preferences. Hence, in a free market 
they will tend to drive him out.169 
The unseen hand, Friedman argued, is also unseeing.170 
165. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133. 
166. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 33. 
167. Id. at 122. 
168. Id. 
169. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 109-10. 
170. This claim, Friedman suggests, finds empirical support in some of history's noblest 
moments: "It is a striking historical fact that the development of capitalism has been 
accompanied by a major reduction in the extent to which particular religious, racial, or social 
groups have operated under special handicaps in respect of their economic activities; have, 
as the saying goes, been discriminated against." Id. at 108. 
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With respect to public forms of protection, he writes: " [T]he 
imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are 
governmental functions. We have established elaborate constitutional 
parliamentary and judicial provisions to control these functions, to 
assure that taxes are imposed so far as possible in accordance with the 
preferences and desires of the public."17 1  Thus, according to Friedman, 
problems such as pollution and unemployment are problems for the 
government to address through tax-and-spend policies or antipollution 
regulations. The claim that corporations are in a better position to 
serve "social" ends 
must be rejected on grounds of principle. What it amounts to is an 
assertion that those who favor the taxes and expenditures in question 
have failed to persuade a majority of their fellow citizens to be of like 
mind and that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic procedures 
what they cannot attain by democratic procedures.172 
Furthermore, Friedman argues, corporate directors have no 
expertise or special knowledge that would allow them to make 
decisions that are socially beneficial, except insofar as profit and social 
concerns coincide. He asks: 
If businessmen do have a social responsibility other than making 
maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what it is? Can 
self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest is? Can 
they decide how great a burden they are justified in placing on 
themselves or their stockholders to serve that social interest? Is it 
tolerable that these public functions of taxation, expenditure, and control 
be exercised by the people who happen at the moment to be in charge of 
particular enterprises, chosen for those posts by strictly private groups.173 
Suppose, for example, that a director decides that he should spend 
corporate assets to help fight inflation: 
How is he to know what action of his will contribute to that end? He is 
presumably an expert in running his company - in producing a product 
or selling it or financing it. But nothing about his section makes him an 
expert on inflation. Will his holding down the price of his product reduce 
inflationary pressure? Or, by leaving more spending power in the hands 
of his customers, simply divert it elsewhere? Or by forcing him to 
produce less because of the lower price, will it simply contribute to 
shortages? Even if he could answer these question, how much cost is he 
justified in imposing on his stockholders, customers and employe[e]s for 
this social purpose? What is his appropriate share and what is the 
appropriate share of others?174 
171. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 122. 
172. Id. at 124. 
173. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133-34. 
174. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 122. 
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On the other hand, requiring directors to focus solely on profits helps 
protect shareholders because the "criterion of performance is 
straightforward and the persons among whom a voluntary contractual 
arrangement exists is clearly defined." 175 
2. Legal Academia's Elaborations 
The influence of Friedman's basic script of shareholder primacy 
and the larger meta script of policymaking is evident in the work of 
corporate law scholars defending the corporate macro script. These 
scholars place faith in the ability of profit-seeking behavior to 
unconsciously serve larger interests and harbor distrust for those who 
would attempt to serve vague, contestable ends such as the public 
interest or social responsibility. Even though some may view 
Friedman as an outlier advancing extreme versions of the various 
schemas,176 the discussion that follows illustrates that virtually all of 
the modern elaborations on corporate legal theory are firmly 
anchored to Friedman's work.177 Indeed, many elements of the 
detailed macro script are simply more sophisticated renditions of 
Friedman's original ideas. 
a. Maximizing Shared Interests Across Categories. One common 
response to the question of whether directors should have a duty to 
serve the interests of nonshareholders has been to argue, as Friedman 
did, 178 that all stakeholders are automatically protected, as though by 
an invisible hand, if we allow corporations to do what they do best: 
maximize profits.179 This response assumes that the interests of 
nonshareholders are aligned with those of shareholders. The most 
basic version of this first approach is the claim that the bigger the 
corporate pie, the better for everyone, because all stakeholders will 
enjoy opportunities for a larger slice. Easterbrook and Fischel explain: 
175. Id. at 33. 
176. Indeed, our knowledge of the phenomenon of subtyping leads us to expect this. 
Social psychological research has documented the tendency of individuals, when faced with 
nonstereotypical information, to subtype - or subcategorize - that information so that 
they may protect their active schemas and continue to see them as valid. See Chen & 
Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1204-06; see also L. Johnston & M. Hewstone, 
Cognitive Models of Stereotype Change: (3) Subtyping and the Perceived Typicality of 
Disconfirming Group Members, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 360-386 (1992); Renee 
Weber & Jennifer Crocker, Cognitive Processes in the Revision of Stereotypic Beliefs, 45 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1983). 
177. As we noted earlier, a wide range of scholars have acknowledged Friedman's 
influence on corporate Jaw. See supra text accompanying note 161. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 169-175. 
179. As we will review, there are several types of arguments offered to justify 
shareholder primacy. Many scholars and commentators employ both types of responses 
simultaneously - sometimes without making any distinction and other times as arguments 
in the alternative. 
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[M)aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other "constit­
uencies" automatically. The participants in the venture play comple­
mentary rather than antagonistic roles. In a market economy each party 
to a transaction is better off. A successful firm provides jobs for workers 
and goods and services for consumers. The more appealing the goods to 
consumers, the more profit (and jobs). Prosperity for stockholders, 
workers, and communities goes [invisible] hand in glove with better 
products for consumers.180 
Moreover, as stock ownership among workers and consumers has 
grown in recent decades - through pension and mutual funds -
corporate profits are now being spread to a much larger percentage of 
the population, giving more people a direct stake in maximizing the 
size of the corporate pie.181 
Allen and Kraakman make a similar point in their just-published 
and already-popular casebook.182 They argue that most of the time a 
duty of loyalty to shareholders is equivalent to a duty of loyalty to any 
other corporate constituency: 
180. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). Similarly, then-Chancellor (now-Professor) Allen described in 
the early 1990s the key rationale for the shareholder primacy view as follows: 
This rationale asserts that the purpose of business corporations is the creation of wealth, 
nothing else. It asserts that business corporations are not formed to assist in self-realization 
through social interaction; they are not formed to create jobs or to provide tax revenues; 
they are not formed to endow university departments or to pursue knowledge. All of these 
other things - job creation, tax payments, research, and social interaction - desirable as 
they may be, are said to be side effects of the pursuit of profit for the residual owners of 
the firm. 
This argument asserts that the creation of more wealth should always be the corporation's 
objective, regardless of who benefits. The sovereign's taxing and regulatory power can then 
address questions of social costs and re-distribution of wealth. Thus, profit maximizing 
behavior is seen as affording the best opportunity to satisfy human wants and is the most 
appropriate aim of corporation law policy. This second argument for the legitimacy of the 
corporation as shareholder property is not premised on the conclusion that shareholders do 
"own" the corporation in any ultimate sense, only on the premise that it can be better for all 
of us if we act as if they do. 
Allen, supra note 150, at 269-70. At the time (1992), Allen was not arguing that this 
conception was dominant, only that it was then rapidly gaining ground. See id. at 279-80. 
181. New ownership trends may also help ensure a more desirable distribution of that 
pie both by expanding the shareholder base and by helping to provide shareholders slightly 
more voice. Through pension plans and mutual funds, some have argued, the collective 
action problem facing shareholders may not be as significant as it once was. See, e.g., 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, at 452-53. Recent debacles in the mutual fund 
industry indicate, however, that the collective action problem is still quite acute. Moreover, 
stock ownership is still quite limited. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1229 (2002) 
(summarizing evidence that "[t]he vast majority of corporate stock held by individuals is 
held by wealthy individuals"). 
182. Actually, their casebook has, in one form or another, been quite popular for years. 
Reinier Kraakman has been generously sharing various renditions of it for well over a 
decade, and it has, for good reason, proved the favorite among many corporate law scholars, 
including most at Harvard Law School. 
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When a solvent corporation pursues its regular business activities, the 
interests of its management, creditors, employees, and stockholders are 
largely congruent with the interests of its equity investors. Thus, it makes 
no difference whether managers think of themselves as furthering long­
term shareholder interests or furthering a multiconstituency interest in 
long-term corporate welfare.183 
Another version of the pie-maximization argument is that a 
wealthy society, much like a wealthy person, can afford nice things. 
Encouraging profit making thus promotes those ends that are widely 
shared among stakeholders but are otherwise unaffordable. 
Easterbrook and Fischel observe: 
Wealthy firms provide better working conditions and clean up their 
outfalls; high profits produce social wealth that strengthens the demand 
for cleanliness. Environmental concerns are luxury goods; wealthy 
societies purchase much cleaner and healthier environments than do 
poorer nations - in part because well-to-do citizens want cleaner air and 
water, and in part because they can afford to pay for it.184 
Upon closer examination, according to this view, different types of 
stakeholders share a single interest: the public - in its various guises 
- benefits from those who pursue their private interests without 
regard to public concerns. Not only does allowing corporate managers 
to pursue profit single-mindedly just happen to yield many positive 
externalities for everyone in society, it also may be one of the best 
means of serving the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. Thus, 
Professors Allen and Kraakman write that "sophisticated proponents 
of the shareholder primacy goal" agree "that framing the board's 
mission as maximizing shareholder welfare also serves to maximize the 
welfare of other corporate constituencies and society as a whole. "185 
In sum, scholars have offered compelling arguments and evidence 
for the conclusion that shareholder primacy automatically serves all 
stakeholders in the name of serving just shareholders. 
183. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 286 (2003). Some scholars have gone further and 
claimed that the single-minded pursuit of profit is the best, and perhaps only, cure to certain 
social problems. See supra note 170 (summarizing Friedman's view on discrimination); see 
also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive 
Tactics: ls There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 261 n.45 (1989) 
("Note that for present purposes we assume that maximizing gains to target shareholders 
serves the broader objectives of shareholder and social welfare. This view is generally 
accepted by the courts but remains controversial among some commentators."). 
184. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 38. Easterbrook and Fischel 
compare U.S. and Soviet pollution records as empirical verification for their theoretical 
claim. Id. ("Soviet plants pollute more than American ones and produce less, because they 
give less attention to profit rather than despite the difference. Within this nation, goals 
competing with profits are most likely to be sacrificed as profits fall."). 
185. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 287-88. 
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b. Balancing Conflicting Interests Across Categories. The 
"maximizing shared interest" script - that the interests of 
shareholders and nonshareholders are naturally and automatically 
aligned - may satisfy those who are already inclined toward 
shareholder primacy. But to the nonbeliever, who is suspicious about 
the role of corporations and corporate law, the "shared interest" script 
holds little weight. 
What of the evidence, too commonly encountered, of corporate 
policies designed and justified as profit maximizing directly harming 
nonshareholder constituencies? What of the plant closings that 
destroy a community? What of the deadly products heavily promoted 
around the globe? What of the poor treatment of workers or the 
environment for the sake of profit? What of profit-maximizing 
discrimination? Proponents of shareholder primacy who have 
attempted to answer such questions have voiced several responses -
each of which admits that some nonshareholders may be hurt but 
argues that alternative policies would entail even larger welfare losses. 
The first answer insists that the price of freedom and long-term 
efficiency requires some short-term costs. The case for shareholder 
primacy - or capitalism, for that matter - is not premised on the 
notion that, if adopted, no one gets hurt. To the contrary, the 
presumption is that with freedom comes choice and with choice comes 
risk.186 To accept the meta script of policymaking and macro script of 
corporate law is to accept the possibility - no, the certainty - that 
some groups and individuals will get hurt. Like "tough love" or 
compassionate conservatism, the path to greater long-term individual 
and social welfare involves both risk and reward, both pain and gain. 
Easterbrook and Fischel write: 
Frequently the harmony of interest between profit maximization and 
other objectives escapes attention. Firms that close plants in one area 
while relocating production elsewhere are accused of lacking a sense of 
responsibility to affected workers and communities. Yet such a statement 
ignores the greater benefits that workers and communities in the new 
locale enjoy. (They must be greater, or there would be no profit in the 
move.) Firms that cause dislocations by moving their plants are no less 
ethical than firms that cause dislocations by inventing new products that 
cause their rivals to go out of business, yielding unemployment at the 
failed firm. All competition produces dislocation - all progress produces 
dislocation (pity the makers of vacuum tubes and slide rules! )  - and to 
try to stop the wrenching shifts of a capitalist economy is to try to stop 
economic growth.187 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. 
187. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 38-39. Another common response to 
particularly egregious examples of harmed constituencies is to claim that the policy reflected 
"bad business" or "unprofitable" decisionmaking that would not be sustained in the market 
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Those upset about the outcomes suffered by a particular 
constituency, then, are often just calling the glass half empty when, in 
fact, it's nine-tenths full. A given group may have to pay a price for the 
many greater benefits that it previously enjoyed or will eventually 
enjoy.188 Or one group may have to take a hit so that others can hit it 
big. But, one way or another, competitions produce not only winners, 
but also losers. And the existence of losers is the inevitable and telltale 
by-product of progress. Tempering those risks by curtailing the forces 
that generate them is tantamount to biting the invisible hand that 
feeds us.189 
That argument, like the simpler one reviewed in the previous 
Section, is premised almost entirely on faith. It may be true that harms 
generated by profit-seeking institutions are trivial in comparison to 
those that would be suffered by us all were we to adopt an alternative 
regime. But it also may be false. Those skeptical of Friedman's good 
news about markets typically require more. Much of the legal 
academic scholarship over the past several decades has been devoted 
to amassing arguments and evidence to fill in what Friedman left out. 
That effort leads to the second answer. 
The more sophisticated corporate law scholarship today begins by 
conceding, even emphasizing, that there are unintended, untoward 
consequences of the single-minded pursuit of profit. It then carefully 
argues why profit primacy is nonetheless in all stakeholders' 
interests.190 There are a variety of versions of this approach, most of 
which seem complementary. For the balance of this Section, we 
attempt to summarize the main elements of those arguments.191 
To frame the issue, many scholars begin by asserting that, precisely 
because of the conflict among corporate constituencies, the law must 
limit corporate fiduciary obligations to just one. Otherwise, the 
argument goes, neither corporate decisionmakers nor their monitors 
long term. Evidence of policies that seem to lower social welfare can thus be treated as 
evidence confirming, not undermining, the shareholder primacy norm. 
188. As Mark Roe describes the conventional argument: "Current employees might be 
made worse off in some industries, but employees overall will have more opportunities, 
higher salaries, and better working conditions." Roe, supra note 154, at 2065. 
189. Some scholars argue that, because corporate law, corporations, and all of their 
various constituencies are governed more or less by contract, current arrangements are 
prima facie good. We will explore that argument more thoroughly below. See infra text 
accompanying notes 379-392. For now, we want only to highlight the legitimating role that 
choice sometimes plays in the case for the shareholder primacy norm. 
190. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
191. Our goal here is not to detail the arguments of any one scholar, but to survey the 
arguments that seem to have been more or less accepted by the majority of corporate law 
scholars. For the most sophisticated and lengthy justification of shareholder primacy, see 
Henry Hansmann's book on the topic. HANSMANN, supra note 153. As thorough as 
Hansmann's analysis is, it is no less susceptible to many of the illusions that we describe infra 
Parts IV & V. 
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can distinguish good decisions from bad ones, and those in power will 
be free - consciously or not - to pursue their own private interests, 
to everyone else's detriment. The point was made at least as early as 
1932, when Adolph Berle was first building the case for shareholder 
primacy: 
[Y]ou can not abandon emphasis on "the view that business corporations 
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders" until 
such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable 
scheme of responsibilities to someone else . . . .  Otherwise the economic 
power now mobilized and massed under the corporate form . . .  is simply 
handed over, weakly, to the present administrators with a pious wish that 
something nice will come out of it all.192 
A half century later, Robert Clark summarized the point, in his 
seminal corporate law hornbook, as follows: 
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored 
than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable 
accommodation of all affected interests. It is easier, for example, to tell if 
a corporate manager is doing what she is supposed to do than to tell if a 
university president is doing what she is supposed to do. Assuming[, as 
Clark does,193 that] shareholders have some control mechanisms, better 
monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept more 
accountable. They are more likely to do what they are supposed to do 
and do it efficiently.194 
Clark stressed the importance of monitoring again elsewhere, stating 
that an alternative regime would mean that "corporate 
decisionmakers would not be assigned the task of maximizing a single, 
objective, easily monitored goal . . .  [making it] very difficult to keep 
them truly accountable to a vague statement of purposes."195 
In the following decade, Easterbrook and Fischel built their path­
breaking efficiency-based corporate law work around the principle 
that shareholders come first. In their notably efficient words: 
[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a 
little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to 
neither. Faced with a demand from either group, the manager can appeal 
to the interests of the other. Agency costs rise and social wealth falls. 196 
192. Berle, Note on Trustees, supra note 120, at 1367-68. 
193. "They do. The major control mechanisms are their ability to vote in new directors, 
to respond favorably to tender offers for control, and to bring derivative lawsuits." See 
CLARK, supra note 161, at 20 n.51. 
194. Id. at 20 (citation omitted). Clark remakes the argument later in the same book. Id. 
at 679. 
195. Id. at 692. 
196. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 38; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 420 (4th ed. 1992) ("The manager who tries both to produce 
for the market at lowest cost and to improve society is likely to do neither well."). 
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Similarly, Mark Roe describes the argument in the following way: 
" [A] stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave 
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their 
own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, 
consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own."197 Economist 
Michael Jensen writes: 
[A] single-valued objective is a prerequisite for purposeful or rational 
behavior by any organization. In particular a firm that adopts 
stakeholder theory will be handicapped in the competition for survival 
because, as a basis for action, stakeholder theory politicizes the 
corporation and leaves its managers empowered to exercise their own 
preferences in spending the firm's resources. Equally important, 
shareholders internalize this [shareholder] criterion and may come to use 
it stringently in the evaluation of managerial performance.198 
The key assumption in all of this deserves reiteration, because it will 
be a major focus when we begin to discuss the signs of illusion: 
shareholder primacy makes an important difference in managerial 
decision-making and in the ability of shareholders, courts, and others 
to monitor those decisions.199 
Thus far, this second type of defense of shareholder primacy may 
help explain why boards should have only a single constituency, but it 
does not explain why that constituency should be shareholders. After 
all, the benefits of simplified decision-making and reduced agency 
costs owing to improved monitoring would seem to apply no matter 
the stakeholder group. 
In the face of challenges on this issue, scholars have offered a 
seemingly watertight set of arguments for why that special privilege 
should go to shareholders. The arguments can be categorized into 
three steps: (1) other stakeholders don't need the protection of 
corporate managers and corporate law; (2) shareholders do; and, in 
any event, (3) it is the approach that corporations have chosen. We 
turn now to providing an extended version of that script. 
i. Nonshareholders Don't Need Corporate Protection. The first step 
of the argument - that nonshareholder constituencies don't need 
197. Roe, supra note 154, at 2065. 
198. Jensen, supra note 158, at 10; cf Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and 
American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241, 245 (Nov. 1990) ("It is important that all 
stakeholder interests be considered but impossible to assure that all will be satisfied because 
competing claims may be mutually exclusive."). 
199. See also Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 
75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 189, 1200 (2002) (noting that the "need to measure and monitor agent 
performance provides the foundation for the best of the standard arguments for shareholder 
primacy"). We should note that Blair and Stout's team production work, see supra note 156, 
is based on the idea that "the emphasis placed on principal-agent problems in the corporate 
literature during the last two decades has been both excessive and misleading." See id. 
at 328. 
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corporate law's protection - is fairly straightforward. Whether you're 
concerned about workers, consumers, or members of the community, 
all other stakeholders already enjoy the protection of other private 
and public legal-regulatory mechanisms - from various statutory and 
regulatory protections to common law protections including tort and 
contract, and from protective market forces to ethical imperatives 
impinging on corporate decisionmakers.200 
Consider, for instance, the risks facing corporate employees. On 
the private side, contracting - including collective bargaining - and 
market dynamics are thought to provide considerable protection to 
the labor force. When workers agree to work for a corporation for a 
certain wage, they are made better off by that arrangement than they 
would be in their next-best job at a different wage (or without a job or 
wage at all). Otherwise, they wouldn't have reached the agreement. 
Absent some clear evidence of a market failure such as imperfect 
information, there is every reason to trust the choices of corporate 
employees. But there is also the public side of protection. Even with 
some market imperfections, workers (in this country at least) enjoy 
significant forms of regulatory protection, including pension laws, 
health and safety laws, minimum-wage laws, injury and disability 
compensation arrangements, antidiscrimination laws, sexual 
harassment laws, tort laws, and so on. So, the argument goes, there is 
no good reason to require corporate decisionmakers to take into 
account the interests of employees (any more than they otherwise 
would because of existing market and regulatory pressures). 
With respect to consumers, the same two-part argument applies. 
First, consumers are protected by markets and contracting. If 
consumers don't like a product, they can simply not purchase it. 
Product warranties also protect consumers against certain risks, and 
those warranties are efficient, assuming product markets work 
reasonably well. Other less obvious markets or market actors also get 
involved. Doctors act as helpful intermediaries between patients and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Consumer-oriented groups, such as the 
200. As Robert Clark notes, this element of the macro script is especially counter­
intuitive to, and therefore not so easily digested by, many corporate law neophytes. Clark 
writes: 
Students studying corporate law for the first time are often puzzled or angered by the failure 
of the legal doctrines they encounter to do anything toward the effective solution of 
numerous social problems caused by corporations. As a result, they may object to the 
apparently unbridled power of corporate managers. Some, but by no means all, of the 
puzzlement may be dissolved when they realize that traditionally, the subjects of corporation 
law and securities regulation are simply defined to deal only with relationships between 
shareholders and managers {directors and officers), i.e., with the most capitalistic of 
relationships affecting capitalist enterprise. Business corporation statutes and the securities 
laws do not preclude laws regulating other corporate relationships. There are in fact a great 
many such laws. 
CLARK, supra note 161, at 30. 
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Consumers Union, act as informers and watchdogs on behalf of 
consumers. And the media often acts to provide consumers 
information and warnings that will help protect them in the 
marketplace. Second, even if consumer-product markets are not 
perfectly well-functioning, considerable regulation already exists to 
assist consumers. If a product injures the consumer, for instance, the 
consumer can often obtain compensation through products liability 
law. Moreover, there are numerous regulatory agencies devoted to 
protecting consumers - such as the Food and Drug Administration, 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission. Those 
agencies do everything from testing products, to requiring product 
disclosures, to setting standards for marketing, to mandating recalls, to 
fining corporations for violating regulatory prohibitions. There are 
also antitrust laws and the Department of Justice to protect consumers 
against any anticompetitive urges that sellers might have. Why should 
corporate law attempt to accomplish what these other areas of law and 
experts are specifically designed to achieve? Even if there were some 
problem with those agencies and other areas of law, it is difficult to see 
why corporate law, instead of these other areas of law, should be 
reformed to address that problem. 
With respect to creditors and corporate suppliers, the same basic 
dynamics are said to be in place - though with a twist. These parties 
obviously can contract with the corporations to protect their interests; 
indeed, the relationship a corporation has with its creditors is 
prototypically contractual. According to conventional wisdom, 
however, because shareholders enjoy "limited liability," creditors are 
sometimes described as slightly more vulnerable to harmful corporate 
consequences, which is why business law is said to adjust somewhat to 
protect corporate creditors. And so it is that corporate law in most 
U.S. jurisdictions employs some form of dividend restriction and 
sometimes allows creditors to collect against a corporation outside of 
contract, pursuant to fraudulent conveyance law and veil-piercing 
doctrines. In addition, corporations are subject to other forms of 
regulatory restrictions and mandates - including those exacted 
through our complex systems of bankruptcy law. Again, with those 
protections in place, it makes little sense, according to the 
conventional wisdom, to deploy corporate law in a redundant effort to 
protect creditors. 
Finally, with respect to corporate influence on local communities 
or society more generally, the same script applies. Municipalities and 
governments can and often do negotiate with corporations to perform 
certain functions and provide certain services for the community. 
Similarly, corporations often understand that it is in their interest -
just good business - to be good local citizens and so voluntarily agree 
to behave accordingly. In addition, of course, there are numerous 
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forms of regulation that communities can and do create to influence 
corporate behavior: environmental laws, nuisance laws, zoning 
restrictions, and tax laws. It is through those institutions and laws that 
the public voices and exercises its will. There is no need to ask 
corporate directors and managers to attempt to divine the "public 
interest" beyond what those laws already reveal. Furthermore, if the 
public wants more resources going toward some noncorporate goal, 
they can simply spend their own money in that direction. There is no 
need for a corporate middle person between what the public desires 
and what the public gets. 
Corporate scholars have relied on many of those arguments to 
buttress the case for shareholder primacy.201 Robert Clark, for 
example, writes: 
[N]o one need be made worse off by the corporation's having a single 
goal of profit maximization. The interests of nonshareholder groups like 
employees can be protected by contract, common law developments, and 
special legislation. Negative externalities like pollution can be corrected 
by tort law or by pollution laws telling companies not to pollute or taxing 
them when they do. The production of public goods like defense and the 
redistribution of wealth from rich to poor can be better accomplished by 
actual governments, which have a more legitimate claim to do these 
things. And corporate resources can still be diverted to these 
governmental activities, in small or great measure, as elected represen­
tatives see fit, because governments can tax both corporations and their 
shareholders. 202 
201. For example, James Cox and Thomas Hazen argue as follows: 
The concentration of most businesses into a relatively few huge incorporated units is not due 
primarily to lax corporation laws or even to a corporation's privilege to hold shares in other 
corporations. Whether bigness in business should be curtailed or regulated, and how such 
controls should be accomplished, are unsettled questions of economic policy, not of 
corporation law. Various economic issues - for example, whether and the extent to which 
production, competition, monopoly, labor conditions, profits, and the concentration of 
wealth should be controlled by government - call for patient, thorough study. This task of 
regulating corporate bigness and curtailing supposed corporate 'evils' should not be 
confused with the task of establishing modem corporation laws to facilitate incorporation 
and to define and enforce the rights and duties of shareholders, directors, and officers. 
JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 39 (2003); see also JAMES D. Cox, 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS 37 (1997) (citing Thomas L. 
Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate 
Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 391). 
202. CLARK, supra note 161, at 20-21;  see also id. at 680 (making the same argument). It 
bears noting that Clark himself does not explicitly endorse this element of the macro script 
and seems, at one point, somewhat agnostic: 
Considering both prongs of the argument - that a single, objective goal increases 
management's accountability but need not preempt direct governmental regulation of 
corporations to make them socially responsible - one might conclude that profit 
maximization is a legitimate and desirable goal for business corporations. 
Whether this chain of reasoning actually withstands analysis is a hard question that 
demands a great deal of background knowledge. 
56 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1 
According to Clark, not only is that a possibility, it is a reality. "Every 
major relationship between the corporation and persons or groups it 
affects is subject to vast and intricate bodies of legal doctrine and to 
legal enforcement mechanisms."203 "These currently available controls 
include market forces, for example, corporation behavior is powerfully 
affected by consumer choices; legal mechanisms, for example, 
consumers can sue under existing tort law and consumer protection 
laws; and the right to lobby governments to tax and regulate 
corporation in certain ways."204 
More recently, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman devoted the 
better part of an article to fleshing out the case for shareholder 
primacy. Like Clark, Hansmann and Kraakman are careful to point 
out that making shareholders primary in corporate law "does not 
imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go 
unprotected": 
It merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for 
protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies - or at least all 
constituencies other than creditors - lie outside of corporate law. For 
workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, pension law, health 
and safety law, and antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it includes 
product safety regulation, warranty law, tort law governing product 
liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of product contents and 
characteristics. For the public at large, it includes environmental law and 
the law of nuisance and mass torts.205 
Id. at 21 .  
203. Id. at 678. 
204. Id. at 692. 
205. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, at 442. Further, Jonathan Macey argues 
as follows: 
[T)he traditional common law rules of corporate governance, which provide that corporate 
directors have an exclusive obligation to maximize value for residual claimants and which 
rely on the contracting process to protect the legitimate and important interests of third 
parties, do not "exploit" nonshareholder constituencies. Rather, they best serve the interests 
of society as a whole. 
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment 
of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 201 (1989) 
Some take the argument a step further. Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, assert 
that shareholder primacy actually allows for more effective protections of nonshareholder 
constituencies when society confronts the question of how best "to deal with pollution, 
bribery, plant closings, and other decisions that have effects on people who may not 
participate in the corporate contract": 
Given wealth as a maximand, society may change corporate conduct by imposing monetary 
penalties. These reduce the venturers' wealth, so managers will attempt to avoid them. A 
pollution tax, for example, would induce the firm to emit less. It would behave as if it had 
the interests of others at heart. Society thus takes advantage of the wealth-maximizing 
incentives built into the firm in order to alter its behavior at least cost. .  .. Society must 
choose whether to conscript the firm's strength (its tendency to maximize wealth) by 
changing the prices it confronts or by changing its structure so that it is less apt to maximize 
wealth. The latter choice will yield less of both good ends than the former. 
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Relatedly, Allen and Kraakman, in their just-published casebook, note 
that " [t]he laws of taxation, education, environmental and labor 
policy, product safety, and other issues of health, safety, and welfare" 
exist to "address the distribution of risks and rewards in society."206 
This important set of legitimating arguments for shareholder 
primacy is commonly offered, not only by academics and judges, but 
also by business leaders. The Business Roundtable, for instance, 
echoes this fuller rendition of the macro script, stressing the notion 
that nonshareholder constituencies are well protected outside of 
corporate law: 
Corporations are chartered to serve both their shareholders and 
society as a whole. The interests of the shareholders are primarily 
measured in terms of economic return over time. The interests of others 
in society (other stakeholders) are defined by their relationship to the 
corporation. 
The other stakeholders in the corporation are its employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, the communities where the corporation 
does business, and society as a whole. The duties and responsibilities of 
the corporation to the stakeholders are expressed in various laws, 
regulations, contracts, and custom and practice. 
For instance, OSHA, civil rights laws, wage and hour laws, ERISA 
regulations and so forth determine many of the formal conditions of 
employment. Beyond these laws, the desire of responsible corporations 
to have loyal and motivated employees determines the kinds of 
relationships that corporations seek to achieve with and among their 
employees. 
Similarly, zoning laws, environmental regulations, the tax code and 
related laws and regulations define the corporation's legal obligations to 
its communities and society as a whole. As with employees, many 
corporations go far beyond mere legal requirements in supporting the 
communities in which they do business. The reasons range from wanting 
their employees to enjoy a good quality of life to a strong sense of 
responsibility, as an influential citizen, to help address urgent social 
problems.207 
Sometimes corporate critics suggest that our ethical system, or our 
systems of values and morality, are debased by corporate culture and 
the consumerism that goes along with it. Responses to those claims 
have taken a familiar form. Corporations are merely responding to the 
preferences of consumers as manifested through consumer product 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 37-38. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, 
then, shareholder primacy is justified not just because other constituencies enjoy other forms 
of protection but also because those alternative forms are more efficacious in a regime in 
which managers' allegiance is to shareholders and shareholders alone. 
206. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 2. 
207. Business Roundtable, supra note 198, at 244. 
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markets. If there is a problem with social values, then that's a job for 
the civic, social, and religious institutions of our culture and would 
seem to have nothing to do with the largely reactive and reflective 
conduct of corporations. And, again, if there is some corporate 
behavior that is deemed unethical by the public, they have avenues for 
curtailing that behavior. 
For example, this rationale can be found in the justifications 
offered by corporate executives, seeking to justify the concrete 
consequences of their pursuit of profit. Here, the rubber of the macro 
script meets the road of market practices. For example, Steven 
Goldstone, as Chief Executive Officer of RJR Nabisco, had this to say 
about the cigarette industry: "I have no moral view of this 
business . . . .  I view[] it as a legal business. You shouldn't be drawing a 
moral judgment about a business our country says is perfectly 
legal . . . .  "208 "I know these guys love to put this in moral terms, but if 
they can't convince Congress to ban [tobacco], we don't have any 
choice but to sell it. "209 
Together, the arguments discussed above represent the key 
reasons offered for not giving corporate law protection to all those 
other stakeholders. Yet the question remains: why make directors and 
officers loyal to the interests of shareholders? According to 
conventional wisdom, the answer does not simply follow from the 
process of elimination. There are several positive reasons why 
shareholder primacy makes sense. 
ii. Shareholders Do Need Protection. One key set of arguments for 
why shareholders - as opposed to some other corporate constituency 
- deserve the special, undivided protection of corporate law is the 
mirror image of the arguments offered above. That is, shareholders 
enjoy far less security from private mechanisms, such as contracting 
and market forces, or public mechanisms, such as administrative 
regulators, than do other constituencies. It is the shareholders, 
therefore, who are most vulnerable to adverse corporate consequences 
and most in need of corporate law's protections. Furthermore, 
directors and managers have the necessary expertise and are well 
placed to represent shareholder interests. That, according to 
conventional wisdom, is the primary purpose of corporate law: to 
ensure that directors and managers provide to shareholders the special 
protection that they need and can't otherwise obtain.210 
208. Jeffrey Goldberg, Big Tobacco's Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,  1998, § 6 
(Magazine), at 41. 
209. Id. at 62. 
210. As indicated above, creditors are a notable exception to the shareholder-centric 
focus of corporate law - the exception that proves the rule. See supra Part 111.B.2.b.i. 
Because of the problems posed by limited liability vehicles, "[t]here remains general 
agreement that corporate law should directly regulate some aspects of the relationship 
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What is it that makes shareholders so vulnerable? On the private 
side, shareholders are thought to have a difficult time protecting 
themselves contractually. Tens of thousands of them contribute 
varying amounts of capital to corporate enterprise. The beauty of that 
arrangement, of course, is that corporations can thus raise money from 
many disaggregated individuals to engage in risky, capital-intensive 
ventures, without subjecting any single investor to too much risk.21 1  
The downside is  that none of those individuals obtain a large enough 
stake in the corporation to justify monitoring it carefully or to do 
much about it if they did take the time to monitor and disliked what 
they saw. The benefits of monitoring or taking action accrue to all 
shareholders but the costs are borne by the individual shareholders 
who monitor. So, none monitor: 
In the typical publicly traded U.S. business corporation, no individual 
shareholder possesses a block of stock sufficiently large to provide a 
meaningful degree of control. This is true not only for individual 
shareholders, but even for groups of shareholders that might wish to act 
collectively in influencing corporate activity. For example, the five 
largest shareholders in General Motors - themselves institutions that 
represent the interests of highly dispersed individuals - together hold 
less than 6 percent of the corporation's stock. As a result, the managers 
of many large corporations have long been essentially self-appointing 
and self-policing, free of direct accountability to their company's 
owners.212 
between a business corporation and its creditors." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, 
at 442. We return to a discussion of creditors later in our companion article. See Chen & 
Hanson, Legitimating Schemas II, supra note 10. For now we observe only that this 
exception is used as additional evidence that, indeed, corporate law reflects a concern for 
protecting any and all constituencies that do not otherwise enjoy adequate protection. 
211 .  Shareholder primacy is sometimes justified as a means of attracting shareholders' 
money. Shareholders deserve special protection because large enterprises are good for 
everyone and because, without special protection, shareholders will not contribute their 
wealth toward large enterprises. Robert Clark offers one rendition of this argument: 
Better accountability (to shareholders] . . .  encourages people to participate in large 
organizations, in which claims on the organization and the power to manage it are 
necessarily separated; it helps such organizations exist and function well. Large 
organizations are in turn often desirable for everyone. They increase social welfare, because 
without them certain large scale business ventures would be impossible or would be carried 
out in a wasteful way. 
CLARK, supra note 161, at 20; see also id. at 679-80. That argument presumes that large 
enterprises designed to serve solely shareholder interests happen also to increase social 
welfare. That presumption makes sense only if the first part of this more general case holds 
true - that is, that other constituencies are adequately protected. If it happens that large 
enterprises are harming certain constituencies and that social welfare is not necessarily 
increased in a shareholder primacy regime, then "better accountability" to the single 
constituency of equity holders may be undesirable, even if it does attract equity capital and 
subsidize large enterprises. 
212. HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 57 (citations omitted). 
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Securities laws enacted initially to help shareholders cope with this 
problem proved ineffective - and some say made matters worse.213 
Thus while collective contributions of shareholders reduce one type of 
risk, the resultant collective action problem creates a new sort of risk, 
to which corporate law purports to respond. 
Another explanation for why shareholders alone deserve the 
protection that corporate law affords begins - and virtually ends -
with the premise that shareholders are unique among stakeholders in 
the sense that they all share one and only one interest - · the 
maximization of profits. As Hansmann writes, "Investor-owned firms 
have the important advantage that their owners generally share a 
single well-defined objective: to maximize the net present value of the 
firm's earnings. The costs of collective decisionmaking are thus 
relatively low for investor-owned firms."214 
All the other stakeholders have a variety of interests, and no 
shared sense of how to rank them.215 Thus, among the larger group of 
"workers," some would prefer higher wages, others would prefer 
better working conditions, others would prefer better health-care 
coverage, and others would prefer better family leave policies. That 
conflict, inherent within all the other stakeholder groups, makes 
coordination, communication, and governance considerably more 
difficult - perhaps impossible - to do well. In comparison, 
shareholders, who simply want profit, are far easier to please.216 
iii. The Pressures of the Situation. This third step is really a 
supplement to the first two - a sort of validation that the correct legal 
regime has developed. Proponents of the macro script argue that 
213. The fact that shareholders do not enjoy robust regulatory protection outside of 
corporate law may be changing, as regulators purport to be cracking down on directors and 
managers on behalf of shareholders. The belief has long been, however, that there really is 
no effective form of regulatory protection for shareholders other than corporate law. 
214. HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 62. 
215. Hansmann notes that the conflicts that do exist among investors ("differences in 
tax status, risk preference, or liquidity") "can be eliminated by having them sort themselves 
among firms that have adopted different policies. Whatever differences that remain are 
likely to be modest in comparison with those that divide other classes of a firm's patrons, 
such as its employees or customers." Id. 
216. As we noted earlier, the existence of a single maximand has important implications 
for decisionmaking and monitoring. See supra text accompanying notes 192-199. As 
Hansmann explains: 
[T]he existence of a reasonably obvious, simple, and even quantifiable common objective for 
a firm's investors as investors promotes efficiency by providing a relatively clear standard to 
employ in constructing legally imposed fiduciary obligations to limit self-dealing by powerful 
subgroups of shareholders. (The existence of a simple and quantifiable objective also 
reduces the agency costs incurred by a firm's shareholders as a whole in policing the firm's 
management, both by making it easier for them to judge managerial performance and by 
increasing the effectiveness of indirect - that is, nonvoting - devices for controlling 
managers such as professionalism, peer pressure, and shareholders' derivative suits.) 
HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 62. 
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directors and managers already face strong market pressures to 
behave as if they are profit maximizers - and the market rewards 
them for their profit-maximizing choices. In fact, the pressures that 
product markets, capital markets, and labor markets create constrains 
directors and managers, eliminating any discretion to pursue the 
interests of nonshareholder constituencies. 
Whatever the purported objective of corporate decision-making, 
any board will have to take profit maximization into account (or 
behave as if it does). To survive in the marketplace requires profits. 
To thrive requires lots of profits.217 Thus, it is difficult to imagine that 
profits will not be a primary concern for corporate decisionmakers. 
And, given the assumption that directors can't serve two masters, it 
follows that profit should be their only master. 
Clark emphasizes the fact that, all other arguments 
notwithstanding, directors really have little choice but to pursue profit 
because of the discretion-limiting influence of situational (that is, 
market) pressures. Managerial attempts to serve stakeholders in a way 
that sacrifices profits 
is only likely to be possible within a range of action that corresponds to 
managerial slack. In short, it is not likely to work very well; its economic 
effects are likely to be modest after all. For example, if any one 
corporation's board of directors decides to comply voluntarily with an 
expensive regulatory statute but their competitors do not, their company 
may take a beating in the market for its products. In addition, when the 
company's actual stock market value drops (because of its reduced 
earnings) relative to its potential value (as revealed by comparison to the 
stock market values of noncomplying competitor companies), the 
company may well become the subject of a takeover bid, after which the 
idealistic managers will be replaced. To be sure, these adverse reactions 
from the product and capital markets would not occur if managers of all 
firms in the industry acted as modest idealists. But how, short of coercive 
collective action of some sort, is the state of affairs going to come about? 
Any individual corporation will observe that the best of all possible 
worlds would be for the other corporations to act as modest idealists 
while it acted as a calculating opportunist, because then it would gain an 
enormous competitive advantage.218 
217. Similarly, Easterbrook and Fischel observe that "self-interested entrepreneurs and 
managers, just like other investors, are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize net 
profits." EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 6. 
218. CLARK, supra note 161, at 687-88. The structure of Clark's argument is, as will 
become clear, common among proponents of shareholder primacy. That is, the observation 
is made that because of situational pressures, corporate decisionmakers, whatever their 
dispositions, will not be able to pursue non-profit-maximizing ends for long, lest they be 
driven out of business: 
If the idealist viewpoint were implemented by some form of managerial decision making, the 
managers might well lack the incentive or the slack to pursue the more broadly defined goals 
to a significant extent, unless they were somehow shielded more effectively than they now 
are from takeover bids, derivative lawsuits and competition in their product markets. 
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In light of such pressures, Richard Posner writes: 
The debate over whether modern corporations are really profit 
maximizers may have little practical significance. 
There are economic reasons for questioning both the feasibility and 
appropriateness of major corporate commitments to social goals other 
than profit maximization. In competitive markets, a sustained 
commitment to any goal other than profitability will result in the firm's 
shrinking, quite possibly to nothing. The firm that channels profits into 
pollution control will not be able to recoup its losses by charging higher 
prices to its customers. The customers do not benefit as customers from 
such expenditures; more precisely, they benefit just as much from those 
expenditures if they purchase the lower-priced product of a competing 
firm that does not incur them. Thus the firm will have to defray the 
expenses of pollution control entirely out of its profits . . . .  
It is true that . . .  [a firm] may be able . . .  to continue in business by 
reducing its output. But it will not survive indefinitely, for at its lower 
output it will be unable to pay the owners of the scarce resources (land, 
technical skills, etc.) that it uses a rent equal to what those owners could 
obtain elsewhere; monopsony is rarely a long-run game . . . .  The only 
exception would be if the owners of these resources (who might be the 
firm's shareholders) were altruists who received utility from the firm's 
practice of social responsibility. How likely is that?219 
According to the basic script, not very likely. Executives, too, may be 
selfishly motivated in this model. But that's not the problem, because 
even the executive who embraces "personal power as a maximand"220 
will likely be constrained by market pressures to maximize profits: 
The most powerful corporate executive is the one who controls a highly 
profitable enterprise. He is least likely to encounter criticism from 
Id. Clark further elaborates the point as follows: 
[C]orporate behavior must often bend to the other controlling forces, such as consumer 
choices in the product markets. If a company keeps a relatively inefficient plant in operation, 
for example, it may have to charge more than competitors, lose business, and eventually be 
forced to change its practice or seek a government bailout. This need not happen if 
competitors are following similar policies of accommodating nonshareholder interest. But, 
once again, one must realize the limits of voluntary collective action. 
Id. at 692. Of course, if there were some way - through legal rules, taxes, norms, process 
requirements, board-composition requirements, and the like - of placing situational 
pressures on all boards to pursue non-profit-maximizing ends, then the sorts of impediments 
that they mention would not exist. All firms would share the incentives, and survival would 
require optimally balancing those and other situational pressures. Thus, to observe that 
under current legal rules it is all but impossible for firms to give too much weight to non­
profit-maximizing ends can, depending on the reform proposal, beg the question of whether 
the legal rule should endorse shareholder primacy. See infra text accompanying notes 370-
391 (discussing "illusion of freedom") . 
219. POSNER, supra note 196, at 419-20. 
220. Id. at 419. 
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shareholders, let alone a threat of a takeover. In addition, large profits 
generate capital (and enable additional capital to be obtained on 
favorable terms) that he can use for additional ventures.221 
63 
That leads to a related element of the macro script, which finds its 
roots in a simplistic version of Darwin's theory of evolution and 
natural selection. Owing to the situational pressures just described, 
scholars have argued that that there has been an evolutionary process 
at work within corporate law that has slowly but surely given us the 
ideal species of the corporation. The "survival of the fittest" works not 
only in the natural world, but also in the legal one. 
Echoing those themes, William Allen has argued: 
Each of the two dominant social trends that will exert potentially 
transformative power on corporate governance in the years immediately 
ahead - the evolution of a truly global economy and the continuing 
growth, and coming dominance, of institutional shareholders - is more 
consistent with the property conception of the corporation than with the 
entity conception. 
As the world becomes a fiercer place for American business, 
corporate management is forced increasingly to consider financial 
performance at every stage. Thus, evolving global markets encourage 
efficiency and value-creating management. These developments tend to 
push shareholders, as residual risk bearers, back towards the center of 
thinking about the enterprise.222 
All of the situational pressures are said to be pushing corporations and 
corporate law toward welfare-maximizing laws and conduct. As if 
through natural selection, the modern corporate form has emerged the 
fittest among the alternatives. As Hansmann and Kraakman observe, 
"the standard model earned its position as the dominant model of the 
large corporation the hard way, by out-competing during the post­
World War II period the three alternative models of corporate 
governance."223 Easterbrook and Fischel similarly observe, "Over tens 
of years and thousands of firms . . .  tendencies emerge. The firms and 
managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative 
to others. "224 
This use of the evolutionary schema helps shed light on other 
elements of the script. In particular, it provides comfort that the 
situational pressures legal economists identified above not only exist, 
but are good - indeed, the strongest and best form that nature can 
provide. The evolutionary element also provides support for the idea 
that regulation is unnecessary and even detrimental. Indeed, any 
221. Id. 
222. Allen, supra note 150, at 279. 
223. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, at 468. 
224. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 6. 
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institution that is not subjected to the rigors of natural selection is 
likely to be wanting. As Easterbrook and Fischel write: 
Corporate governance devices that have survived in many firms for 
extended periods are particularly unlikely candidates for challenge as 
mistakes. We have emphasized that the durability of a practice both 
enables people to gauge its effects and allows competition among firms 
to weed out the practices that do not assist investors. There is no similar 
process of weeding out among academic ideas or regulations. Quite the 
contrary, mandatory terms prescribed by law halt the process of natural 
selection and evaluation. Unless there is a strong reason to believe 
that regulation has a comparative advantage over competition in markets 
in evaluating the effects of corporate contracts . . . there is no basis 
for displacing actual arrangements as "mistakes," "exploitation," and 
the like. 225 
Where regulations often go untested, corporations do not. And the 
corporate forms that are weak will, according to Easterbrook and 
Fischel, be "ground under by competition."226 Similarly, states that do 
not adapt will be "ground under as well. "227 
This belief in the evolution of the corporate form provides us great 
comfort that the laws and systems - and, indeed, the dominant macro 
script - we see in place have survived the test of competition and 
emerged as the fittest means of advancing society's interests.228 
c. The Illegitimacy of Social Responsibility. As we highlighted 
earlier, the modem macro script, like Friedman's original version, 
includes the argument that corporate boards and managers are not 
competent to make decisions based on social-responsibility concerns. 
Corporate law scholars sometimes push that argument further, 
pointing out that, because virtually all institutions are similarly unable 
to discern what choices serve the public interest, only specially 
designed democratic institutions should be given that task. According 
to Allen and Kraakman, corporate law is, by design, concerned with 
only "a slice of the human experience. Thus, legitimate political 
questions about, for example, the social distribution of wealth fall well 
outside the competence of corporate law."229 
225. Id. at 31-32. 
226. Id. at 13. 
227. Id. 
228. The scholars who advance this element of the script provide large amounts of 
evidence that document this process. We save a review of that evidence for another article in 
this series. See Chen & Hanson, False Starts, supra note 29. 
229. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 2. Relatedly, their initial observation 
conveys the notion that there is more to consider than "total wealth" or "even our share in 
it." Id. Yet after noting the concern with the "state of the world around us" and "the 
welfare of others," they return to the notion that the societal distribution of wealth is the 
critical counter-consideration to the maximization of wealth. Id. We have more to say on this 
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Governmental institutions - particularly legislatures - and only 
those institutions should concern themselves with big-picture issues 
while the rest of us should, literally and figuratively, mind our own 
business. This belief is implicit in Friedman's claim that those who 
object to the consequences of corporate profit-seeking have no valid 
complaint, for they have obviously "failed to persuade a majority of 
their fellow citizens to be of like mind and . . .  are seeking to attain by 
undemocratic procedures what they cannot attain by democratic 
procedures. "230 
From this vantage point, proponents of the dominant macro script 
of corporate law often argue that, even if directors and managers 
wanted to provide protection to nonshareholder constituencies, the 
law should prohibit them from doing so. It is neither their purpose nor 
within their expertise, and allowing them to try to serve social ends 
violates democratic principles. Although Robert Clark doesn't go as 
far as Friedman, who called the concern for social responsibility 
"unadulterated socialism," he comes close: 
[I]t would constitute an illegitimate form of government - a case of 
oligarchy in disguise, and on a very grand scale indeed. When 
implemented by managerial or shareholder decision making, the high 
idealist's brand of social responsibility will reflect mostly upper class 
preferences. Consider, for example, that over half of the corporate stocks 
and bonds owned by individuals (or estates, trusts, and the like) in the 
United States are held by the wealthiest one percent of the population, 
and that managers of large publicly held corporations are paid incomes 
that send them into orbits far above the ordinary ground-level income. 
Policies defined by such persons will have a very different scheme of 
priorities and effects than policies made by democratically elected 
representatives of the entire population.231 
The argument runs as follows: because corporate decisionmakers are 
likely to have a biased (that is upper-class) vision of the "public 
interest," they should not be permitted to pursue the "public interest. "  
Instead, the public i s  better off if this elite group remains "apolitical" 
and focuses on only profits, while our institutions of democracy take 
care of the rest. 
Thus, like Friedman, modern corporate law scholars have come to 
believe that concerns about social responsibility cannot legitimately lie 
within the purview of corporate law. Social responsibility is, 
ultimately, a political question and is therefore best left to democracy. 
subject in a related paper. See Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, supra 
note 10. 
230. See supra text accompanying note 172 (providing the more complete quotation). 
231. CLARK, supra note 161, at 693 (citations omitted). And according to Clark, "(t]his 
is true even though democratically elected bodies are in fact heavily influenced by elite 
interest groups." See id. 
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3. Summary 
As we have described it, the modern macro script of corporate law 
appears quite compelling - a formidable collection of arguments that 
all seem to point to the shareholder primacy summary script. Indeed, 
the logic of the macro script has won the day: Friedman's basic insight 
that all stakeholders are better off, on net, if profit is the sole 
corporate goal is now the conventional wisdom among prominent 
legal scholars.232 
But appearances can be deceiving. If our hypothesis that corporate 
interests will be successful in the competition to influence our 
situation is correct, then we would expect that the schemas and scripts 
that underlie policymaking and corporate law will be likely sources of 
that success. In other words, if our hypothesis is correct, we expect 
that a close, critical inspection of those schemas and scripts we just 
reviewed will reveal pro-commercial illusions where we had otherwise 
seen magic. 
IV. MAGIC OR ILLUSION? 
We have examined the scripts used to justify shareholder primacy 
in corporate law and the pro-market, anti-regulatory presumptions of 
modem policymaking more generally. In almost every way, those 
scripts seem sound. With respect to the macro script, the idea that one 
constituency needs more protection through corporate law than the 
others seems plausible, and the desire to protect that more vulnerable 
constituency, laudable. It further stands to reason that shareholder 
primacy helps address shareholder vulnerability by providing judges 
and others a tractable means of measuring board behavior and one 
that is, in any case, consistent with the situational pressures of 
markets. In addition, the belief that laws will evolve in a social­
welfare-maximizing direction to reflect the invisible market pressures 
seems to coincide with common intuitions about evolutionary 
processes and, more particularly, the widely held view that markets 
tend toward desirable outcomes. It is the familiar invisible hand of 
private interests unintentionally serving the public interest. 
That leads to (or follows from) the policymaking meta script. 
There are, as we reviewed, compelling arguments that markets are 
good and regulation is bad. First, market actors will discover and 
exploit all opportunities for mutually satisfying trades and in that way 
will serve the public interest. And, second, regulatory agencies are 
likely to be both wasteful and beholden to certain powerful interests 
- usually the producers or sellers who are being regulated. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 178-185. 
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Those two elements of the meta script seem mutually reinforcing, 
like two sides of the same coin. When one argues that the path to 
prosperity and away from serfdom is to be found in the principles that 
markets are good and regulation is bad, it is tantamount to saying that 
the secret to business success is to be found in the principles that 
revenues are good and costs are bad. Markets and regulation are 
presumed to relate to each other the way heat and cold or lightness 
and darkness do - more of one means less of the other.233 Thus, any 
argument or evidence that advances one of the elements of the meta 
script seems to advance the other as well. 
Given the persuasive logic and influence of the meta script, it is not 
surprising that arguments of very similar form would readily be 
adopted in other contexts. As we suggested at the outset, it is the meta 
script's persuasiveness that provides the foundation for the corporate 
law macro script. The meta script thus seems to bolster the macro 
script, because shareholder primacy seems consonant with the 
"markets are good" schema. The idea that free-acting market 
participants seeking only profit promote the larger public interest is, 
because of the meta script, more readily accepted. The norm of 
maximizing corporate profits seems like an easy application of that 
invisible-hand logic. The pro-market element of the meta script also 
legitimates the idea that market pressures push corporations to 
maximize profits and legal regimes to focus on profit. Markets lead 
presumptively to desirable outcomes. According to those scripts, the 
trick is not to be fooled by the illusion that the self-serving motives 
behind those outcomes somehow contaminate the system. 
Understood this way, it is difficult not to "marvel," as Hayek did,234 
at the magic of markets, as well as at the corporate law that promotes 
the businesses that maximize those markets. But is this the only 
233. Indeed, the claim "markets are good" is a relative claim, which more precisely 
translates to "markets are better than regulation." And the claim that "regulation is bad" 
similarly translates to "regulation is not as good as markets." Furthermore, many of the 
arguments seem to advance both simultaneously - such as the now conventional critiques 
of minimum wage laws and of rent control. For a microeconomic example, see Milton 
Friedman & George Stigler, Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem, POPULAR 
ESSAYS ON CURRENT PROBLEMS, Sept. 1946, at 7, and for a macroeconomic example, see 
ROBERT LUCAS & THOMAS SARGENT, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND ECONOMETRIC 
PRACTICE (1981). 
There are, by the way, other reasons for this perception. For instance, both elements 
seem to depend on the same core vision of the human actor as dispositional. From that 
assumption it follows that markets respond to the preferences of consumers and regulation 
interferes with those preferences. See Hanson & Wright, supra note 86. Moreover, there is a 
long tradition among major political and philosophical thinkers of distinguishing between 
coercive state actions and noncoercive individual actions. We won't review that tradition 
here. Our point is simply to indicate that there is an easy schematic association, one that 
Friedman and many others have made explicit, that markets are "free" and regulation is 
coercive. See infra text accompanying notes 370-392 (discussing the illusion of freedom). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
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understanding that one can plausibly have of policymaking and 
corporate law? Is this magic? Or is it illusion? 
A. The Magician and Our Minds 
Good magicians are masters of illusion. The key to their skill is, in 
many ways, quite simple: magicians understand and exploit our 
knowledge structures, the schemas that tell us where to look and, just 
as important, what to look for when we look.235 To illustrate this 
principle with a simple example, we would like to conduct a little 
magic of our own, which will require your cooperation.236 
Begin by mentally selecting one card out of the following set. 
FIGURE 2. PICK A CARD 
!• . 7 + • i• . !• . B +  + i• . ••• • • • •  ••• 
• • 
.. ... • • • • • •  • •  • • • • •t • • • • •• • •• • • • • •• l B L B 6 .  
�·, ,� . .  ,., �·· 
Touch it with your finger and concentrate on it. Now, here's the 
part that is a little weird: While you're focusing on your card, click 
your heels together three times. If you skip this part, the magic is 
almost certain to fail, so please just play along. Now, once you've 
completed that step, tum the page. 
235. For a more extensive discussion of the many ways in which magicians rely on our 
knowledge structures to befuddle their audiences, see Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, 
supra note 8; see also PETER LAMONT & RICHARD WISEMAN, MAGIC IN THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORETICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF CONJURING 
(1999). 
236. We learned this trick from The Amazing Hondo, at http:f/www.hondomagic.com/ 
html/pick_a_card2.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). 
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Behold! We have magically removed your card from the pile: 
FIGURE 3. THE CARD DISAPPEARS 
l• . �· . !• . 1• . �·.· ••• ••• • •  �·· • • • • • •  • •  
• •• L • • • 6 . •: • •• 6 • •• L 
Amazing, no? 
Okay, by now you have probably discovered the "trick" behind the 
trick: the "card magic" schema influences what you focus on and what 
you infer about what you don't focus on. All activated schemas have 
that effect - regardless of how they were activated or who activated 
them.237 And, if you were tricked by your schema initially, your motive 
to figure the trick out - a type of motive for accuracy - likely sent 
you back to the previous page to try a less schema-driven and a more 
bottom-up analysis of the cards. More specifically, you likely needed 
to pay more attention to situation than you were inclined (in part by 
the frame of the trick and in part by the limits of your perceptual 
abilities) to do. In any event, discovering the secret to the trick was, no 
doubt, somewhat disappointing.238 
When we watch the most skilled magicians, we marvel at their 
abilities to conjure illusions. We pay far less attention to - indeed, 
don't notice - our own contributions to their efforts. This Article is as 
concerned with the audience - ourselves - as it is with the person on 
stage. When we wonder at the power and skill of the magician, we 
should reserve similar awe for our own contribution to the 
performance. It is the limits of our minds and perceptions coupled 
with our failure fully to appreciate those limits that transforms 
deception into magic and that renders us vulnerable to illusion again 
and again. Understood properly, the power of magic owes less to the 
power of magicians than to the unseen influences on our conscious 
perceptions. The magician's role is in locating and perfecting means of 
exploiting those influences. 
237. We understand that this format is not ideal for doing magic. Still, the skeptical 
reader should know that this same trick is often quite successful when done in more 
conducive venues. 
238. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8 (describing the motivation to 
see magic, and the disappointment when the trick is revealed). 
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B .  Signs of Illusion 
We began this Article with the hypothesis that large commercial 
interests will be advantaged in the competition to influence the 
situation. Testing that hypothesis is difficult, because the hypothesis 
includes a prediction that, although its underlying structure will reflect 
the interests of corporations, the law will purport to serve the public 
interest generally, and its pro-commercial bias will be well-hidden by 
illusion. In the next Sections, we attempt to spot illusion and to 
uncover the trick behind it. Spotting illusion, of course, will be 
difficult. Were it otherwise, the magician would be quickly out of 
business.239 
Given our understanding of illusion, it is clear where our efforts 
should begin. Illusions find their power in our schemas - in 
manipulating our schemas, misdirecting our attention, and shaping our 
inferences.240 Our earlier research detailed the ways in which people 
rely on schemas and the potentially distorting consequences.241 We 
briefly review that research here to recount some clues that suggest 
that illusion is at work.242 
239. There is the additional problem posed by the presumption of our approach: we are 
actively seeking evidence of illusion and are, in effect, assuming that illusion is at work. In 
that sense, we are not so different from other scholars or laypeople searching for evidence 
that confirms (or, less likely, contradicts) their thesis. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically 
Biased, supra note 5, at 1207-08 (reviewing evidence from social psychology regarding the 
biased ways in which people test their hypotheses); see also infra notes 257-268 and 
accompanying text (providing a brief summary of that evidence). But that doesn't reduce the 
risk that we may, as many do, find what we're looking for and fail to notice the 
nonsupportive and contradictory evidence that may exist. We attempt to address that 
problem in future work by examining a variety of types of evidence, including the evidence 
that many scholars indicate best demonstrates the "magic" of existing laws. See, e.g. , Chen & 
Hanson, False Starts, supra note 29; Chen & Hanson, Testing Shareholder Primacy, supra 
note 12. For now, we hope that readers will agree that we all have very good reasons -
including many of the lessons of history and social science - to share the skepticism 
inherent in our illusion-seeking approach. See generally Hanson & Y osifon, The Situation, 
supra note 4; Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5. In any event, if our own 
experience with the Hondo card trick is any indicator, discovering illusion requires actively 
looking for it. 
240. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8. 
241. See id. ; Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, passim. 
242. Some readers have expressed a concern that we do not provide an alternative 
schema to the schemas we are criticizing. As Bill Allen cleverly put it, "[i]t takes a schema to 
beat a schema." We certainly understand the desire to have a way of resolving policy and 
corporate law disputes in a way that provides closure and seems legitimate. See generally 
Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1 182-1211 (discussing the motives 
that influence our schemas); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4, at 
Part III.C.2 (summarizing the psychic benefits of such theories). In this Article, however, our 
goal is to provide a schema, not for how to make policy, but for how policy is made. In fact, 
that is one of the primary ambitions of the larger project of which this is just one piece - to 
better understand the process by which policy schemas are created. Understanding that 
process will, we believe, assist in the development of better policies and better processes for 
making policies. For now, however, the desire for quick, simplistic policymaking schemas 
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1 .  Misdirection 
One of the most fundamental elements of illusion is misdirection.243 
The good magician is a master at making us look where she wants us 
to look. This technique is effective because the focus of our attention 
on one piece of information causes us to miss other, far more 
significant information. Thus, one sign of illusion would be evidence 
that our focus is heavily directed. 
Research on schemas tells us that our desire to make our complex 
world manageable will often lead us to focus on information that is 
clear and easily categorized at the expense of information that is 
complex and outside our categories.244 That tendency to turn away 
from difficult-to-manage information and to attend selectively to only 
the more easily digested information may provide fertile ground for 
illusion. 
Social psychological evidence demonstrates that the ease with 
which we categorize information depends in large part on how that 
information compares with the prototypical examples of that 
category.245 Thus, to detect the presence of illusion we should 
scrutinize the prototypes that we are given. Doing so is no easy task. 
Once those prototypes take root in our minds, it is difficult not to 
succumb to the cognitive efficiency they deliver.246 But telltale signs 
that our categories are distorting our perceptions exist which aid the 
search for illusion. When an item is categorized, we see it as more 
similar to other items in that category, and more dissimilar to items 
outside that category, than it actually is.247 Furthermore, our categories 
themselves are often not as "real" or "natural" as we assume, and 
evidence that our perceptions are illusory can often be found in the 
discovery that our seemingly real and seductively rigid categories are 
neither.248 The more evidence there is of those sorts of effects in our 
should be resisted and the focus should be on better understanding our situational natures 
and our situations. See id. ; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4. 
243. See E. SACHS, quoted in LAMONT & WISEMAN, supra note 235, at 28 (1999) 
("Misdirection is the grand basis of the conjuror's actions."). 
244. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5,  at 1240. 
245. See id. ; Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 461 ,  
532-47 (1975) [hereinafter Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points]; Eleanor H. Rosch, On the 
Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 1 1 1  (T.E. Moore ed., 1973) (hereinafter Rosch, Internal 
Structure] . 
246. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1 150-53. 
247. See id.; W.F. Battig & F.S. Bellezza, Organization and Levels of Processing, in 
MEMORY ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE 321-46 (C.R. Puff ed., 1979); Henri Tajfel & 
AL. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104-08 
(1963); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. Soc. ISSUES 79 (1969). 
248. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5,  at 1149-50. 
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conventional scripts and schemas, the more likely it is that we are 
seeing illusion. 
Our categorization process often helps determine what schemas we 
apply.249 We should also be on the lookout, therefore, for biases in that 
process. The illusion and, perhaps, the magician's hand might be 
revealed where we find ourselves focusing on particular information 
or ideas, and not others, and interpreting them through particular 
schemas, and not others. 
2. Smoke 
Another of the staples in the magician's bag of tricks is the puff of 
smoke that, when it finally dissipates, reveals that what we once 
thought we saw has disappeared, and something different and quite 
unexpected has appeared in its place. Where there is smoke, there is 
likely to be illusion. 
One form of cognitive smoke is to be found in ambiguity. As our 
other work has reviewed, ambiguity increases the range of viable 
schemas and strengthens the perceived plausibility of the one we have 
activated.250 Where there is evidence that appears, upon close 
examination, to be in tension with our activated scripts, and that 
evidence is ignored or treated as ambiguous in those scripts, illusion 
may be at work.251 
Our schemas and scripts themselves contribute to smoke-obscured 
illusion. As we noted at the outset, and as we thoroughly examined in 
our previous work, schemas and scripts serve an incredibly valuable 
role in allowing humans to gain a handle on, or an understanding of, a 
world that presents us with infinite quantities and types of 
information. Without knowledge structures, what we think of as 
"knowledge" would not be possible. But our schemas and scripts, 
because they are simplifying tools, come at a cost. This is true in large 
part because we are blind to their workings and effects. We trust our 
simplified vision of the world and do not believe that it is, in any 
significant way, distorted. Our perceptions seem accurate and holistic 
when, by necessity, they are inexact, partial, motivated, and biased.252 
249. See id. , at 1 139-41. 
250. See id. , at 1201-04. 
251 .  The creation of ambiguity is a standard technique in public relations and marketing 
campaigns. It was a technique notoriously employed, for instance, by the tobacco industry as 
a means of dealing with evidence of the harmful effects of smoking. See Jon Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1483-96 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Market 
Manipulation]. 
252. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1 195-1211 ;  Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4, at 111.C.2.d.i; Lee Ross & A. Ward, Nai"ve 
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This suggests one of the key biasing influences of schemas. We 
tend to store knowledge like we store food - canned items here, 
refrigerated items there; butter on one shelf, fruits on another. 
Because we are motivated to believe that we base our knowledge and 
behavior on sound reasoning, we are easily convinced of the 
coherence of our own views. With schemas operating automatically 
outside our consciousness, we have no reason or obvious opportunity 
to pull them together to ensure that they cohere with one another. 
Moreover, when we are motivated to believe the conclusions that a 
schema helps us reach, we have little motivation to ensure that our 
schemas are internally consistent. 
FIGURE 4. THE NECKER CUBE 
The point is usefully made with the "Necker Cube" (see Figure 4). 
There are several things to notice about this well-known optical 
illusion. First, what is in fact a two-dimensional object appears three­
dimensional to us. Second, there are actually two conflicting three­
dimensional versions of the image that our minds can see and tend to 
alternate between. Third, and more important for our purposes, even 
if we consciously try, it is difficult to see a two-dimensional figure or 
both three-dimensional images at the same time. Each of those 
phenomena is a manifestation of our knowledge structures and of our 
cognitive motive to give order to the information to which we attend. 
We see what isn't there, and once our brain "makes up its mind" on 
one version, it does not simultaneously see an equally plausible 
alternative version. When our minds do reconstrue the image, the 
previous version disappears like magic. The two schemas for the image 
Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALVES 
AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward Reed et al. eds., 1996). 
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are kept on separate shelves, and only one is activated at any given 
moment. Finally, evidence of one version seems not to raise doubts 
about what we're seeing when we "see" the other. We perceive our 
perception as accurate, though neither our perception nor our 
perception of our perception is. 
There is thus another source of smoke to be found in the 
undetected tensions within and between our schemas.253 In looking for 
illusion, we should examine the circumscribed view of the world that 
our schemas provide and consider whether that perspective is in 
tension with a similar view, borne of another schema, that we might 
hold in other instances.254 Because of the power of our schemas, our 
motive to question the inferences that our active schemas generate is 
often quite low. And yet our schemas operate independently of one 
another and rarely at the same time,255 providing little occasion for 
challenging individual schemas, much less comparing and contrasting 
the logic across schemas. Evidence of illusion might be found by 
engaging in just that sort of difficult examination.256 
3. The Audience's Motives 
Our motivations also may provide clues to whether illusion is at 
work. The magician's skills are significantly enhanced by an audience 
that wants to be entertained, that wants to believe that what they are 
seeing is magic. To the extent that we want to see magic and that we 
are disappointed when the trick is revealed,257 there may be greater 
reason to worry that we are seeing illusion. 
The motivation to see magic can, as we detail elsewhere, come 
from many sources: from our desire for accuracy and accountability;258 
our desire to self-affirm, group-affirm,259 and system-affirm;260 our 
253. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1 199-1201.  
254. See id. 
255. See id; ZIV A KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 463 (2001 ). 
256. That process might expose something, too, about the identity of the illusionist. 
Patterns in those tensions - in how those tensions are resolved if they are indeed resolved 
at all - can be quite revealing. See infra text accompanying notes 269-271 (discussing the 
"tilt"). 
257. See supra notes 9, 238 and accompanying text. 
258. See, e.g. , Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1183-84; SUSAN T. 
FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 231 (2d ed. 1991) .  
259. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4, at Part IIl.C.2.b; 
see, e.g., David Dunning, On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTRAINDIVIDUAL PROCESS 348, 352 (Abraham 
Tesser & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2001); Steven Fein & S.J. Spencer, Prejudice as Self-Image 
Maintenance: Affirming the Self through Derogating Others, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 31 (1997). 
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positional motivations;261 our motive for closure;262 and our motive to 
protect our schemas.263 Affect, also, can have important influences on 
what schemas we apply and on what conclusions we draw from the 
schemas we do apply.264 
In addition to exploiting, unconsciously, the confusion of smoke to 
further their motivations, individuals often display a variety of 
cognitive tendencies to satisfy their motives, such as selectively 
avoiding disconfirming evidence,265 subtyping such evidence,266 and 
reducing our cognitive effort when confronted with such evidence.267 
Such insights, summarized more crudely, are that we often look 
where we want to look, see what we want to see, and ignore, 
depending on how strong our motivations are, the things we don't 
want to see. We won't look where we might not like the answer. And 
if for whatever reason we do look, we might still find good reason to 
ignore that answer if we are able to.268 Evidence that we are engaging 
260. For example, social psychologists have documented in research on system 
justification a desire for self-affirmation - or a desire, amongst both those who are 
advantaged and those who are disadvantaged, to see our world as just. See Chen & Hanson, 
Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1184-85; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, 
supra note 4, at Part 111.C.2.b.iii; see also John Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The Psychology of 
System Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 13 EUR. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 
111 (2003). 
261. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1 187-89; see, e.g. , 
MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED 
INTRODUCTION 270 (1995); JONATHAN POTTER & MARGARET WETHERELL, DISCOURSE 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: BEYOND ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 50-52 (1987). 
262. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1189-95; Hanson & 
Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4, at Part 111.C.2.a & III.C.2.c; see also FISKE 
& TAYLOR, supra note 258, at 164. 
263. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1 195-1211 ;  Hanson & 
Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4, at Part IIl.B.3. 
264. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1181-82. 
265. See id. ; see also Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 
in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 41 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986). 
266. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1204-06; see also 
Leonard Johnston & Miles Hewstone, Cognitive Models of Stereotype Change: (3) Subtyping 
and the Perceived Typicality of Disconfirming Group Members, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 360 (1992). 
267. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1197-99. We might also 
create circumstances in which schemas will be self-fulfilling - appearing consistent with our 
motivations or affect, but consistent only because our attempt to apply those schemas has 
made them so. Id. at 1207-11. 
268. Just as there is a clear limit to how much magicians can store up their sleeves, there 
are limits to the extent that our motivations can help us see magic. And, indeed, once the 
sleeves are understood as a means to illusion, there is a limit to how long and baggy a 
credible magician's sleeves can be. To maintain the appearance of real magic, magicians are 
forced to develop new tricks. When we attend to information that is unambiguously 
inconsistent with the schemas we desire to apply, we might find ourselves forced to abandon 
those schemas in search of others. See id. 
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in such behavior suggests that the magic we think we see is merely 
illusion. 
4. The "Tilt" 
To the extent that we do observe the phenomena described in the 
previous Sections, our suspicions of illusion should increase. When we 
look for patterns in the way that tensions and ambiguities are 
resolved, it is helpful to have a hypothesis about the direction of the 
"tilt" to aid in our assessment of whether there is, in fact, illusion. 
We have already hypothesized that the magician is shared 
commercial interests.269 Assuming that hypothesis is correct, it is a 
small step to predict the direction of the "tilt" in the scripts that we 
have been examining. Specifically, we predict that corporations will, 
with respect to the meta and macro levels of policymaking and the 
law, tend to favor schemas that maximize the size of the pie that all 
corporations are competing over. Such schemas would - constrained 
by the need for legitimacy210 - tend to justify maximizing markets, 
privatization, (negative) externalities, and profits while undercutting 
profit-reducing, cost-internalizing, and market-reducing regulations. 
To be sure, individual corporations or industries may also seek 
market-power-enhancing regulations that enable them to gain more of 
the share of the pie that corporations are competing over. Still, there is 
a common interest among all commercial enterprises to increase the 
number and size of opportunities for profit.271 And that is the shared 
interest that we predict will most clearly define the general purpose of 
corporate law and policymaking. 
The hypothesis that corporate law will be structured to maximize 
profit opportunities suggests the more specific prediction that law and 
legal theory will justify profit-seeking conduct minimally constrained 
by concerns for "other" constituencies. If there is an illusion, and if we 
are correct about the magician, then the macro script of corporate law 
and the meta script of policymaking will, through illusion, legitimate 
269. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at 219-30; Chen & Hanson, 
Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8; Hanson & Wright, supra note 86; supra text accompanying 
notes 5-9. 
270. A policy's legitimacy will depend on several variables. For instance, it needs 
plausibly to serve the "public interest" or "social welfare." Similarly, it must punish, 
prohibit, or otherwise deter, harm-causing behavior that falls below a certain standard of 
culpability (for instance, where the individual acted volitionally, with control, and pursuant 
to a bad or selfish motive). See generally Jon Hanson, Ana Reyes, & Daniel Schlanger, 
Attributional Positivism: The Naive Psychology Behind Our Laws (work in progress) (on 
file with authors) (providing a positive theory of law - based on positive theory within 
social psychology known as attribution theory - regarding how and when citizens, courts, 
and lawmakers attribute causation, responsibility, and blame). 
271. See authorities cited at supra note 269. 
October 2004] The Illusion of Law 77 
the ideas that markets are good, regulation is bad, and corporations 
should pursue only profits. 
C. Spotting the Illusion 
In this Section we expose five broad illusions within the macro and 
meta scripts. First, we argue that the perceived coherence of the 
scripts, both internally and with respect to each other, is more 
imagined than real. Second, we argue that the assumptions of 
exogeneity in the meta and macro scripts are illusory. Third, we show 
evidence of illusion in the biased categories employed in the macro 
and meta scripts. Fourth, we argue that the goal of "freedom" that the 
scripts purportedly advance is largely illusion. And fifth, we argue that 
the perceived threat posed by any deviation from the dominant 
schemas is, more than not, a false perception. 
1. The Illusion of Coherence 
We begin by looking carefully for possible tensions between and 
among the elements of the meta script of policymaking and the macro 
script of corporate law. This Section, in other words, tests the 
conclusion we reached above that the two scripts are both internally 
coherent272 and externally synchronous.273 
To identify tensions between the policymakers' meta script and 
corporate theorists' macro script, it helps to highlight three key 
elements of each. The macro script is built on three premises or 
presumptions: (1) shareholders are not adequately protected in their 
relationship with corporate boards and managers; (2) nonshareholders 
are adequately protected by other institutions; and (3) to correct for 
the first, corporate law is devoted to providing protection to 
shareholders by giving corporate decisionmakers a single maximand, 
thereby giving to others (including judges) the tractable task of 
monitoring corporate boards and managers.274 
272. Our primary focus in this Section will be on the conflict between the meta and 
macro scripts. It is worth noting, however, that even within the macro script there are 
tensions that we will not take time to review with care. For instance, in the arguments 
defending shareholder primacy, scholars often argue, first, that serving shareholder interests 
simultaneously serves the interests of other stakeholders. See supra text accompanying notes 
178-185. Scholars, sometimes the same scholars, also argue that there is a tension between 
the interests of shareholders and that of other stakeholders. Indeed, according to that view, 
the tension is so great that, to avoid the untenable situation in which boards must seek to 
serve two masters or make decisions without the advantages of a simple and single 
maximand, shareholder primacy is necessary. See supra text accompanying notes 192-199. As 
the alert reader will discover, this is just a specific rendition of a more general tension that 
exists between the meta and macro scripts. See infra text accompanying notes 276-292 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 233-234. 
274. See supra Part Ill.B. 
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The meta script of policymaking also importantly depends on three 
presumptions: (1) that markets work effectively to overcome almost 
any problem and to ensure that resources are efficiently allocated; (2) 
that regulation works poorly largely because regulators lack the 
expertise or incentives needed to make judgments that are reliably in 
the public interest; and (3) that regulators, moreover, are likely to be 
captured by certain interests or groups - usually the group or interest 
being regulated.275 The following Section unveils latent tensions 
between each of the two scripts' three premises. 
a. The First Tension. The macro script's assumption that share­
holders need special protection by corporate law276 conflicts with the 
meta script's assumption that markets and contracting will provide 
more effective protection to virtually all groups than will regulatory 
alternatives.277 If markets are superior to regulation, the question 
becomes, why don't markets protect shareholders adequately? 
Markets should do the trick, not just because private mechanisms 
might emerge to fill the shoes of state corporate law statutes,278 but, 
more importantly, because shareholder primacy, under the guise of 
profit-maximization, is itself a market imperative.279 
The tension between the meta and macro scripts implicates a 
tension within the macro script. Recall that a common refrain among 
corporate law scholars tells us that there are numerous situational 
forces - independent of corporate law - that lead corporate 
decisionmakers to maximize profits.280 Competition for consumers, 
workers, managers, and capital invisibly conspires to coerce 
corporations to maximize profits. That belief is itself another 
manifestation of the influence of the pro-market element of the meta 
script. Indeed, the summary meta script's "markets are good" prong 
is just a more general version of the macro script's claim that 
situational pressures force corporations to act as if shareholder 
primacy were the goal.281 
275. See supra Part 11.B. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 210-216. 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 91-111 .  
278. Cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at  34-35. 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 217-228. 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 217-228. 
281. The preference for markets can be seen by measuring the height of the 
presumptions that corporate scholars have erected in favor of relying on markets. Clark, for 
example, states as follows: 
[E]ven massive regulatory failure doesn't necessarily imply a change in the corporation's 
residual goal of strict profit maximization. It does so only if (1) an alternative to external 
regulation were available that would result in better achievement of the legitimate public 
goals behind regulation, (2) the alternative would necessitate a change in the profit­
maximizing goal, (3) the cost of the alternative (in terms of reduced monitoring and control 
of corporate managers' performance for example) would not outweigh the gains, and (4) no 
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With those scripts in mind, corporate law scholars defending the 
macro script assert that markets work and that directors and officers 
have little choice but to maximize profits. In part because managers 
are forced to pursue profit anyway, shareholder primacy is said to be 
an appropriate corporate law norm.282 On the other hand, proponents 
of the macro script sometimes claim that markets do not provide 
adequate protection to shareholders and that directors lack necessary 
incentives to maximize profits, thus justifying the need for shareholder 
primacy.283 Flipping the logic, either of the two conflicting arguments 
might have been used to help justify rejecting shareholder primacy.284 
For instance, it might be argued that, because markets are already 
pushing managers to pursue profit, corporate law need not worry 
about that end. Instead, it should require that directors take into 
account other concerns, knowing that they will otherwise pursue 
profits. Or one might argue that, because markets do not force 
managers to pursue profit above all else, managers have discretion to 
pursue other ends, a discretion that corporate law should exploit for 
the benefit of nonshareholders. In any event, scholars have not, for the 
most part, recognized the tension in the factual claims, much less 
resolved it.285 
There are various responses that proponents of the macro script 
might offer to relieve that tension.286 For instance, some might point 
out that although markets are generally preferred to regulation, in this 
case it has been demonstrated that shareholders are subject to a 
particular market failure - a collective action problem - that other 
constituencies do not suffer and that shareholders cannot otherwise 
other alternative reform strategy exists that would yield a better cost-benefit ratio but not 
involve a change in the corporation's goal. 
CLARK, supra note 161, at 681. 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 217-228. 
283. See supra text accompanying notes 210-216. 
284. Our claim is not that either argument, by itself, is compelling. Our point is that the 
same factual claims - even conflicting factual claims - can be used to justify any 
conclusion. In this case, all roads lead toward shareholder primacy. 
285. Note another related tension. Scholars often argue that situational pressure may 
excuse managers for not more actively pursuing "social responsibility" ends. The situational 
forces are cited as a basis for legitimating the status quo. But when managers engage in acts 
that undermine that legitimacy, there is very little talk of the situational forces that may have 
led to that conduct. Instead, people blame disposition for the bad conduct, partly (we 
suspect) in order to minimize the problem and isolate its cause - like looking for bad apples 
and ignoring the barrel or the tree. Doing so helps to maintain the legitimacy of the system. 
See Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I, supra note 10 (discussing the "illusion of 
reform"). 
286. Of course, some individual scholars have come closer to avoiding or resolving this 
tension than others. For instance, Henry Hansmann, whose work we examine more 
closely below, has probably gone furthest in resolving this first tension. See HANSMANN, 
supra note 153. 
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solve on their own.287 Were the factual predicates of this argument 
clearly established, that might help to relieve the tension. But it is not 
so obvious that shareholders' collective action problem is unique or 
any worse than the market failures vexing the contracts between 
corporations and other constituencies. Nor is it clear that shareholders 
lack alternative means of solving their problem. 
For instance, employees would seem to suffer the same sort of 
collective action problem - there are many of them and only one 
employer. But the problem would seem worse for employees than for 
shareholders given that their human capital cannot be so easily 
diversified - that is, they have much more at stake than the typical 
shareholder has.288 Furthermore, their ability to coordinate as a group 
through purely contractual means is likely constrained by the fact that 
they may not all share the same interests.289 In fact, the common claim 
that because shareholders share a single interest, they should receive 
the greatest protection from corporate law may actually suggest a 
reason why shareholders are less vulnerable than other groups, and 
therefore less needy of corporate law's protections.290 
The same argument might be made, perhaps more emphatically, 
with respect to society's interests. Understanding who constitutes 
"society" and how "society" would act together as a group is itself 
somewhat of a puzzle. Imagining that "society" would respond to the 
potentially harmful social effects of corporations or commercial 
interests seems to require a leap of faith beyond the leap needed to 
imagine that shareholders could act cohesively as a group to advance 
their collective interests. 
Furthermore, the fact that other groups have adopted solutions to 
their collective action problems does not prove that shareholders need 
protection; it may only reveal how marvelously markets work, 
particularly when the law doesn't intervene. To look at the world as it 
is and claim that shareholders need the protection that corporate law 
provides because the market will fail to provide it may be to reverse 
the true causal relationship. The existence of contractual solutions for 
287. See supra text accompanying notes 212-213; see, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 304-05 (1985) (concluding that "shareholders are 
among the least protected of corporate constituencies. Unlike workers, suppliers, or 
creditors, they are unprotected by explicit covenants or contracts and are unable periodically 
to renegotiate the terms of their relationship.") . 
288. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
283 (1998). 
289. See id. 
290. See infra text accompanying notes 454-465. 
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nonshareholders and the absence of contractual solutions for 
shareholders may reflect corporate law, rather than justify it.291 
In a similar vein, the claim that shareholders lack other forms of 
protections seems overstated. It is true, as Bob Clark stresses, that 
" [t]he interests of nonshareholder groups like employees can be 
protected by contract, common law developments, and special 
legislation. "292 And, to be sure, legislation and administrative bodies 
have been established to do just that. Similarly, it is true that 
consumers enjoy the protection from, say, products liability law and 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission. It is also true, however, 
that shareholders enjoy similar protections: common law protections 
against fraud or misrepresentations; private regulatory institutions, 
such as the New York Stock Exchange; public regulatory institutions, 
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission; and other 
regulatory laws, including, most recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The 
robustness of those sources of protection might be greater were 
corporate law not, to some degree, preempting the field. Again, it can 
be misleading to take what is true today of corporate law and other 
institutions as natural, and fail to see that what is true today may, in 
large measure, reflect existing corporate law. Believing that, because 
other institutions do not adequately protect shareholders, corporate 
law should be devoted to that cause, may be to reverse the actual 
causal relationship. 
Even if proponents of corporate law's macro script had succeeded 
in demonstrating that the problem facing shareholders truly is 
different in degree than that facing other constituencies, they would 
not have demonstrated that it is different in kind. Absent such a 
distinction, the presumption favoring markets over regulation still 
raises questions about the policy conclusion that corporate law should 
attempt to regulate on behalf of shareholders. Proponents have, after 
all, offered no rule for locating the threshold beyond which regulatory 
intervention - generally presumed to be "bad" - would be justified. 
In sum, this tension between the macro script's claim, that 
shareholders need special regulatory protection through corporate 
law, on one hand, and the meta script's claim that markets work, may 
reveal one of the ways in which what we see may be smoke-obscured 
illusion. 
b. The Second Tension. There is a second tension between the two 
scripts that we've reviewed. Corporate law's macro script includes the 
argument that courts should, on behalf of disaggregated shareholders, 
291. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1207-1211 (discussing 
the self-fulfilling effect of schemas); supra note 267 (same); see also Hanson & Yosifon, The 
Situation, supra note 4, at 175-76 (describing the self-fulfilling effects of dispositionism). 
292. CLARK, supra note 161, at 20. 
82 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:1 
monitor corporate decisionmakers and intervene on behalf of 
shareholders when they deem appropriate.293 On the other hand, the 
policymaking meta script presumes that centralized decisionmakers 
lack the information needed to make reliably welfare-increasing 
judgments.294 
The likely response to this tension is that the presumption against 
regulation is overcome in this particular context. Because of the single 
maximand of profit, judges need far less knowledge or information 
than they do in other regulatory contexts. Because there is one goal, 
profit, courts can easily determine if the directors are acting in pursuit 
of that goal; therefore, regulation is likely to be relatively successful in 
this (exceptional) context. That was, after all, one of the key 
arguments in favor of shareholder primacy.295 
Such a response, however, does not resolve the tension. First, as 
we'll indicate below and detail in future work, judges are not, in fact, 
able to reliably assess whether a board's decision will advance profit.296 
Even if they were, courts at the micro level (that is, in creating and 
applying corporate doctrine) have largely foreswom making such 
evaluations. They do not, in other words, assess business decisions to 
determine if they were well made. In fact, the "business judgment 
rule,'' under which judges presumptively decline to "second-guess" the 
business decisions of corporate managers, is a prominent theme of 
corporate law. And, strikingly, judges use the "imperfect knowledge" 
rationale of the regulation-bad meta script to justify that position.297 
Thus, the corporate law macro script is in tension, not only with the 
meta script, but also with its own micro script. 
c. The Third Tension. The third tension may well be the most 
significant and the most straightforward. The corporate law macro 
script holds that nonshareholder constituencies are adequately 
protected through exogenous regulatory institutions.298 Because 
regulation is presumed to serve the public interest, the argument goes, 
corporate law needn't concern itself with that end. This argument for 
shareholder primacy is treated as uncontroversial. At the same time, 
however, the policymaking meta script holds that regulatory 
institutions will tend to be captured - that is, they will generally fail 
to protect the public interest and instead will tend to serve special, 
293. See supra text accompanying notes 211-213. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 79-87. 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 191-199. 
296. See Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I, supra note 10; Chen & Hanson, 
Legitimating Schemas II, supra note 10; infra text accompanying note 359. 
297. See infra text accompanying note 359. 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 200-209. 
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concentrated interests, often the producer group being "regulated. "299 
That tension, as will become clear, is significant, not only because it 
has been overlooked, but also because it is particularly revealing with 
regard to who, or rather what, is behind the illusion. 
2. Schematic Illusions 
The schematic biases and illusions described above in connection 
with the Necker Cube may be an important source of the tensions 
discussed in the previous Section. We have separate scripts that we 
apply in separate contexts, and, so long as the scripts are not placed 
side-by-side and so long as the tensions are not highlighted, we don't 
experience the dissonance. With the meta script on one shelf and the 
macro script on another, we feel no need to invest the cognitive 
resources to examine the otherwise cognitively cheap schema-driven 
process. Put differently, each simplifying schema is more or less 
exogenous to the other. 
In part because the interconnections and interdependencies 
between our mental models are frequently unrecognized or unex­
amined, we are blind to and easily manipulated by our situation.300 The 
power of the widely discussed framing effect is just one of the better­
known instances of a much more general human tendency to be 
constrained by our activated mental models.301 Those tendencies are 
illustrated, also, in the illusions of "magic. "302 
The same tendencies characterize our use of policy schemas and 
help explain how the tensions between the macro script of corporate 
law and the meta script of policymaking remain largely unnoticed. 
Consider, again, the former. There is an implicit assumption - which 
generates what we call a schematic illusion - coursing like lifeblood 
through the elements of the corporate law macro script: all of the 
private and public forces and institutions described in the macro 
script are assumed to be fixed and unaffected by corporations and 
corporate law. 
There are actually two facets of that schematic illusion. The first is 
that corporations are moved almost entirely by outside (exogenous) 
forces. Among them, consumers are most important. Corporations 
merely react to the market pressures that consumers create - hence, 
299. See supra text accompanying notes 100-1 13. 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 250-256. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, 
Situational Character, supra note 4, passim. 
301. See generally Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, passim; Hanson 
& Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 4, at Part IIl.B. 
302 See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8 (summarizing some of the 
basic mechanisms of illusions). 
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the belief in consumer sovereignty.303 This notion underlies all of the 
arguments in favor of relying on markets or contracts - a belief that 
because consumers are autonomous actors and only they know their 
preferences, institutions should therefore defer to their choices.304 This 
concept of consumer sovereignty is implicit, if not explicit, in most 
U.S. laws and policies, including corporate law.305 
The second facet of this schematic illusion is the assumption that 
corporations have no sway over those outside sources of corporate 
influence. Causal influences flow from all individuals and institutions 
to corporations and not the other way around. Thus, corporate 
practices and products reflect consumer preferences, regulatory 
parameters, and cultural shifts. They don't cause them. Corporate 
practices are driven and curtailed by market and regulatory dynamics. 
They don't drive them.306 Markets, corporations, and corporate 
practices emerge out of a world taken as given. They don't alter it.307 
303. This type of argument is actually fairly common in the areas we reviewed above. 
Employees facing workplace risks are often said to prefer those risks, given the offsetting 
wage premiums that they enjoy. Employees, then, effectively call the shots. If they didn't, 
then why would they stay in their jobs? 
304. As we highlighted above, this defense of shareholder primacy is not meant to deny 
that corporations will not sometimes engage in behavior that is harmful to nonshareholder 
constituencies. Rather, the assertion is that any such groups are harmed less than other 
groups are made better off. On net, communities and society at large are made better off. In 
addition, the argument goes, any attempt to intervene in those market relationships any 
more than we already do is likely to create unintended consequences - and harm the very 
people it is intended to help. The fear of unintended consequences emerges in part from the 
perception of the human actor as behaving according to stable, exogenous preferences -
preferences that are simply invisible to anyone but the actor, except as revealed through 
behavior itself. Regulatory solutions are likely to lead to unintended consequences because 
regulators will not know those preferences and consumers will continue to act upon them. 
Market processes are preferred because they give the people what they really want. Any 
attempt to intervene with that process will simply force consumers to find some more 
expensive way to get what they want - or will end up hurting people more than it helps. For 
a more complete discussion of why regulations, but not markets, are often said to have 
"unintended consequences," see Hanson & Wright, supra note 86. 
305. See id.; Leary, supra note 76. 
306. Relatedly, as we discussed earlier, scholars may have reversed the causal 
connection between the fact that corporate law purports to serve shareholder interests and 
the fact that market institutions or other regulatory solutions are arguably not in place. See 
supra text accompanying note 289. Had scholars seen the way that current arrangements 
outside of corporate law may reflect corporate law, they would have been less inclined to 
claim that corporate law reflects those arrangements. 
307. To the extent that the world isn't given, the argument sometimes continues, it is 
other institutions that have the greatest influence over how people think, what they want, 
and what they consider acceptable behavior. If anything, it is institutions such as the family, 
our churches, unions, universities, and our civic organizations that lie behind our thoughts 
and behavior. And, of course, if there is a corporate practice that is widely perceived as 
egregious - and somehow not reflective of aggregated, stable personal choices - the 
solution is not to alter corporate law or even to blame the corporation. The solution is to call 
on the legislatures or regulators to step in and alter the regulatory context to which the 
corporation is responding. In such instances, legislatures are, like markets, presumed to be 
October 2004] The Illusion of Law 85 
The psychological tendency to focus narrowly on only schema­
relevant information and to assume the rest is fixed - sometimes 
called "focalism"308 - is also observable in the meta script for policy 
making. Scholars examining the variables that help or hinder an 
entity's or group's ability to influence regulations assume that those 
institutions are unchanged by the competition itself.309 In short, 
proponents of the macro script focus on the corporation and corporate 
law and assume that everything else is fixed while proponents of the 
antiregulation facet of the meta script focus on regulations and assume 
that everything else is fixed. 
The fact that the meta and macro scripts are built on unexamined 
(and, as we'll see, dubious and conflicting) assumptions about what is 
moving and what isn't suggests that they may be fostering illusion. 
3. Categorical Illusions 
Schematic illusions do not appear out of thin air. Our previous 
article detailed the significant relationships between the categories we 
humans rely upon and the schemas we activate.310 Categorization is 
often a necessary first step in our cognitive processes. And catego­
rization depends significantly on the prototypes for our categories.311 In 
determining what falls into what category, individuals will tend to 
compare information to their prototypes and categorize each item 
according to its similarity or dissimilarity with a prototype.312 Thus, 
searching for categorical illusions in our macro and meta scripts 
requires looking for biases, not just in the categories we use, but also 
in the prototypes we rely on to define those categories. 
We just suggested that our categories trigger particular schemas, 
and they do. But the relationship between categories and schemas can 
be more complex; our categorization process does not operate entirely 
prior to or independent of our schemas. Activated schemas can have a 
the legitimate conduit through which aggregated individual preferences are expressed. It's 
the consumer sovereignty norm in slightly different garb - citizen sovereignty. 
308. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 821 (1998). 
309. We'll have more to say about this tendency in future work. See Chen & Hanson, 
Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8. 
310. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, passim. 
311.  See id. at 1 144-54. 
312. See id. This prototype view has superseded the classical view, which argued that 
categories have clear boundaries and that the characteristics of an element would determine 
whether that element fell into the category. In contrast to the classical view of 
categorization, the prototype view accepted the fluidity of category boundaries, therefore 
acknowledging that our categories are flexible. Id. ; see also Rosch, Cognitive Reference 
Points, supra note 245; Rosch, Internal Structure, supra note 245. 
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significant effect on what categories we rely on in the first place.313 
Furthermore, the schemas and categories are not themselves 
independent of all other influences. Affect, motivation, and priming, 
among other unseen interior phenomena, can also influence what 
categories and schemas we employ. 
How might all this matter to corporate law and policymaking 
scripts? Among other ways, the fact that the meta script is so central 
to policy analysis suggests that it is, as social psychologists put it, 
"chronically primed."314 Our minds are poised to see the world 
through the meta script's categories and schemas. It is in part for that 
reason, we suspect, that corporate law scholars have so readily 
employed the markets-good and regulation-bad script to questions of 
corporate law. 
Priming can also determine which of the two elements of that 
script we adopt. Suppose we are asked to determine if an institution is 
a "market institution" or a "regulatory institution," in a case where 
categorization is unclear. If beforehand we encounter - are "primed" 
with - words like "freedom," "consent," "contract," and "revenues," 
our schema for markets will tend to be activated and we will tend to 
see a market.315 Conversely, if we are primed with words like 
"coercion," "central planning," "socialism," "bureaucrat," and "public 
interest," we are likely to see the same institution as regulatory, and, 
consequently, see it as "bad." In both cases, our categories and 
schemas will create a corresponding, automatic affective response.316 
Thus, in light of the meta script (assuming we adopt it), we will have a 
positive affective response to the "market" institution and a negative 
affective response to the "regulatory" institution.317 
Affect can be the cause, as well as the consequence, of our 
categorical processes. That is, if we feel positively toward an 
institution that itself, given the meta script, will lead us to perceive it 
as a "market" or market-like. A negative view of an institution 
likewise leads us to label it "regulation." 
313. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1139-41. 
314. See id. at 1180-81. 
315. There are, of course, limits to such tendencies. See id. at 1242-43. 
316. Cf Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471 (1923) ("It is because the word 'coercion' frequently seems to carry 
with it the stigma of impropriety, that the coercive character of many innocent acts is so 
frequently denied."). 
317. For summaries of experiments of this sort, see id. The associations today are very 
much like those of the "first law and economics movement" a century ago. Barbara Fried 
notes "how deeply ingrained in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British and 
American thought was the view that the market was the province of freedom, and the 
government the province of coercion." FRIED, supra note 56, at 31. 
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As noted earlier, the categories employed have an immense influ­
ence on perceptions of the constituents of each category. For instance, 
we tend to see two members of the same category as more alike than 
we otherwise would. And we likewise tend to see two members of 
different categories as more different than we otherwise would.318 
In our effort to spot illusion, therefore, we attempt now to 
determine if those automatic, nonconscious categorical biases are 
evident in the arguments underlying the macro script of corporate law 
and the meta script of policymaking. 
a. Markets Versus Regulation. At the heart of the meta script of 
policymaking lie the categories of "market" and "regulation." There 
are numerous ways in which the categories of "free markets" and 
"state-interventionist regulation" - the invisible hand and the heavy 
hand - bias our understanding and thus serve to create illusion. 
One category error has long been recognized - at least by some 
legal scholars. Robert Hale, three-quarters of a century ago, 
challenged the categories and claimed, in effect, that the idea that 
there is such a thing as a "free" market is itself illusion: 
[T]he systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in 
reality permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom, and 
with restrictions, moreover, out of conformity with any formula of "equal 
opportunity" or of "preserving the equal rights of others." Some sort of 
coercive restriction of individuals . . .  is absolutely unavoidable . . . .  319 
Recognizing the category error that Hale identified has since become 
a staple of critical legal scholarship.320 As Jamie Boyle recently 
summarized: 
Without the rules of contract, tort, and property there would not be a 
market. Barring a belief in classical legal thought, how could we claim 
that the particular set of (common law?) rules found in this country at 
this time is any more natural, or nonregulatory than the rules imposed by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? . . .  [R]eading much of 
the economic literature, one might imagine that the legal system came 
with preset, default positions. "Protect owners against physical invasion 
of land, allow formation of contracts when information is concealed, 
318. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5, at 1160-63. 
319. Hale, supra note 316, at 470; id. at 471 ("What is the government doing when it 
'protects a property right'? Passively, it is abstaining from interference with the owner when 
he deals with the thing owned; actively, it is forcing the nonowner to desist from handling it, 
unless the owner consents."); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1943) ("What work we should do and how much we might 
consume were determined by a process known as freedom of contract. Yet in that process 
there was more coercion, and government and law played a more significant part, than is 
generally realized."). 
320. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 103-109 (1987); see, 
e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING 
ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 83 (1993). 
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nullify contracts where lies are told . . . .  " But this is silly. The choice is 
not between "regulated" and "unregulated" but between different kinds 
of regulation.321 
The fact that this categorical error is well known in critical circles has 
not made it any less (and has perhaps helped to ensure that it has 
remained) unfamiliar among most legal scholars and policymakers.322 
Even assuming that one recognizes the inevitability of 
"regulation," there are other ways in which those categories have led 
to illusion. Below, we discuss the prototypical forms of regulation and 
the resultant prejudices associated with naming an institution or policy 
"regulatory." First, it is illuminating to consider what proponents of 
the meta script seem to exclude from the category of "regulation." 
Acts of "deregulation" are seen, as the name implies, as reductions 
in regulation. The assumption seems to be that, if regulation is bad, 
deregulation must be good. That presumption is strengthened by the 
exaggerated categorical distinction between "regulation" and 
"markets." Because the categories are understood to be two sides of 
the same coin, anything that reduces (bad) regulation is understood to 
expand (good) markets. Such an understanding means that the 
insights of Stigler and many others regarding the way "regulation" 
might be disproportionately influenced by powerful interests are 
presumed inapplicable. Thus, while it seems clear that acts of 
"deregulation" benefit (and are actively encouraged by) producers 
and may harm consumers, suppliers, employees, or some other 
disaggregated group, and while it is also clear that such acts are 
implemented by the very "regulatory" institutions that Stigler and 
others studied, deregulation is viewed through a very different lens 
than "regulation" is.323 
Also excluded from "regulation" are the acts of virtually every 
private (market and nonmarket) institution in the economy.324 Thus, 
the media is not "regulatory." Nor are employers, churches, civic 
organizations, universities, or knowledge structures. The bias in the 
categories becomes evident when one considers the fact that Stigler's 
logic applies well beyond the prototype of, say, the now-defunct Civil 
Aeronautics Board and should include any institution that can 
321. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 89 (1996). 
322. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 77 (describing the role of the category error in anti­
trust law). 
323. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at 233-35 (reviewing Michael 
Powell's case for "deregulation" and the underlying presumption that deregulation is not 
captured). 
324. Cf LARRY LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
October 2004] The Illusion of Law 89 
influence the profits or success of groups who might compete to 
influence that institution.325 
To understand a second biasing effect of the "regulation" and 
"market" prototypes, it is helpful to consider the widely understood 
effects of stereotypes. "Stereotypes" are simply the popular term for 
the wider phenomena we are discussing here. When we complain of 
racial stereotypes, for instance, we are complaining about the 
tendency to use extremely negative (or positive) exemplars of the 
category and to assume that what is true of the exemplar is true of all. 
The process is particularly harmful because, in addition to influencing 
our cognitions, the stereotype influences our attitudes (prejudices) and 
our behavior (biases).326 
All of those prototype effects are evident with the categories of 
"regulation" and "markets." The prototypical forms of regulation, for 
example, are either the "plans" of some mid-level apparatchik or the 
rules promulgated by administrative agencies or commissions and 
published in the increasingly cumbersome and technical Federal 
Register. Given that prototype, labeling an institution as "regulatory," 
stimulates all of the negative affective and attitudinal associations that 
attach to communists and captured bureaucrats. The prototypical 
markets include bustling stock markets or gleaming supermarkets 
where options of every sort trade freely and the idiosyncratic tastes 
and preferences of all involved are satisfied and given expression. 
As we've indicated, the reverse is also true. Assuming we subscribe 
to the meta script, when our encounter with an institution leads to, or 
happens to correspond with, a negative affect or attitude, we are more 
likely to see the institution as "regulatory." Similarly we tend, within 
the limits of illusion, to see those institutions that correspond with 
positive affect or attitudes as "market" institutions. Such categorical 
assignments activate the corresponding schemas, leading to the 
prejudices and biases associated with the meta script. 
b. Profit Versus Social Responsibility. Above we asserted that the 
policymaking meta script has influenced virtually all of modern policy. 
We claimed further that the corporate macro script is a case in point: 
the shareholder primacy norm itself reflects the application of the 
meta script categories and schemas to the question of what corporate 
law's goal should be.327 In this Section, we attempt to provide more 
direct support for those claims and, in doing so, illustrate the 
categorical and schematic biases just summarized. 
325. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at 206-12 (describing "deep 
capture"). 
326. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 5. 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 1 14-116. 
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Recall the long-standing debate between, among others, Berle and 
Dodd regarding the extent to which corporate directors and corporate 
law should be concerned with anything beyond profit. By the 1950s 
Dodd had by all accounts (including Berle's) won that debate.328 When 
Milton Friedman turned his focus to the question, he brought to it his 
meta script for policymaking, summarized as markets are good and 
regulation is bad.329 At the time, his was a lone (public) voice. But by 
the power of the meta script over policymaking generally, and its 
effective application by Friedman to corporate law specifically, his 
voice was soon joined by a chorus and transformed into what is now 
the conventional wisdom regarding corporations and corporate law.330 
A close examination of Friedman's analysis and the subsequent 
refinements, however, reveals the very categorical biases we've 
identified. Friedman arrived at the corporate-law debate with the 
meta script activated and processed information through its categories. 
As is true in the application of the meta script to any new policy area, 
the basic question involved identifying those elements of corporate 
practices and corporate law that belong in the "regulation" category 
and those that belong in the "market" category. When examining 
the macro question regarding whether corporations should seek to 
serve only shareholders' interests (assumed to be profits331) or to serve 
the interests of other constituencies as well, the categorization was 
automatic. 
Maximizing profits is clearly a "market" activity. "Social 
responsibility" is clearly "regulatory."332 With that categorization, the 
categorical prejudices and schemas kicked in. Profits are simple and 
good. Social responsibility is difficult and bad. Thus, when Friedman 
approaches the issue, he asks whether 
328. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142. 
329. See supra text accompanying notes 144-150. 
330. Of course, the fact that the most influential versions of the meta script and the 
macro script emanated, literally, from the same mind - Friedman's - provides some 
further evidence, we believe, that the former was helping to create the latter. 
331. See supra text accompanying notes 166-167; see, e.g. , POSNER, supra note 196, 
at 420. 
332. We suspect that much of what determines the categorization is not simply the clear 
associations between concepts like markets and profits, on one hand, and "social 
responsibility" and regulators' "public interest" rhetoric on the other, but also affective 
responses of Friedman and others to the concepts. We have noticed a general suspicion and 
seeming distaste for all notions of "doing good for others" in the writings of members of the 
Chicago and Austrian schools and a concomitant attraction to notions of "doing well for 
myself." See, e.g. , Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 124 ("I share Adam Smith's 
skepticism about the benefits that can be expected from 'those who affected to trade for the 
public good."'). Any such affective response would, in turn, lead to the categorization of 
profits as market-related and social responsibility as regulation-related. 
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self-selected private individuals [can] decide what the social interest is? 
Can they decide how great a burden they are justified in placing on 
themselves or their stockholders to serve that social interest? Is it 
tolerable that these public functions of taxation, expenditure, and control 
be exercised by the people who happen at the moment to be in charge of 
particular enterprises, chosen for those posts by strictly private groups?333 
91 
Notice how Friedman's description conjures the category of 
"regulation" and not "markets," and how the balance of his analysis is 
determined by the "regulation is bad" schema of the meta script. 
According to Friedman, directors, when claiming to promote social 
responsibility, are "self-selected." Instead of responding to the free 
choices of disaggregated individuals, they instead are imposing their 
own personal views on the hapless stockholders. Relatedly, the 
directors are not responding to the information contained in the price 
mechanism or to competitive pressures, but are simply imposing their 
ill-informed views. The goal of "social responsibility" is, to Friedman, 
indistinguishable from the governmental (that is, regulatory) 
"functions of taxation, expenditure, and control." 
As we explored above, the macro script includes the assumptions 
that directors and managers lack the information and knowledge to 
make welfare-enhancing judgments about how to serve social 
responsibility334 and that they are well-equipped to make the simpler 
profit-oriented judgments.335 These assumptions reveal the power of 
the markets-good and regulation-bad meta scripts and, more 
importantly, the biasing influence of the categories. The macro script, 
because of that bias, wrongly assumes that corporate managers can 
avoid considering the "public interest" in their decisionmaking. Closer 
anaiysis reveals that such an assumption is, in several ways, a 
categorical illusion. 
First, even prototypical "business decisions" involve one or more 
nonshareholder constituencies. Indeed, the very basic question of how 
consumers will respond to a new product involves attempting to 
understand the influence of a decision on a nonshareholder 
constituency. A "market analysis" is an analysis of consumer reaction 
to a new product or a new pitch. And "market strategies" reflect not 
the obvious and certain path of profit, but a corporation's best guess of 
overall effects. Almost as often, business decisions influence and must 
consider the reactions of the interests of employees, creditors, and 
suppliers. When those reactions are significant, they are ignored at the 
corporation's peril. "True, we can make a better mousetrap, but if 
333. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133-34. 
334. See Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 33 (emphasizing the "analytical 
looseness and lack of rigor" associated with the concept of business social responsibility) .  
335. See supra text accompanying notes 191-199. 
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conditions for our employees are worsened as a consequence, then we 
need to worry about how they will respond." "True, the law permits us 
to continue selling these deadly products, but if many consumers die 
as a consequence, our reputation may be badly tarnished." "Yes, we 
can pollute this stream, but what will it do to our community 
relations?" 
Some industries, it seems, have devoted vast resources toward 
convincing the public, accurately or not, that they are committed to 
nonprofit ends. Even if one believes that the words and deeds of these 
corporations are neither truthful nor sincere, they reveal an ambiguity 
between the categories of "profits" and "social responsibility" for 
which the macro script fails to account. For instance, Philip Morris and 
other tobacco companies have long claimed that their primary concern 
is consumer health. In 1954, tobacco companies came together in 
response to evidence that cigarette use was correlated with lung 
cancer and published a lengthy, reassuring advertisement in 
newspapers across the country. Central to that advertisement was the 
following claim: "We accept an interest in people's health as a basic 
responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our 
business."336 In 1966, when many corporate executives were pledging 
their allegiance to social responsibility concerns, Phillip Morris 
emphasized their commitment in these terms: 
[W]e feel a deep sense of responsibility to our cigarette smokers. All of 
us who work in this industry feel a deep concern over questions raised 
about cigarettes and health. We will not rest until we learn the scientific 
facts that will provide solutions to the medical problems in question. 
We intend to leave no research question unanswered in our quest for 
the truth.337 
A decade later, even as the case against corporate social responsibility 
was beginning to gain momentum, Philip Morris recommitted to the 
same end: "We in the industry took a position which is one that we 
think is probably the only correct or moral one, which is that some 
very serious charges have been made, and it's up to us morally to find 
the answers."338 At the turn of the millennium, when corporate 
scholarship and corporate law had, according to many, reached "the 
336. TOBACCO INSTITUTE RESEARCH COUNCIL, A FRANK STATEMENT TO CIGARETTE 
SMOKERS (1954), reprinted in K.M. Cummings et al., Failed Promises of the Cigarette 
Industry and Its Effect on Consumer Misperceptions of the Health Risks of Smoking, 
http://tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/11/suppl_l/il lO (last visited Oct. 7, 2004). 
337. Joseph F. Cullman, President, Phillip Morris, Remarks Before the South Carolina 
Tobacco Warehouse Association (June 7, 1966), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ 
state_strategies/220.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004) 
338. Interview by Thames Broadcasting with James C. Bowling, Vice President, Philip 
Morris, (Aug. 16, 1976), http:/ltobaccodocuments.org/pm/2024939913-9946.html (last visited 
Oct. 11 ,  2004). 
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end of history," Philip Morris apparently refused to make profits its 
sole concern. As their website at the time highlighted: 
The Philip Morris family of companies has been making grants to 
nonprofit organizations - local, national and international - since 1956, 
making it one of the nation's oldest corporate giving programs. Today, 
we are also one of the largest corporate contributors of monetary grants 
in the United States, with annual charitable contributions of more than 
$60 million in 1998. The reason we continue to give is simple: We want to 
make a meaningful difference in people's lives. You see, while Philip 
Morris is well known for being a family of companies, we are also a 
company of families. And the values and qualities that are important in 
our homes are also fundamental to our business. Foremost among these 
is a commitment to community service and lending a hand to others who 
need our help.339 
More recently, Philip Morris Companies Inc. went so far as to 
change its name to Altria Group, Inc., in significant part to "focus 
attention on the qualities we want to reflect - such as operational 
excellence, financial strength, and a commitment to integrity and 
corporate responsibility."340 And Philip Morris USA, the tobacco 
product subsidiary of Altria, has renewed its vow to Doddian 
decisionmaking: "We will support our mission by proactively engaging 
with our stakeholders to enhance our ability to act in a way that is 
consistent with society's expectations of a responsible company. "341 
The skeptic might claim that Philip Morris's repeated acts of social 
responsibility are actually intended to maximize profits and that Philip 
Morris's claims have been fairly transparent attempts to put a socially 
responsible face on greed-driven behavior. Perhaps so. But it is a hard 
case to prove, and there is clearly enough ambiguity between 
categories of "profit" and "social responsibility" to make it worth their 
while to claim to put the latter first. 
Furthermore, if we remove "tobacco companies" from the story, 
the smoke of ambiguity becomes greater still. Shell purports to be 
integrating environmental and social considerations at all levels of its 
decisionmaking process. An internal document explains: " [W]e have 
moved on from what you might call corporate philanthropy, which 
often meant handing over money and sitting back, to the more 
structured approach of social investment. "342 That approach includes 
339. www.philipmorris.com/pmcares (last visited June 10, 2000). 
340. John Hoel, Director, State Governmental Affairs, Phillip Morris Management 
Corp., The Path to Responsibility at Phillip Morris Companies, Speech to South Tampa 
Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 20, 2002), http://www.altria.com/media/executive_speech/ 
03_09_02_hoelspeechTampa.asp. (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
341. http://www.pmusa/com/about_us/mission_values.asp# (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
342. Sir Geoffrey Owen, Introductory Paper Delivered at Conference Entitled 
"Corporate Social Responsibility: Rethinking the Role of Corporations in a Globalizing 
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the development of "management systems, indicators, metrics and 
targets across a spectrum of economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of business performance."343 McDonald's, in its 2004 
Corporate Responsibility Report has, in response to corporate 
"scandals" and heightened "concerns about nutrition and health,"344 
recommitted to "being a responsible enterprise."345 According to the 
extensive report, that 
means striving to do what is right, being a good neighbor in the com­
munity and integrating social and environmental priorities into our res­
taurants and our relationships with suppliers and business partners. 
We work toward responsible actions by understanding the 
perspectives and needs of our customers and other important 
stakeholders, by collaborating with experts to understand issues and 
opportunities and by inspiring the people in our system - company 
employees, owner/operators and suppliers - to share and act on these 
care values.346 
Professor Dodd would be lovin' it. 
Other companies, such as Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, made their 
social commitments and their rejection of shareholder primacy a 
corporate mantra. Their "mission statement" includes an "economic 
mission" that focuses specifically on stakeholders rather than 
shareholders and a "social mission" that focuses on improving the 
quality of life "locally, nationally, and internationally."347 As Ben 
Cohen, CEO of Ben & Jerry's, commented: "It makes no sense to 
compartmentalize our lives - to be cutthroat in business, and then 
volunteer some time or donate some money to charity. For it is 
business that is the most powerful force in our society . . . .  [B]usiness 
sets the tone for our society."348 Ben & Jerry's decision to focus on 
World"(Oct. 3, 2002), http://www.21stcenturytrust.org/owen.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) 
(quoting Shell document). 
343. Id. (quoting Shell statement). 
344. McDONALD'S CORP., supra note 12, at 2. 
345. Id. 
346. Id. at 3. 
347. Ben and Jerry's professed "economic mission" is "[t]o operate the Company on a 
sustainable financial basis of profitable growth, increasing value for our stakeholders & 
expanding opportunities for development and career growth for our employees"; their 
"social mission" is "[t]o operate the company in a way that actively recognizes the central 
role that business plays in society by initiating innovative ways to improve the quality of life 
locally, nationally & internationally." See Ben & Jerry's, Our Mission Statement, at 
http://www.benandjerrys.com/our_company/our_mission/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
348. Ben Cohen. Ben & Jerry's HOMEMADE, INC. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991) 
(cited in Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics 
by Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1625, 1625 (1993)). 
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social responsibility proved, in the end, to be very profitable. The 
company was acquired at a sizable premium several years ago by 
Unilever,349 and Ben himself cashed out at nearly $40 million dollars.350 
In sum, the categories of profit and social responsibility are difficult to 
distinguish, even when it comes to making prototypical business 
decisions. 
It is not just businesspeople who have occasionally recognized the 
fuzziness between the categories of "profit" and the "public interest." 
As even corporate law scholars sometimes emphasize, corporate 
boards routinely make charitable contributions of one sort or 
another.351 Those decisions may well enhance profits, but they need 
not. In any event, it's clear that they do have an effect on the interests 
of nonshareholder constituencies - those who enjoy the contributions 
and those who do not. There is little doubt that corporate executives 
must take those interests into account in deciding to whom, and how 
much, to give. Robert Clark, in this case, does not complain that such 
contributions have contributed to a grand "oligarchy," although the 
logic of his earlier argument suggests he should.352 Friedman, too, finds 
charitable contributions acceptable, though he believes that they are, 
in fact, profit-motivated. He blesses that illusion, because such a 
"hypocritical window-dressing" "is one way for a corporation to 
generate goodwill as a by-product of expenditures that are entirely 
justified in its own self-interest."353 And corporate law in practice has 
very little problem with those contributions and is quite liberal in 
permitting boards to determine the whens, hows, to whoms, and how 
muches of corporate charitable contributions, topics that we will 
examine more thoroughly in other work. 354 In sum, there appears to be 
349. See Joanna Weiss & Stacey Chase, A Swirl of Emotions: Ben & Jerry's Backers 
Applaud, Fear Buyout, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2000, at Bl. 
350. David Gram, Ben & Jerry's Founder Feeling Out in Cold; Questions Social Activism 
Since Buyout, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 1, 2000, at B3. Loosely, the size of the 
premium enjoyed by Ben and other shareholders may well have reflected the capitalization 
of previously untaken profit opportunities. Although Unilever assured Ben & Jerry's that 
they would maintain the company's traditional commitment to social activism, those 
assurances may not be legally binding. See id. As a result, Ben has expressed significant 
concerns about the direction of his former company. See Weiss & Chase, supra note 349 
("Now he worries that the food giant's promises of continued social activism may be melting 
away like a pint of Cherry Garcia left in the sun. 'Ben & Jerry's will become just another 
brand like any other soulless, heartless, spiritless brand out there - that's my concern,' 
Cohen said."). 
351. See Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I, supra note 10. 
352 See supra text accompanying note 231 (reviewing Clark's argument that allowing 
boards to pursue social responsibility may contribute to an oligarchy). 
353. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 124. Put differently, he sees social 
responsibility actions like regulatory actions - those that serve private interest but behind 
the "cloak" (his term) or illusion of the "public interest." 
354. See Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I, supra note 10. 
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only support for the idea of corporate charity, and the idea that 
corporate directors and officers can judge wisely how best to serve, 
through their contributions, the public interest. 
Furthermore, large corporations are not voiceless or noninfluential 
in the public sphere. Indeed, among voices, theirs is probably the 
loudest (which, by the way, is precisely what makes Friedman so upset 
with their "pontificating rhetoric"355). Large commercial interests 
routinely participate in policymaking of all sorts - policymaking that 
purports to serve the public interest. The phenomenon of heavy 
corporate involvement in policymaking is well understood and 
sometimes lamented among economists who criticize the outcomes of 
the regulatory process.356 The claim that corporate managers should 
not get involved with issues of social significance because they lack the 
requisite expertise ignores the fact that a huge portion of corporate 
energy and resources are devoted precisely to those issues, a practice 
that the law has sanctioned and a practice that experience has helped 
to make perfect.357 Here again, one element of the meta script is in 
tension with another. In short, executives and corporations are very 
much involved in the public sphere already. Either their involvement 
is incompetent and dangerous, in which case it should be prohibited, 
or it is not, in which case this "lack of expertise" claim falls flat.358 
In addition, the dichotomy between the "public interest" and 
"profit" has been accompanied and reinforced by a false, or at least 
exaggerated, claim that decisions regarding the former are beyond the 
ken of corporate executives while the latter are standard fare. The 
preceding discussion helps make clear the flaw in that claim. But even 
if the focus of corporate executives were solely on profits, without 
regard to social ramifications, the difficulty of the decision can be 
355. See infra text accompanying notes 556-561 .  
356. See supra text accompanying notes 100-113. 
357. See, e.g., Belotti v. First Nat') Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. 765 (1977). Justice 
Rehnquist, in a solo dissent, eloquently raised the question of deep capture: 
A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and 
limited liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be 
concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers 
in the political sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression 
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States permit commercial 
corporations to exist. So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal Governments 
remain open to protect the corporation's interest, in its property, it has no need, though it 
may have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection. Indeed, the 
States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to obtain 
further benefits beyond those already bestowed. 
Id. at 827. 
358. What gives Friedman and the other scholars the expertise to know that laws in a 
world in which "social responsibility" is taken seriously (or the single-minded pursuit of 
profits is "curbed") are worse than laws in a world in which it isn't - given that they know 
that the laws will be very different in those two worlds? 
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immense. Deciding whether to maximize long-term or short-term 
profits is a complicated question, but it pales in comparison to the far 
more complex issue of how to do either successfully. If business 
decisions involve both prototypical profit-related concerns and, as we 
have argued they do, concerns about the public interest, then the 
degree of difficulty of these decisions may be greater still. 
When we examine how the law is applied in practice, we see 
further evidence of this categorical illusion. Courts have largely 
abandoned careful monitoring precisely on the ground that they lack 
the competence to adequately judge even purely profit-oriented 
business decisions. Even though profit-related decisions are supposed 
to be relatively "easy," because they involve a single maximand, when 
faced with the supposedly easy task of monitoring that decision­
making, courts have tended to draw upon the other side of the meta 
script - the idea that centralized decisionmakers do not have the 
knowledge or expertise to make good judgments. This difficulty in 
decision-making has led corporate law courts to avoid second-guessing 
any business judgment.359 
Corporate law scholars, too, have argued in other contexts that 
virtually any goal that is actually motivated by some social interest can 
be framed in terms of profits.360 If that is true, then it provides 
additional evidence that the boundaries between the categories of 
"profit" and "social responsibility" are not as clear as the macro script 
would have us believe. After all, if the claim is that "social 
responsibility" is too broad and amorphous a concept for directors to 
handle, and yet the category of "profit" can accommodate virtually 
any socially responsible decision, then that suggests that the category 
of "profit" is no narrower or simpler in practice than the amorphous 
category of social responsibility. 
It is worth noting that when Friedman claims that decisions about 
social responsibility are far more complex than are decisions about 
profit, his argument is built more on his prototypes for the categories 
than on the categories themselves. Recall that for his prototype of a 
concern within the category of "social responsibility,"361 he used 
inflation. Given his work on that topic and the importance of the 
problem at the time, it seems reasonable to do so. As a prototype for 
the "social responsibility" category, however, inflation seems an 
unusual choice - in part because it seems an unlikely corporate goal, 
even for those corporations whose directors claim to be devoted to the 
359. See Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I, supra note 10 (examining the tension 
between the macro script and the meta script); Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas II, 
supra note 10 (same). 
360. See Chen & Hanson, Legitimating Schemas I, supra note 10. 
361. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
98 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1 
public interest.362 Fighting inflation is a topic where the issues are, as 
Friedman elucidates, quite complex.363 
Not all issues within the social responsibility category, however, 
are so difficult. A corporate board committed to taking social respon­
sibility with respect to air or water quality faces a not-so-complicated 
question. It's a pretty safe bet that decreasing emissions or effluent 
would advance that goal and that increasing them would not.364 
Although deciding precisely how much to reduce and at what cost to 
the "bottom line" can be difficult, those complexities seem no less 
challenging than the ones facing executives deciding how much, what 
type, and what color of paint to use on a new model-widget. Put 
differently, Friedman did not show that corporate executives are 
incompetent as much as he showed that some issues within the "social 
responsibility" category are extremely complex and even insuperable. 
Even the "democratic" governmental bodies to which Friedman 
would defer have had an extraordinarily difficult time knowing how 
best to address problems of inflation - a point that should have been 
evident to Friedman, given that he devoted the better part of his 
career attempting to convince governments how their macroeconomic 
policies dealing with inflation were inherently flawed. 
There are other schematic and categorical biases worth 
highlighting. As noted above, our categorization process is often 
influenced, if not determined, by our affective response to the item to 
362. We have seen no evidence that any firms have, on their own, engaged in the 
practice of limiting their price increases in an attempt to slow inflation. And, to the extent 
that firms have held down prices in response to calls from government officials (such as 
when Presidents Nixon and Carter implored firms to cap prices to help stem the inflationary 
tide), firms were responding to governmental direction and, sometimes, incentives. Such 
examples, however, are beside the point; Friedman cannot fault executives for relying on the 
advice and incentives of the government, which he himself claims is the right institution to 
make such determinations. See Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 122. 
363. See supra text accompanying note 174. Inflation - while having "micro­
foundations" - is a macroeconomic topic involving forces at a level that one corporation 
can hardly hope to affect. For example, one corporation is highly unlikely to affect a 
significant number of consumers' inflationary expectations, a key variable (it is thought) in 
the dynamics of the inflation rate. 
364. To be sure, the clever analyst can tell an "unintended consequence" story that 
makes one do-good corporation's decision to reduce pollution the cause for more pollution 
in the long run. Indeed, even we can. But here, we'd prefer to offer two generic responses to 
such a causal story. First, as an argument that corporate boards should rely on governments 
to make relevant decisions about how best to reduce pollution, the "unintended 
consequence" of privately motivated, socially responsible acts usually fail. After all, the 
unintended consequence story is likely also to bedevil the governmental regulations (as 
these scholars and analysts would, were they looking just at the regulation, stress). Second, 
the fact that scholars and policy analysts are prone to imagine a complex set of causal stories 
when people operate outside of their model for appropriate behavior, but are blind to or 
accepting of the harmful, including unintended, consequences of schema-consistent 
behavior, is itself evidence of schematic and categorical biases. 
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which we are attending at a given moment.365 Further, the way we 
categorize an institution or practice influences our attitudes and 
affective reactions to it as well as the associations that are primed by 
it. If, for example, we subscribe to the basic meta script of 
policymakers and we perceive something to fall into the category of 
"markets," perhaps because it is framed that way to us, we will tend to 
feel positively toward it and, thus, will tend to trust the institution and 
feel good about its potential and actual outcomes.366 Conversely, if we 
perceive something to be "regulation," our affective response will 
likely be negative, as will our attitudes and associations.367 An item 
categorized as "regulatory" will more likely be seen as coercive368 and 
less likely be seen as consensual than it otherwise would be.369 
In sum, the similarities, connections, and interactions between the 
categories of "profit," "market," "social responsibility," and "regu­
lation" appear rife with illusion. 
4. The Illusion of Freedom 
Perhaps the most compelling reason offered for preferring markets 
to regulation is the idea that the former sets people free, while the 
latter coerces them.370 So it is that Friedman titled his two best-known 
books Capitalism and Freedom and Free To Choose. 
The meta script's reliance on freedom as its paramount norm has 
been integral to the case for maximizing markets and minimizing 
regulation in all contexts. Today, administrative regulators commonly 
use "freedom" as their primary stated purpose when calling for 
and enacting deregulation.371 For instance, Thomas B.  Leary, 
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, recently explained 
365. See supra note 264 and text accompanying notes 313-318. 
366. Below, we'll explain how it is that scholars, by characterizing corporate law as 
"market"-based, seem to have gone out of their way to see consent that is otherwise not 
obvious and to overlook "coercion," even when it is fairly obvious. See infra text 
accompanying notes 382-392. In fact, these scholars are not "going out of their way" to see 
some things and avoid others, they are simply floating easily with the automatic cognitive 
currents of their knowledge structures. 
367. Cf infra notes 393-412 and accompanying text (describing the illusion threat). 
368. See supra text accompanying notes 164-168 for an example in which Friedman 
claims that executives purporting to serve the social interest are acting contrary to 
shareholder interests, but misses his own point that shareholders could, if they were unhappy 
with all the talk about social responsibility, vote them out of office. 
369. For instance, economists often describe any governmental regulation as a coercive 
mandate and not as a price that businesses have the option of paying or not. See generally 
Hanson & Wright, supra note 86 (describing how the situational influence of governmental 
policy is more salient but no more influential than other situational forces). 
370. See supra text accompanying note 8 (Hayek's version of this point); supra text 
accompanying notes 96-97 (Friedman's version). 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 63-76. 
100 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1 
that his concern, and that of his colleagues, was less with efficiency 
than with promoting freedom.372 Echoing Hayek and Friedman's work, 
Leary describes the "fundamental and glorious idea . . .  that people 
should be free to engage in whatever occupation they choose."373 That 
freedom is what makes it possible for you 
to sell not only your labor, but also your goods and your ideas. 
The corollary of this seller freedom, and the thing that makes it fully 
effective, is the notion that buyers have the corresponding freedom to 
buy whatever they want. With rare exceptions, individual buyers can 
exercise this freedom, even if they choose things that are very bad for 
them. This is what we call consumer sovereignty, and it is also a precious 
legacy. 
I think economic efficiency is not a core value in itself but rather a 
way to mediate between conflicting freedoms.374 
In making this appeal to freedom through markets, Leary is 
articulating the dominant perspective among policymakers. As Leary 
himself goes on to explain, "this new learning is mainstream 
competition law."375 Indeed, "all of [his] colleagues agree that the 
objective [of policy] is to maximize efficient outcomes" to better 
mediate conflicting freedoms.376 Michael Powell, current Chairman of 
the FCC, takes the same "markets are good because they encourage 
freedom," and "regulation is bad because it interferes with freedom" 
position. In a recent interview, for instance, he insisted that his 
preference for markets was based on the faith that markets "empower 
consumers: [the market] lets consumers choose the products and 
services they want - which is their right as free citizens. "377 
The view that the macro script in corporate law likewise promotes 
freedom is, as we should expect, also prevalent. And so, in concluding 
his case for shareholder primacy in corporate law, Friedman writes: 
The political principle that underlies the market mechanism is 
unanimity. In an ideal free market resting on private property, no 
individual can coerce any other, all cooperation is voluntary, all parties 
to such cooperation benefit or they do not participate. There are no 
"social" values, no "social" responsibilities in any sense other than the 
shared values and responsibilities of individuals. Society is a collection of 
individuals and of the various groups they voluntarily form.378 





377. Powell, supra note 74. 
378. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 126. 
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More recently, Easterbrook and Fischel emphasize the contractual -
that is voluntary - nature of corporate law in the following terms: 
To say that a complete relation among many voluntary participants is 
adaptive is to say that it is contractual. Thus, our reference to the 
corporation as a set of contracts. Voluntary arrangements are contracts. 
Some may be negotiated over a bargaining table. Some may be a set of 
terms that are dictated (by managers or investors) and accepted or not; 
only the price is negotiated. Some may be fixed and must be accepted at 
the "going price" (as when people buy investment instruments traded in 
the market). Some may be implied by courts or legislatures trying to 
supply the terms that would have been negotiated had people addressed 
the problem explicitly. Even terms that are invariant - such as the 
requirement that the board of directors act only by a majority of a 
quorum - are contractual to the extent that they produce offsetting 
voluntary arrangements. The result of all these voluntary arrangements 
will be contractual. 379 
And everywhere one looks, according to Easterbrook and Fischel's 
contractarian vision, there is freedom: 
The founders and managers of a firm choose whether to organize as a 
corporation, trust, partnership, mutual, or cooperative . . . .  They choose 
what the firm will make or do and whether it will operate for profit, not 
for profit, or hold a middle ground, pursuing profit but not to the 
exclusion of some other objective (as publishers of newspapers do). They 
choose whether to allow the public to invest or whether, instead, the firm 
will be closely held. They choose what kinds of claims (debt, equity, 
warrants) to issue, in what ratios, for what price, with what entitlements: 
not only the right to receive payments (how often, in what amounts) but 
also whether these investments allow their holders to vote - and if to 
vote, how many votes, and on what subjects. They choose whether to 
incorporate (states have different legal rules). They choose how the firm 
will be organized (as a pyramidal hierarchy or a loose, multidivisional 
collective), whether central leadership will be strong or weak, and 
whether the firm will grow (internally or by merger) or shrink (by selling 
existing assets or spinning off divisions). Investors select members of the 
board of directors, who may be "inside" (part of the management team) 
or "outside" (often associated with investors, suppliers, or customers), 
and the board decides who exercises which powers on the firm's behalf. 
As a practical matter boards are self-perpetuating until investors become 
dissatisfied and a majority decides to redo everything to a new taste. 
With trivial exceptions all business decisions - including the managers' 
pay, bonuses, stock options, pensions, and perquisites - are taken by or 
under the supervision of this board, with no substantial inquiry by 
anyone else.380 
379. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 14; see also text accompanying 
note 224 (quoting Easterbrook and Fischel's discussion of the "choices" involved in 
corporate law). 
380. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 
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Easterbrook and Fischel are so impressed with the freedom inherent 
in corporate law that they conclude that, in fact, " [n]o contract used in 
our society is more likely to satisfy the conditions for enforcing 
voluntary agreements" than are "the terms under which corporations 
operate. "381 
We do not dispute that markets, contracts, and corporate law, 
particularly framed this way, can easily be understood as reflecting the 
free, voluntary acts of the individuals involved. Nor do we dispute that 
this appearance helps make markets, contracts, and corporate law 
quite appealing. But things may look different when one is wary of 
illusion. If it turns out that markets, contracts, and corporate law are 
not in fact as free as they seem, then their normative appeal may 
disappear. 
One of the most thoroughly demonstrated phenomena in social 
psychology is, as we highlighted at the outset, that people can be 
influenced by situational forces of which they are unaware.382 A 
related finding is that individuals tend to attribute people's actions in 
those circumstances, not to the situation itself, but to dispositions. Put 
differently, they may have some difficulty at first, but typically they 
will find a way to make sense of "their choice" to act as they did. 
Behaviors, according to conventional attributional schemas, reflect 
"choices" which, in turn, reflect stable preferences.383 The situation 
often moves us though we perceive we are freely choosing and willing 
our actions. Of course, if "the situation" is particularly salient and 
powerful - say, a gun to the head - then we no longer see our 
actions as volitional when faced with the choice "your money or your 
life." But most of the time we miss most of the significant effect of the 
situation. In sum, social psychology gives us reason to believe that our 
"freedom" - conceived as preference-driven choices - is often an 
illusion. 
In this specific context, too, there is reason to worry that the 
freedom glorified in the meta script of policymaking and the macro 
script of corporate law is itself illusion. The idea that consumer 
product markets promote freedom - that consumers are sovereign in 
the marketplace - has been challenged at length in other work.384 
381. Id. at 24; see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 2 ("Corporate law 
addresses the creation of economic wealth through the facilitation of voluntary, ongoing 
collective action."). 
382. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5. 
383. For an expansive treatment of these tendencies, see Hanson & Yosifon, The 
Situation, supra note 4, at Part II, and Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra 
note 4, passim. 
384. See Hanson & Kysar, Market Manipulation, supra note 251, at 1444-50; Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, passim; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, 
supra note 4, passim; Benforado, Hanson & Y osifon, Broken Scales, supra note 10, passim. 
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Here, we want to focus solely on the notion that corporate law is 
contractual, thus enabling participants to choose whatever business 
form and pursue whatever end they like. As Easterbrook and Fischel 
suggest, the magic of the market is, in their view, that anything goes: 
An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of a corporation 
removes from the field of interesting questions one that has plagued 
many writers: what is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for 
whom? Social welfare more broadly defined? Is there anything wrong 
with corporate charity? Should corporations try to maximize profit over 
the long run or the short run? Our response to such questions is: who 
cares? . . .  If a corporation is started with a promise to pay half of the 
profits to the employees rather than the equity investors, that . . .  is 
simply a term of the contract. It will be an experiment. Professors might 
not expect the experiment to succeed, but such expectations by strangers 
to the bargain are no objection. Similarly, if a bank is formed with a 
declared purpose of giving priority to loans to minority-owned businesses 
or third-world nations, that is a matter for the venturers to settle among 
themselves. So too if a corporation on building a plant, undertakes never 
to leave the community. Corporate venture[r]s may select their preferred 
"constituencies. "385 
Thus, the contractarian view of corporate law purportedly removes 
any concern about coercion. Any interesting questions go away, 
because everyone is free to do as they please, and no one is forced to 
do anything. When we see corporations, then, as focusing solely on 
profits and ignoring all other constituencies, we can be sure that they 
are doing so because that is what they want to do. Existing practices 
reflect existing preferences and thus maximize welfare (and profit) . 
But there is a major problem for Easterbrook and Fischel, and 
virtually all other defenders of the macro script who presume that 
people's behavior reflects nothing other than their disposition-driven 
choices: because of powerful situational constraints, there is, it turns 
out, virtually no freedom for individuals to choose what commercial 
forms they prefer, what laws they want to apply, or what ends they 
want their entities to serve. We are not alone in making this claim. It is 
an argument made often and persuasively by proponents of the macro 
script in other contexts. 
As we've illustrated already, a common refrain in the macro script 
is that market pressures leave business managers little choice but to 
385. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 35-36. Here, Easterbrook and 
Fischel assert that there might be departures from the dominant macro script of profit 
maximization. But they later predict that those departures will be few and far between and 
suggest that the default rule for corporate law should therefore be shareholder wealth 
maximization. They write that "the background term should be the one that is either picked 
by contract expressly or is the operational assumption of successful firms." Id. at 36. And 
that means profit maximization: "For most firms the expectation is that the residual risk 
bearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in tum 
maximizes the value of their stock." Id. 
104 Michigan Law Review [Vol . 103:1 
adopt only those goals, forms, and laws that are profit maximizing.386 
But the point is perhaps more tellingly made if we make it through 
Easterbrook and Fischel's own words. In the same work in which they 
celebrate corporate law as fully contractual, they repeatedly 
emphasize that market pressures limit the freedom of business 
managers. At one point, for instance, they explain that although 
managers might be tempted to pursue some other end, "they find that 
the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors' 
interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand."387 The 
invisible hand, then, is a metaphor for what we call the (invisible) 
situation. Its effect here is to determine venturers' behavior while 
convincing those involved that they are the ones calling the shots. 
In some ways, it is as if the invisible hand is pointing an invisible 
gun at the market participant's head, and the invisible mouth is 
whispering "your money or your life."388 In Easterbrook and Fischel's 
terms, "the firms that pick the wrong terms will fail in competition 
with other firms competing for capital."389 "The history of corporations 
has been that firms failing to adapt their governance structures are 
ground under by competition."390 So it is true, as Easterbrook and 
Fischel underscore, that " [c]orporate venture[r]s may select their 
preferred 'constituencies,"' but should they not "freely choose" 
shareholders as their "sole" constituency, those venturers can look 
forward to being "ground under by competition."391 It is analogous to 
saying that the person who holds onto his wallet and loses his life 
acted freely, and that we should therefore celebrate the outcome. 
Of course, that is not the view that economists and the law take of 
such unfair bargains. Easterbrook and Fischel, for instance, write that 
" [c]ontracts signed under threat of force displace voluntary 
386. See supra text accompanying notes 217-222. One strain of this argument insists that 
managerial discretion is itself an illusion: 
Businessmen do have discretion in the sense that they face a range of choices, as do 
quarterbacks in football games and contestants on quiz shows. But just as a quarterback who 
calls the wrong play may see his team suffer a loss or hopeful contestants may see their 
hopes dashed by a wrong answer, a firm which makes a bad judgment will suffer financial 
consequences. Firms that make the most accurate decisions will prosper and the pressures of 
competition will cause all others to copy them and seek even more accuracy. This pragmatic 
groping for the profit-maximizing product and price-output ratio may well appear as 
discretion, but it is discretion fettered by market rewards and penalties. 
RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 61 (1978). 
387. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 4. 
388. The narrow exceptions for when we see situation (for example, a gun to the head) 
in laws and legal theories are discussed at length in Hanson & Y osifon, The Situation, supra 
note 4, and Hanson & Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra note 4. 
389. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 17. 
390. Id. at 13. 
391. Id. 
October 2004] The Illusion of Law 105 
arrangements and are unjust . . . .  "392 So why aren't the contracts 
signed under threat of "market force" seen as involuntary or unjust? 
At least in part, it is because of the illusion of freedom. 
5. The Illusion of Threat 
Our freedom may, as we've suggested, be largely an illusion, but it 
is an illusion that we cherish. And, for good reason: there's a lot to like 
about freedom.393 And likewise, we cherish the capitalistic-democratic 
foundations of our system precisely because it is the basis of our 
perceived freedom. To suggest, as we have, that our freedom is largely 
illusory represents a threat, not just to our views of ourselves, but to 
our understanding of our entire system.394 
Yet we are hardly the first to suggest that our system may be under 
threat. In fact, the success of the entire meta script and macro script 
has, we believe, turned significantly on the presence of a perceived 
threat. Just as the "markets are good" element of the meta script is 
based significantly on promoting the norm of "freedom," so is the 
"regulation is bad" element. But the "regulation is bad" element is 
fueled largely by its conscious and subconscious associations with 
freedom-reducing institutions - from fascism to communism and 
from socialism to serfdom. Indeed, a major goal of Hayek's Road to 
Serfdom was to highlight the connections among those various 
examples of what he placed within a single category of totalitarianism. 
Under that unifying classification, all those alternatives began to look 
alike, and democratic-capitalism was seen as exceptional - in a 
category by itself. 
392 Id. at 22. 
393. There is even a lot to be said for the illusion of freedom. But that must await future 
work. 
394. James Boyles observes: 
[I]n the contemporary Unites States, it is possible to challenge the assumption that the "free 
market" will always produce the right answer. It is harder to challenge the language of 
freedom and choice in which such discussions are often couched and hardest of all to 
question the epistemology of autonomous subjects on which it depends. Some criticisms are 
seen as legitimate attempts to explore the internal problems of a system of beliefs, some are 
seen as challenges to the system itself, and some cannot even be understood as meaningful 
speech acts. 
BOYLE, supra note 321, at 189. 
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Within our system, too, the threat to freedom has been endlessly 
trumpeted. When Friedman and Hayek spoke of "free markets,'' they 
were speaking of "free people." And limits on free markets constitute 
threats to our freedoms.395 The regulator is the gunman, regulation is 
the gun, and our system and freedom stand in the cross hairs. That is 
the salient situational force that the frames of the meta script 
encourage us to see. 
In addition to the examples that we have provided throughout this 
Article, consider economist David Henderson's recent book, The Joys 
of Freedom.396 Throughout he emphasizes the continuing threat 
395. Cf Reagan, supra note 43 ("[L]et me speak plainly: we cannot have prosperity and 
successful development without economic freedom. Nor can we preserve our personal and 
political freedoms without economic freedom.} 
396. DA YID HENDERSON, THE JOYS OF FREEDOM: AN ECONOMIST'S ODYSSEY (2002). 
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regulation poses to our freedom. He writes: " [D]espite the proven 
economic success of freedom, much of the world, including the United 
States, is hanging on to freedom's opposite, government control."397 
Referring to Al Gore's argument that the government should act, not 
as a "big brother,'' but as nurturing "grandparents," Henderson 
admonishes: " [I]f you want to stick with [Gore's] model, think of the 
government as grandparents with guns who have never met you and 
don't care much about you."398 There's that gun again. Henderson 
concludes by connecting more explicitly the government regulations in 
this country with those same, threatening totalitarian regimes that 
motivated Hayek's analysis: "The fall of the Berlin Wall and the utter 
collapse of the vicious antihuman communist regimes around the 
world was a great victory. But the victory is incomplete. People should 
be much freer than any government in the world is letting them be. "399 
The same "regulation is coercive" script figures prominently, too, 
in the macro script's case against "social responsibility." Friedman 
opens his famous article on the topic by emphasizing how the 
"contemporary crop of reformers" promoting the idea that business 
has "a 'social conscience"' is in fact "preaching pure and 
unadulterated socialism."400 Later in the article, Friedman ratchets up 
the threat: "the use of the cloak of social responsibility, and the 
nonsense spoken in its name by influential and prestigious 
businessmen, does clearly harm the foundations of a free society."401 
And then, in case we had missed it, Friedman closes his article with 
this warning: 
[T)he doctrine of "social responsibility" taken seriously would extend the 
scope of the political mechanism to every human activity. It does not 
differ in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist doctrine. It 
differs only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can be attained 
without collectivist means. That is why . . . I have called it a 
"fundamentally subversive doctrine" in a free society . . . . 402 
397. Id. at 41. 
398. Id. at 42-43. 
399. Id. Similar conceptions of threats to our freedom and our system played a 
significant role in the 2004 presidential election. For a summary of that evidence and a more 
thorough analysis of the psychological effects of threat, see Benforado & Hanson, supra 
note 7. 
400. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 33. 
401. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 126. 
402. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 126; see also FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133 ("Few trends could so thoroughly 
undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials 
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as 
possible."). 
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The message is clear. Notions of "social responsibility" pose a 
significant threat to our system and therefore to our freedom. 
Easterbrook and Fischel are a bit subtler in describing the threat. 
It is not just "that firms failing to adapt their governance structures are 
ground under by competition."403 The situational lesson also applies 
across regimes: "The history of corporate law has been that states 
attempting to force all firms into a single mold are ground under 
as well. "404 
Most recently, Professors Allen and Kraakman similarly 
emphasize the significance of the profit-maximizing corporate form to 
our system: 
The bankruptcy of the old Soviet-style planned economy is exhibit one in 
an argument for the importance of incentives and the law of ownership, 
control structures, and legal protection of capital. Marxism doctrinally 
denied the productive contribution of capital to the collective effort to 
produce wealth. Anglo-American corporation law, on the other hand, 
recognized from the beginning the legitimate rights of the shareholders 
who contributed equity capital to the business enterprise. The collapse of 
the Soviet economy and its political control system and the success of the 
Anglo-American model of legal regulation of large-scale enterprise 
suggest that an organization's internal governance affects its 
performance. 405 
Although Allen and Kraakman do not make the threat explicit, it is 
there all the same. Lest we go the way of the discredited Soviet 
system, it's best we stick with the basic Anglo-American corporate 
form, in which shareholders come first.406 
So why all this attention to threat? There are probably several 
reasons. First, the writers no doubt feel that our system is superior to 
the alternatives and that it is threatened by challenges to the macro 
script. Unsurprisingly, their writing reflects those concerns. 
Second, those feelings themselves reflect the same sort of 
categorical errors that we discussed above. Scholars and policy 
analysts have combined into a single category all "totalitarian" and 
"collectivist" regimes, including Nazism and communism. They have 
then lumped into that same category any form of "regulation" - even 
within a capitalist democracy - if that regulation seems to interfere 
with "free markets." And into that same category, they have also 
added any corporate goal other than pure profit. Those unfamiliar 
with the various scripts would no doubt experience many of the 
403. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 22. 
404. Id. 
405. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 3. 
406. Id. ("Additional evidence of the significance of the law of enterprise organization is 
the dominance of the corporate form throughout the world. The basic legal form of large­
scale firms is remarkably similar in almost all economies."). 
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threats we've mentioned as farcical. To the uninitiated, it seems a long 
leap from "social responsibility" to "fascism." But the scripts and 
categories we've been discussing bring the ideas together effortlessly, 
like the script for "firing squad" brings together the otherwise distinct 
images of blindfold, rope, and gun. With the meta script and macro 
script in place, what might have been a gigantic jump becomes a 
greasy and steep decline. 
Third, the perception of a threat simply advances the case of the 
meta and macro scripts' proponents. In a pathbreaking series of 
studies, social psychologist John Jost and his colleagues have found 
that across individuals, and across social groups, there is a powerful 
motive to justify systems and rationalize the status quo.407 Individuals 
not only perceive the existing social fabric as an equitable 
arrangement, but may go as far as to see it as "natural," or even 
"inevitable."408 Certainly the evolution script - so common in 
corporate justifications of the macro script - is consistent with those 
findings.409 The system-affirming, or system-justifying, motive is 
immensely powerful when triggered by perceptions of system threat. 
This may well explain why Friedman opened and closed his article 
with a threat and why Hayek chose such a threat-evoking title for his 
most famous book. 
The literature on the system-legitimacy motive provides further 
lessons. The evidence to date suggests that many people internalize 
negative stereotypes of even their own identity groups when doing so 
helps legitimate the system as a whole. High-status individuals are not 
the only ones motivated to see low-status individuals as dispositionally 
deserving of their status. Low-status individuals share that motive, 
particularly when the system is under threat. The powerful presence of 
the system justification motive in low-status groups permits a 
maintenance of the social, political, and economic status quo, and 
acceptance on the part of low-status groups of their own unequal 
position in society. In short, system threats promote the motive to 
407. See John T. Jost et al., Non-conscious Forms of System Justification: Implicit and 
Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 586 
(2002); John Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System Justification: An 
Experimental Paradigm for Investigating the Effects of Socio-economic Success on Stereotype 
Content, in FlJTURE DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL COGNITION (G. Moskowitz ed., 2001); Jost & 
Hunyady, The Psychology of System Justification, supra note 260. For extended discussions 
of system-legitimacy work and some of its implications for law and legal theory, see Hanson 
& Y osifon, The Situation, supra note 4; Hanson & Y osifon, The Situational Character, supra 
note 4; Benforado, Hanson, & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 10. 
408. See authorities cited supra note 407. 
409. See supra text accompanying notes 222-227; see also Chen and Hanson, False 
Starts, supra note 29 (summarizing convergence hypothesis and "race for corporate law" 
literatures); supra text accompanying note 224 (quoting Easterbrook and Fischel on "natural 
selection" process in corporate law). The natural selection script is also commonly used in 
defenses of the meta script. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95. 
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affirm the system even (indeed, particularly) among those who are 
most disadvantaged by the system.410 
What might that tendency imply about any attempt to legitimate 
existing power relationships? This question is taken up in detail in 
other work.411 For now, we will simply observe that were powerful 
interests seeking to maintain a self-serving illusion, one of the best 
means of doing so - that is, of legitimating the system, the power 
dynamics, and the knowledge structures behind it - would be to 
suggest that the system is under significant threat by those who 
challenge it. The strategy would be even more effective if the audience 
is, together with the threat, simultaneously offered a reassuring and 
simple set of stereotypes and scripts that naturalize and legitimate the 
status quo and help further advance the trajectory being challenged. In 
sum, one of the best ways to promote existing arrangements is to 
create the illusion of a threat to those arrangements.412 
To be sure, the threat need not be illusory for the technique to 
work. For reasons that we have already provided, the threat does 
appear to be largely an illusion. Insofar as the categorical distinctions 
between "regulation" and "markets" are illusory, and insofar as the 
categorical distinctions between "profit" and "social responsibility" 
are illusory, and insofar as the freedom supposedly at risk is itself 
illusory, the threat is an illusion. 
The illusion of threat provides further evidence for our general 
thesis that there is a still larger illusion in play. But there is more. It 
may be that as a consequence of this illusory threat to our illusory 
freedom, any hope of more meaningful freedom truly is being 
threatened. Those are the subjects of the next Part. 
V. UNVEILING THE TRICK AND THE MAGICIAN 
The previous Part went looking for, and claimed to find, numerous 
signs of illusion that have gone largely unnoticed in the scripts for 
policy making in general and for corporate law more particularly. This 
410. See authorities cited supra note 407. 
411. Id. 
412. We do not presume that anyone has been conscious of this strategy and 
intentionally implemented it. Although it is true that individuals seeking to promote 
dispositionism are likely to highlight any possible threats, it is also true that individuals 
perceiving threats are likely to promote dispositionism. Furthermore, those individuals can 
be one and the same. 
There is interesting empirical evidence, by the way, that individuals who embrace 
conservative world views tend to perceive threats to the system more readily than do 
individuals with more liberal world views. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism 
as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339 (2003); see also Benforado & 
Hanson, supra note 7 (considering the implications of that evidence for legal theory -
particularly the history of law and economics and examining implications of that evidence 
for dynamics of policy debates). 
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Part attempts to take some of the conventional arguments behind the 
dominant meta and macro scripts to their logical conclusion and to 
identify tilts and tendencies in what we have found. We hope, through 
the process, to put the pieces back together in a way that better 
explains the dominant approach to policymaking and that more clearly 
reveals not only the existence of illusion, but also the magician behind 
that illusion and its bag of tricks. 
A. Revealing the Basic Tricks 
As we have stressed several times, categories and schemas play a 
major role in helping us understand our world. As we have also 
illustrated, however, those same cognitive tools play a major role in 
distorting what we "know" about our world. One of the central lessons 
of those examples and of the literature on knowledge structures is that 
our categories, schemas, and scripts lead us astray by connecting items 
- concepts, ideas, images, and so on - that should be kept separate 
and by separating items that are in fact connected. 
This Section attempts to reveal some tricks by putting together, or 
looking for connections between, two scripts that, although they 
emerge from common origins and bear an unmistakable likeness to 
one another, have been kept apart in practice. This Section, in other 
words, explores the implications of assuming, first, that the meta script 
for policy making and the macro script for corporate law are both true 
and, second, that those two scripts are connected as two pieces of a 
larger dynamic. 
What would it mean for the macro script of corporate law if the 
meta script for policymaking were simultaneously taken seriously? 
The macro script, recall, assumes that nonshareholder constituencies 
are protected in significant part by regulatory institutions designed 
with each group's interests in mind.413 As that script has conventionally 
unfolded, corporate law scholars have made little effort to determine 
the efficacy of those regulatory institutions. From the vantage point of 
the macro script, regulation and the regulatory process are viewed as 
exogenous and reliable. In short, regulation is good. 
Now add the meta script, which takes regulation and the 
regulatory process as one of its primary focuses. According to the 
meta script, regulation is actually endogenous: interests compete to 
determine who among the various regulatory constituents will be 
served by the regulation and at whose expense. That, recall, was a 
major insight driving the economics of regulation literature.414 The 
413. See supra Part IIl.B. 
414. See supra text accompanying notes 100-113; see also Press Release, Royal Swedish 
Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1982 (Oct. 20, 1982), available at http://nobelprize.org/ 
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regulatory literature also provides reason to worry that the playing 
field of competition for regulatory favors is not level and that 
regulations therefore tend disproportionately and inefficiently to serve 
the most powerful interests. In short, regulation is bad. 
The large literature debating what constitutes "power" in the 
context of regulatory competition is complex, too vast and intricate to 
do justice to here.415 Still, Stigler's important early work on the topic 
provides some loose but useful starting assumptions. Regulatory 
institutions tend to be captured by the interests being regulated. That 
is especially true when those interests are, among other things, narrow, 
well-financed, and otherwise well-suited for coordinating and 
cooperating as a group.416 Based on that presumption, we will now 
assume that the regulated commercial interests will tend to wield 
greater power than any of the numerous disaggregated constituencies 
with whom they battle in the competition for regulation.417 
We are now ready to unveil one of the tricks of the illusion.418 Place 
the two scripts side by side and examine them closely. What should be 
clear is that the meta script's "regulation is bad" element undermines 
corporate law's macro script, which assumes that "regulation is 
good."419 Given that regulation is endogenous to the economic system, 
and assuming that corporate interests tend to enjoy power advantages 
over other interests, corporate law scholars cannot justifiably presume 
that workers will be adequately protected by employer regulations, 
even though those regulations are ostensibly serving the workers' 
interests.420 Neither can they conclude that consumers are well­
protected by manufacturer regulations, despite any claims that those 
regulations are intended to guard the interests of consumers.421 
Similarly, scholars cannot ignore the environment on the grounds that 
it is well-protected by so-called "environmental" regulations.422 And 
economics/laureates/1982/press.html (explaining that one implication of Stigler's work is that 
"legislation is no longer an 'exogenous' force which affects the economy from outside, but an 
'endogenous' part of the economic system itself') (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). 
415. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8 (providing a detailed 
discussion); see also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4 (introducing "power 
economics" and discussing some of the factors that contribute to regulatory power). 
416. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text. 
417. We come back to this assumption below. 
418. Please lower your expectations; as we noted earlier, discovering the trick behind 
most illusions is often disappointing. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8, 
(describing the reactions of audiences when the secrets of magic are revealed). 
419. The "regulation-is-bad" script undermines the "regulation-is-good" script, and not 
the other way around, because the former is based on theoretical and empirical 
investigation, whereas the former is based merely on assertion. 
420. See supra Part IIl.B.2.b.i. 
421. Id. 
422. Id. 
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scholars cannot simply presume that communities and society as a 
whole will be well-protected against the harms caused by 
corporations.423 If we take seriously the basic "regulation is bad" meta 
script, there is strong reason to presume that those "regulatory" 
institutions will tend to serve the very institutions that they are 
supposed to guard against - corporations - and will actually harm, 
or at least will not as adequately serve, the interests of their purported 
beneficiaries. 
That's the first trick. There are more in this magician's bag.424 Look 
again at the two scripts side-by-side, this time focusing initially on the 
meta script of policymaking. The "regulation is bad" element of that 
script largely assumes, as was implicit in our review, that the 
characteristics of competitors are exogenous.425 An interest - be it an 
individual, an institution, or a group - is assumed to have either a 
clear and narrow goal and to be relatively concentrated and well­
coordinated, or not (or somewhere in between). Insofar as an interest 
has such characteristics, it is likely to do well in the competition for 
regulatory influence. To the extent that it does not, it is likely to suffer 
in that competition.426 
But why are those interests assumed to be fixed? If the "regulation 
is bad" meta script were to take the lessons of the corporate macro 
script seriously, then it would be clear that those characteristics are 
themselves endogenous. Market institutions that, owing largely to 
intense situational pressures, evolve toward an organizational form 
that is superior to any other for creating and exploiting opportunities 
for profit427 would seem certain to gain a distinct advantage in the 
competition for regulation. By accepting an evolutionary argument, 
the macro script implicitly accepts that competition influences not only 
the shape of the product, but also the shape of the producer. And 
given that there are immense potential advantages to, and profits in, 
"capturing" various forms of regulation, a market participant's failure 
to evolve ensures that that institution will "be ground under by 
competition." 
423. Id. 
424. Indeed, there are more than we can detail in this Article. For example, the 
dominant schemas behind corporate Jaw justify ignoring numerous effects that corporations 
might have on other constituencies or concerns (for example, workers, consumers, creditors, 
suppliers, communities, the environment, non-human animals, and many institutions and 
conceptions within our culture) by legitimating those effects. They do so directly by 
legitimating market outcomes and deligitimating certain types of regulatory interference. 
And they do so indirectly, inasmuch as they reflect and reinforce the system-legitimating 
species of dispositionism underpinning almost all policy schemas. See Hanson & Y osifon, 
Situational Character, supra note 4, passim. 
425. See supra Part II. 
426. See supra text accompanying notes 100-113. 
427. See supra text accompanying notes 222-227. 
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With that trick unveiled, our somewhat tentative assumption 
above - that corporate interests will tend to win the competition for 
regulatory influence - gains a much firmer foothold. Corporate 
interests win in any competition for profits because,428 more than any 
other interest on the globe, that is what they have evolved to do. 
Those two tricks taken together again reveal, among other things, 
how our schematic and categorical biases distort our thinking. Despite 
their many similarities, the two scripts are not only separated in our 
minds but the conclusions of each are ignored when considering the 
other. "Regulation is bad" assumes that regulations (and we would 
add all law and other private and public institutions that might be 
profitably influenced)429 are endogenous. But it also assumes that the 
shape of the participants is exogenous. The corporate macro script, in 
contrast, treats the form of the organization as endogenous and 
regulations, as well as everything else around corporations, as 
exogenous. The failure to treat all institutions as endogenous makes 
the trick possible.430 And the source of the tricks is, notice, less the 
consequence of anyone's conscious intentions and more the result of 
hidden features of our minds. 
That tendency to focalize and to treat institutions and issues as 
exogenous431 contributes to still other tricks. For instance, the widely 
held assumption that contracts work reasonably well assumes that 
somehow contracting and regulations operate independently of one 
another.432 But they do not.433 The bargaining position of a corporate 
428. We recognize that not all corporations have the same interests of all other 
corporations. We discuss this point in other work, see Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, 
supra note 8, but for now we'll make three quick assertions. First, corporations have many 
interests that they more or less share. For those interests, they will be on the same side of the 
competition. Second, the issues involved in the macro script (e.g., profit versus the 
environment or profit versus workers) are an example of such interests. And, third, many of 
those shared interests are also specific to each corporation, and each corporation will have 
an incentive to promote them, both individually and collectively. 
429. See supra text accompanying note 325. 
430. The human tendency to focus on only a thin slice of an issue or on one or two 
variables is amplified in economists who tend to place high value on mathematical renditions 
of policy arguments. The desire for closure, clarity, and mathematical tractability leads to a 
particularly strong tendency to exogenize. As we've argued, however, tractability has its 
costs. In Amartya Sen's words: 
The demands of tractability can conflict with those of veracity, and we can have a hard 
choice between simplicity and relevance. We want a canonical form that is uncomplicated 
enough to be easily usable in theoretical and empirical analysis. But we also want an 
assumption structure that is not fundamentally at odds with the real world, nor one that 
makes simplicity take the form of naivety. 
Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 341, 341 (1985). 
431. See supra text accompanying notes 303-309. 
432. See supra notes 200-207 and accompanying text. 
433. See supra text accompanying notes 319-326. 
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constituency will depend immensely on numerous situational forces 
and conditions, including the laws and regulations governing the 
relationship between that constituency and corporate interests. 
Regulations, contracts, and much more will often be intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing. In light of the fact that corporate interests are 
generally advantaged in shaping existing regulations (and other 
situational variables), the contractual landscape will also tend to be 
tilted to favor corporations. Regulatory capture contributes to what 
might be called contractual capture.434 
Thus, one might, as many do,435 attribute the outcome of labor 
contracts to little more than the free interactions of workers and 
employers under a given regulatory environment. But such a 
dispositionist viewpoint misses the role of laws governing either those 
contracts locally or similar contracts in other jurisdictions across the 
nation or globe.436 Similarly, it misses the influence of workers in the 
given jurisdiction or in other jurisdictions whose own situations 
(including regulatory protections) may place them in a relatively 
feeble bargaining position. Insofar as employers can shape existing 
laws or the existing labor pool or shop for alternative laws and labor 
pools, the contracts will favor employers. A potential employer's 
ability to hire other workers at a lower wage (or at a similar nominal 
wage with fewer protections or benefits) reduces the ability of existing 
workers to bargain for more. In that way and others, contracts often 
reflect situational conditions over which employers and large 
corporate interests wield disproportionate influence. 
A parallel argument can be made for virtually any corporate 
stakeholder. Inasmuch as large commercial interests are, as we have 
argued, advantaged in capturing all relevant elements of the situation, 
they will be more or less successful at promoting situations that 
maximize corporate profits while minimizing the take of corporate 
stakeholders. The next section considers that distributional effect. 
1. A Concrete Example of the Basic Tricks 
In revealing the tricks, the previous Section relied on the 
somewhat generic rendition of the macro script provided in Part III, 
supra. It is illuminating to examine one critical example: Henry 
Hansmann's superb book on why firms are organized as they are and, 
434. Both are just examples of situational or deep capture. 
435. See supra notes 200-207 and accompanying text. 
436. Cf supra text accompanying notes 319-326 (discussing biasing categories of "free 
markets" and "regulation"). 
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more particularly, why shareholder primacy has emerged as the most 
prevalent organizational form.437 
In that book, Hansmann compellingly argues that "over the long 
run, cost-minimizing forms of organization will come to dominate 
most industries."438 That is true both because of the "conscious design 
and imitation on the part of the entrepreneurs who organize firms" 
(that is, disposition) and because "higher-cost forms of organization 
tend to be driven out of business by their lower-cost competitors" 
(that is, situation).439 It follows, writes Hansmann, that " [i]f we observe 
that a particular form of ownership is dominant in a given industry, 
this is a strong indication that the form is less costly than other forms 
of ownership would be in that industry."440 As Hansmann details 
throughout his book: 
An important reason for the prevalence of investor-owned firms in 
market economies is that contracting costs for financial capital are often 
relatively high compared with contracting costs for other inputs -
including labor - and for most products. A second reason is that, 
however poorly situated investors may be to exercise effective control, 
there are often no other patrons who are in a better position, either 
because they lack the requisite homogeneity of interest or because they 
are too transitory and dispersed.441 
In short, the sum of contracting costs and governance costs tends to be 
minimized with investor ownership - and that is what makes 
investor-ownership dominant in most (though not all442) contexts. 
We do not dispute most of Hansmann's careful analysis or his 
remarkably wide-ranging evidence.443 And, with respect to 
Hansmann's positive or descriptive story, we basically agree with one 
reviewer, who wrote that "Hansmann succeeds brilliantly."444 
Problems emerge, however, when one places Hansmann's 
sophisticated version of the macro script for corporate law against the 
meta script for policymaking. Taking seriously the meta script's 
presumptions about regulation undercuts Hansmann's assertion that 
437. See generally HANSMANN, supra note 153. 
438. Id. at 22. 
439. Id. 
440. Id. 
441. Id. at 296. 
442. Much of the power of Hansmann's analysis comes from the fact that the exceptions 
to investor ownership - for instance, worker ownership or producers' cooperatives - prove 
the cost-minimization rule. See id. at 66-148. 
443. Hansmann amasses revealing evidence of varying forms of business enterprise from 
across industries, nations, and time periods. See id. 
444. Eric W. Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1961 
(1998) (reviewing HANSMANN, supra note 153, and G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1996)). 
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the process he describes leads to, not only the "cost-minimizing" form 
of ownership, but also to the "form of ownership . . . that is most 
desirable from a social point of view."445 It undercuts, that is, 
Hansmann's foundational normative premise.446 
To better understand why that is true, note that Hansmann's focus 
is basically limited to just one dependent variable - the form of 
"ownership." Like most of us, Hansmann assumes that his vision is not 
impaired by his narrow focus and that he sees all that he needs to see 
in order to make an accurate assessment of institutional 
arrangements.447 That unconscious tendency to miss features of the 
situation leaves us largely blind to influences and dynamics that can be 
more significant than the ones of which we are aware.448 So it is that 
Hansmann happens to miss many of the implications of his work. 
The same competition that Hansmann so richly elucidates seems 
likely to influence, not just the form of enterprise ownership, but also 
the form of all that is mutable and worth competing over - from 
prototypical regulations to knowledge structures. Insofar as the form 
of enterprise ownership does evolve in response to the "logic of the 
market,"449 it will do so in ways that influence the situational variables 
that Hansmann takes as given. 
The assumption that all other variables are fixed by no means 
reflects, we believe, a deliberate attempt to trick his readers. Far from 
it. That Hansmann devotes major portions of his book to analyzing 
how well different types of groups can work together to advance their 
own interests and how market forces encourage success in that regard, 
while assuming that "regulation" is independent of that process and 
essentially good,450 reveals the biasing power of knowledge structures. 
The trick is more or less on us all - the unseen consequence of the 
larger schematic illusions in policymaking scripts. When those illusions 
are taken seriously and the tricks are observed, it is difficult to 
445. HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 23. 
446. When Hansmann claims that the implicit but powerful competition among forms of 
organization is "cost-minimizing" or "efficient" he means that it leads "to a situation in 
which there is no alternative arrangement that could make any class of patrons better off, by 
their own subjective valuation, without making some other class worse off to a greater 
degree." Id. 
447. See supra text accompanying notes 305-306. 
448. See supra text accompanying notes 243-255. 
449. HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 295. 
450. See, e.g., id. at 151 ("We see here an important phenomenon that we shall meet 
again . . .  when we examine other industries such as banking and life insurance. Governmen­
tal regulation to protect consumers can substantially improve the viability of investor-owned 
firms in industries where they would otherwise have difficulty competing with consumer 
cooperatives."). 
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conclude that existing arrangements are, in fact, the "most desirable 
from a social point of view."451 
2. Refined Evidence of the Tricks 
If the claims made in the two previous Sections are correct, then 
some interesting predictions follow. 
First, consider again the "regulation is bad" element of the meta 
script. If corporations are indeed changing form to better take 
advantage of regulatory profits, then corporations should have, over 
the last several decades, increasingly taken on the characteristics that 
scholars have identified as effective in that competition. We will not 
offer a thorough test of that prediction here, but there is one 
prominent characteristic worth highlighting. 
The conventional wisdom among economists, political scientists, 
public-choice theorists, and other scholars examining regulatory 
competition is that groups with a single, narrow interest have an 
important advantage over groups with many, conflicting interests.452 
The single-interest advantage not only assists a competitor in deciding 
what policy positions to endorse and resist; it also facilitates 
coordination and cooperation within any group of similarly placed 
competitors. Thus a group with a single, shared interest will be able to 
work together more efficiently and to influence regulations more 
effectively than groups with multiple interests, other things equal.453 
451. Id. at 23. The tendency to exogenize can be seen in many contexts, all of which 
seem to be mutually reinforcing. It is not just academics who miss the fact that commercial 
entities will change their form to better exert regulatory influence or otherwise cope with 
regulatory institutions. Regulators also tend to assume that the commercial entities' form 
and shape is independent of the regulations. For instance, many regulatory institutions 
adjust fines or damages according to the wealth of the entity being penalized. The practice 
spans institutions as diverse as jury-determined punitive damages in tort law to the 
Environmental Protection Agency's settlement guidelines. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 382, at 1068 (2001); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15 (W. 
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (describing role of wealth in punitive damage 
assessments); Mendelson, supra note 181, at 1241 & nn.149-52. The common justification for 
such rules or guidelines is that the survival of an entity should not be unduly burdened by 
regulatory penalties. See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry Been, Director of Site Remediation 
Enforcement, EPA, General Policy on Superfund Ability to Pay Determinations 1-2 (Sept. 
30, 1997) (explaining that settlements should not place entities under "undue financial 
hardship"), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/genpol-atp 
-rpt.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).  A problem with this seemingly sensible rule, as Nina 
Mendelson has argued, is that firms can, and often do, alter their shape precisely to reduce 
their perceived "ability to pay." Mendelson, supra note 181, at 1241; see id. at 1245-46; Lynn 
M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996). Again, the tendency to 
exogenize serves the ends of large corporate interests who can, by moving risky activities to 
corporate forms with comparatively few assets, externalize costs to potential victims. 
452. See authorities cited supra note 102; see, e.g. , OLSON, supra note 106, at 48-49; Chen 
& Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8. 
453. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 102. 
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Look carefully. The key regulatory-theory explanation for why 
some interests are better able to influence regulation than others is 
identical to "an especially important consideration"454 that Hansmann 
offers to explain why investor ownership has become so prevalent and 
why other forms of enterprise organization have emerged in other 
contexts. Both boil down to the notion that groups can be more 
successful when, other things equal, their members enjoy homo­
geneous interests.455 Hansmann summarizes much of the evidence 
contained in his book and the seemingly "obvious conclusion" to be 
drawn from it this way: 
[A]lthough there are hundreds of thousands of firms in the economy, and 
although these firms exhibit a diverse variety of ownership structures, 
including a surprisingly large number of firms in which ownership is not 
in the hands of investors, in virtually all cases the group of individuals to 
whom ownership is given is extremely homogeneous in its interests. It is 
extraordinarily rare to find a firm in which control is shared among 
individuals who have stakes in the enterprise that are at all dissimilar.456 
With the value of homogeneity of interests in mind, it is 
illuminating to recall the major shift in corporate practices and 
corporate law over the past thirty years.457 Corporations that once had 
loosely defined ends, including "social responsibility," evolved into 
entities with a single, shared maximand - profit.458 Furthermore, as a 
quick review of Part III will confirm, most of the arguments for 
shareholder primacy (that is, the macro script) seem to have direct 
application, not only to the competition for consumers, workers, and 
capital, but also to the competition for regulatory advantage.459 In sum, 
the evolution of the form of enterprises and of corporate practices 
near the end of the twentieth century represented a transformation of 
commercial interests from a group of entities with relatively 
heterogeneous and multiple goals to a group with a shared, single goal. 
That homogenization occurred both on an intra- and inter-firm basis. 
Assuming that the conventional schemas are correct,460 that implies 
454. HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 288. 
455. Id. 
456. Id. 
457. See supra text accompanying notes 120-158. 
458. See supra text accompanying notes 152-159. Indeed, according to the macro script, 
a single-minded focus on profits is - or should be - one of the defining characteristics of 
corporations. See supra text accompanying notes 217-227. 
459. See supra text accompanying notes 161-231. 
460. Some critics of public-choice theory have argued that the basic capture script is 
inconsistent with the evidence that regulators often make decisions in accordance with their 
ideology and apparent beliefs about what is in the public interest. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, 
Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 29 (2000); Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, 
Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 109, 115 (2000). It is true that public-choice models, like all economic models, 
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that the last several decades has heightened the power of commercial 
entities - individually and collectively - to advance their interest by 
influencing other regulatory institutions (defined broadly). 
Thus, when Hansmann observes that homogeneity of interests "is 
evidently a significant factor in the widespread success of the modern 
investor-owned business corporation,"461 we can only agree. 
Unfortunately, though, that is part of the problem. What Hansmann 
(with Kraakman) has described as the normatively desirable "end of 
corporate law history,"462 in which "corporate enterprise [is] 
organized . . .  to serve the interests of society as a whole"463 appears 
upon closer inspection to reflect a normatively suspect expansion of 
corporate power behind an illusion of "aggregate social welfare."464 
All that leads to a related prediction. If corporate interests are 
advantaged in the competition for regulation, and if that advantage 
has been heightened over the last quarter century or so as shareholder 
primacy has solidified, and if "regulation" is defined broadly, as we 
have argued it should be, then there should have been growing 
corporate influence over those regulations in that time period. Again, 
this is the topic of future work, but we do not believe that many would 
dispute the proposition that corporate influence has indeed grown 
immensely in that time period.465 
embraced a predominantly dispositionist view of the regulatory process, one in which the 
actions of "captured" regulators were often described as conscious and intentional attempts 
to serve their own interests at a cost to the public. The deep capture hypothesis assumes, in 
contrast, that capture occurs through more or less situational means and that regulators 
perceive themselves to be acting in the public interest, regardless of whether they are in fact. 
See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 4, at 206-12. Indeed, that is a belief that 
most of us are motivated to have about most of our actions. See Hanson & Y osifon, The 
Situational Character, supra note 4, at Parts III.C.2.b.i & III.C.2.d.i. To satisfy that motive, 
we seek "reasons" to make sense of our behavior. Id. A key role of the schemas we examine 
in this Article is that they serve that purpose. 
461. HANSMANN, supra note 153, at 288; see also id. ("[A]nd it also appears to be an 
important reason for the relative paucity of worker-owned firms, which otherwise have some 
significant efficiency advantages."). 
462. See supra text accompanying notes 152-155 (summarizing Hansmann and 
Kraakman's "end of history" argument). 
463. See supra note 155 and accompanying quotation. 
464. Id. 
465. For a sample of popular books sounding this theme in a variety of contexts, see 
ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA (2003) ;  CYNTHIA CROSSEN, TAINTED TRUTH 
(1994); CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATION NATION: How CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING 
OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998); BARBARA EHRENREICH, 
NICKEL AND DIMEO: ON (NOT) GETTNG BY IN AMERICA (2001); ROBERT KUTTNER, 
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (1997); ROBERT D.  
MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S ADDITION TO 
CREDIT (2000); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY (1999); 
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION 
AND HEALTH (2002); ROBERT G. PICARD, THE ECONOMICS AND FINANCING OF MEDIA 
COMPANIES (2001); PAULA M. RAYMAN, BEYOND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE SEARCH FOR 
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Still, we will highlight one example here: corporate law itself. The 
conventional account of corporate law steers wide of suggesting that 
corporate law is a regulatory institution. In fact, as we summarized, it 
is widely understood as "contractual" and "voluntary" - the stuff of 
markets.466 Given that categorization, it has been relatively automatic 
for scholars to assume that corporate law - like markets - are good. 
Under our definitions (and arguably under theirs), however, 
"corporate law" is better understood as "regulatory." Whether, for 
instance, corporations have an obligation to take into account the 
interests of various constituencies will greatly influence their profits. 
And corporate law is, also according to conventional wisdom, subject 
to influence from exogenous sources. If corporate law is understood as 
a form of regulation, then the "regulation is bad" element of the meta 
script leads to the prediction that corporate law is itself "captured." 
The prediction is easily confirmed by what we have already 
reviewed. Corporate law qua regulation advances the interests of 
corporations against competing interests by, among other things, 
endorsing shareholder primacy. And shareholder primacy promotes 
corporate interests by, among other ways, making corporations more 
effective competitors for all forms of regulation. 
B. The Disappearing Distribution Trick 
In this Section, we want to reveal a separate but related trick to 
those identified above. A review of most corporate law treatises and 
virtually all corporate law scholarship demonstrates that 
"distributional" considerations are understood to be beyond the scope 
of corporate law. To those familiar with the legal-academic literature, 
this is no revelation. Distribution is one of those topics that legal 
scholars rarely dwell on, except in the occasional articles discussing 
whether ignoring distribution is appropriate. According to 
conventional wisdom, legal rulemaking should be concerned solely 
with efficiency considerations and "distributional" concerns should be 
addressed through the tax-and-transfer system.467 In other work, we 
argue that this general tendency to categorize "distributional" effects 
as separate from nondistributional effects (usually "efficiency") 
reflects the influence of the same scripts and biases that we have 
identified here.468 Although this is not the place to review that work, it 
DIGNITY AT WORK (2001 ) ; ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE 
ALL-AMERICAN MEAL (2001). 
466. See supra text accompanying notes 376-378. 
467. See generally Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, supra note 10. 
468. See generally id.; see also KENNEDY, supra note 320. Occasionally, efficiency­
oriented scholars do look at distributional consequences. In a recent work, for instance, 
Steven Schwarcz implements what he describes as a "balancing test" that would worry about 
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is worth briefly examining here how corporate law scholars in 
particular have justified their omission of the distribution question. 
Conventional corporate law scholarship is, again, almost devoid of 
distribution talk. In their book on corporate law, for instance, 
Easterbrook and Fischel never explicitly broach the topic.469 As early 
proponents of the now-dominant macro script, they set the tone for 
the current discourse by making it clear that corporate law is about 
maximizing wealth, not distributing it. Those corporate law scholars 
who have given the topic attention have done little more than to make 
that position explicit.470 
Professors Allen and Kraakman, for instance, observe that "the 
search for efficiency is, and should be, at the core of organizational 
law"471 and that "efficiency in the production of wealth [ought to be] 
the principal standard for evaluating current law."472 By "efficiency," 
they mean Kaldor-Hicks efficiency473 or "wealth maximization," which 
they rightly emphasize "has important limitations": " [I]t has little to 
say about the legitimacy of initial distributions of wealth. Additionally, 
it can be criticized for ignoring the actual distributional consequences 
of policies . . . .  "474 
So how do corporate law scholars justify ignoring those 
limitations? The trick - and, here again, we mean the subconscious 
cognitive trick, not a conscious sleight of hand - is a familiar one. 
"Distributional" considerations are separate from "efficiency" 
considerations, and the former is beyond the expertise of corporate 
law scholars and corporate law. That does not mean that distributional 
considerations are unimportant or should be ignored. It just means 
that society should rely on other institutions that are designed to 
address such concerns.475 Allen and Kraakman explain: 
not just whether a policy was Kaldor-Hicks efficient, but also the extent to which the 
externalities associated with the policy should be internalized. See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form and Substance 28-33 
(Nov. 11 ,  2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
469. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 180. Nor does Hansmann in his book on 
the ownership of enterprise. See HANSMANN, supra note 153. 
470. See, e.g. , supra text accompanying note 202. 
471. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 7. 
472. Id. 
473. As they describe it, "(A]n act (or a rule) is efficient . . .  if at least one party would 
gain from it after all those who suffered a loss as a result of the transaction or policy were 
fully compensated" - though actual compensation is not required. Id. at 5. 
474. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
475. Actually, Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek do believe that 
"distributional" considerations should be pretty much ignored altogether - in significant 
part because they believe the institutions that would attempt to make such determinations 
lack the information that they would need and would, in the effort, interfere with people's 
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Corporation law has been . . .  as a field limited to only a slice of the 
human experience. Thus, legitimate political questions about, for 
example, the social distribution of wealth fall well outside the 
competence of corporate law. The laws of taxation, education, 
environmental and labor policy, product safety, and other issues of 
health, safety, and welfare address the distribution of risks and rewards 
in society. Corporate law addresses the creation of economic wealth 
through the facilitation of voluntary, ongoing collective action.476 
As that passage illustrates, the conventional script for dismissing 
distributional concerns is little more than a specific application of the 
more general macro script used to dismiss all considerations beyond 
shareholder primacy. Similarly, it is little more than a specific 
application of the more general arguments used against ever 
considering distributional considerations in legal rulemaking. 
There are several things to notice about the disappearing 
distribution trick. The first is just a restatement of a point we made in 
the previous Section: if one takes seriously the possibilities that 
institutions or ideas are subject to competition whenever they might 
be profitably influenced, and that corporations are highly advantaged 
in that competition, then one should be extremely skeptical about any 
claim that the tax-and-transfer system will ensure an appropriate 
distribution of wealth. The tax-and-transfer system will be heavily 
skewed to favor those interests with the greatest ability to influence it. 
Second, the categorization of policy concerns into separate policy 
arenas - efficiency pursued through legal rules and distribution 
pursued through the tax-and-transfer system - is a source of some 
now-predictable categorical illusions. The categories, for instance, 
obscure the fact that legal rules have immense distributional 
consequences. Consider one of the most important defining features 
of the corporation - limited liability of shareholders.477 The history of 
how that feature gradually emerged - it did not spring fully formed 
upon the arrival of the corporate form - reveals that it was 
"developed as a broad-based investment subsidy"478 at the behest of 
freedom. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 161-76; 
Interview by Thomas W. Hazlett with F.A. Hayek, supra note 2. 
476. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183, at 2; see also Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, 
supra note 3, at 124 (arguing that the claim of some that corporations should serve social 
purposes "amounts to . . .  an assertion that those who favor the taxes and expenditures in 
question have failed to persuade a majority of their fellow citizens to be of like mind and 
that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic procedures what they cannot attain by 
democratic procedures"). 
477. See Mendelson, supra note 181, at 1203, 1208-09 & n.14 (2002) (collecting 
authorities that emphasize the importance of limited liability to the success of the corporate 
form over alternative arrangements). 
478. Mendelson, supra note 181, at 1212. 
124 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1 
large industrialists.479 To be sure, efficiency stories have been offered 
to justify limited liability.480 On the other hand, those stories are highly 
contestable,481 and, more to the point, there is no denying that the 
emergence of limited liability had immense distributional 
consequences. It is not that scholars would, if pressed, deny that legal 
rules have such effects. The point is that by placing those effects in the 
"other" category, scholars are not mindful of them in practice. Out of 
sight, out of mind. Only if the issue is raised need one even access the 
"tax-and-transfer" defense. 
Because distributional concerns are otherwise removed from the 
cognitive picture, policy analysts do not attend to them or their 
significance - even when alternative legal rules would have the same 
"efficiency consequences." If a transaction between A and B will yield 
gains to trade of $100, no matter who gets the entitlement or how the 
entitlement is protected, A and B would be primarily interested in the 
distributional consequences. By not being attentive to distribution, we 
forget that the As and Bs of the world will be competing for legal rules 
that favor them distributionally - even when doing so compromises 
efficiency.482 Now for the capture script: certain interests will tend to 
be advantaged in those competitions . . . .  483 
It is wrong and potentially dangerous to assume that "corporate 
law" and "distribution" belong in separate, independent categories. 
That line of argument leads to the prediction that, particularly over 
the last quarter century, corporations would have been more or less 
successful at reducing the legal protections and bargaining power of all 
of the constituencies with whom they compete for distributional 
shares. Relatedly, it suggests that wealth disparities would have been 
heightened between, on one hand, corporations and the individuals 
who exercise the most power over them and, on the other hand, 
individuals without such influence. We will not test those predictions 
here; however, a casual inspection of trends in employment law, 
unionization, tort law, safety and health regulations, wealth 
479. Id. at 1210-11 .  
480. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 161 ,  at  8-10; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
180, at 40-45. See generally Mendelson, supra note 181, at 1212-32 (reviewing various 
justifications). 
481. See, e.g. , Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 passim (1991); Mendelson, supra note 181, 
passim. 
482 Cf Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal 
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 470-71 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (summarizing several distribution-based criticisms of law and 
economics and their importance). 
483. See supra text accompanying notes 103-112. We suspect that reducing a group's 
bargaining position in the marketplace will often concomitantly reduce their efficacy as 
competitors for regulation. 
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distributions, and so on seem quite consistent with this basic story.484 
We attempt a more systematic examination of distributional trends in 
subsequent work.485 
Assuming our description of the tricks and their effects is roughly 
accurate, the disappearance of distribution from policy analysis further 
reveals the power of our categorical and schematic biases. As a 
general matter, most of us tend to believe we are witnessing the 
workings and outcomes of fair competitions in a legal regime that 
basically plays no more of a role than an umpire behind home plate. 
Given that worldview, the winners and losers in our system appear as 
the winners and losers in that same game - in which, on average, the 
more talented, harder working, more deserving - in short, the better 
- team wins. In part because of our categories, distribution is off the 
table, not because it isn't in play but because it has vanished from our 
sight. As a general matter, those who are poor deserve to be. And as 
for those who are rich, "more power to 'em." 
C. Revealing the Magician 
As the smoke obscuring the tricks clears, the once-invisible threads 
between the macro script and the meta script become clearer still, and 
the magician, too, comes into focus. That a meta script that maximizes 
markets and minimizes regulation is good for the collective interests of 
484. For example, data on union membership rates among wage and salary workers 
document a steep and steady decline in the United States since the 1950s. See Richard B.  
Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes, in THE 
DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE 
TwENTIETH CENTURY 265 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998); see also DAVID CARD ET 
AL., UNIONIZATION AND WAGE INEQUALITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE U.S., THE 
U.K., AND CANADA, at tbl.1 (Nat') Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9473, 
2003), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9473 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) (showing data that 
unionization rates have declined steadily - from 30.4 percent in 1960, to 26.4 percent in 
1970, to 22.2 percent in 1980, to 15.3 percent in 1990, and 13.5 percent in 1999). 
Similarly, changes in the "Gini coefficient," which measures income inequality (with a 
value of 0.0 for perfect equality and 1.0 when one family or household "has all the income 
and the rest have none"), are also remarkably consistent with the changes in the meta script. 
See ARTHUR F. JONES & DANIEL H. WEINBERG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING 
SHAPE OF THE NATION'S INCOME DISTRIBUTION 1 (2000) ("With two exceptions, the Gini 
coefficient decreased between 1947 and 1968 . . . .  Since 1968, however, this trend has 
reversed. Income inequality for families, measured by the Gini coefficient, increased 
between 1968 and 1998."); see also Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage 
Inequality: The United States vs. Other Advanced Countries, in WORKING UNDER 
DIFFERENT RULES 29, 32 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994). As Freeman and Katz note: 
In the 1980s overall wage dispersion increased in the United States to levels greater than at 
any time since 1940. The hourly earnings of a full-time worker in the ninetieth percentile of 
the U.S. earnings distribution . . .  relative to a worker in the tenth percentile . . .  grew by 20 
percent for men and 25 percent for women from 1979 to 1989. 
Id. For a more detailed examination of those trends, see Chen & Hanson, Distribution 
versus Efficiency, supra note 10. 
485. See Chen & Hanson, Testing Shareholder Primacy, supra note 12. 
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corporations is self evident. We've already indicated how the macro 
script benefits from the meta script, but we believe that the two are 
mutually reinforcing. The meta script - its success in the marketplace 
of ideas, such as it is - benefits from the macro script because the 
macro script empowers corporations in the competition over 
regulatory institutions and ideas. Put differently, the success of the 
meta script itself reflects the heightened ability of corporations, owing 
to corporate law and the macro script, to influence our institutions and 
ideas (including the meta script itself) .  
When the dynamics are seen as connected, what once seemed 
clearly right begins to seem clearly wrong. Milton Friedman writes: 
" [T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business - to use 
its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game. "486 Friedman is missing 
the tricks: "the rules of the game" are not fixed and independent of 
what business does; indeed, the Friedman doctrine has given business 
little choice but to "use its resources and engage in activities designed 
to increase its profits" by changing the "rules of the game." 
So, who is the magician? By now, the question should answer itself. 
Every element of the meta script and macro script - from "markets 
good" to "regulation bad" and from "profit good" to "social 
responsibility bad" - seems designed to maximize and legitimate the 
power of large commercial interests. Every tension that exists reveals 
a tilt in favor of those interests. Freedom is understood increasingly in 
terms of our role as "consumers" and our "freedom to choose" 
whatever products we are willing to pay for. The illusion of freedom 
and the illusory threat to that freedom favors no group so much as the 
large corporate enterprises that benefit immensely from our blindness 
to, and their ability to manipulate us through, the situation. 
Restrictions to freedom wielded through "lawful" situational forces 
are ignored. "Regulation" and the process of "capture" is defined to 
implicate only those institutions that tend to limit the powers of 
corporate interests. "Distribution" is defined to protect existing, 
corporate-favoring wealth disparities and the policies that help create 
them. And the power of markets to shape corporate forms is 
presumed to stop at the moment the effects would be clearly 
malignant. 
As we emphasized at the outset, the power of magic is less the 
power of magicians and more the unseen influences over perceptions 
and behavior. The magician's role is, through trial and error, to 
discover and perfect means of exploiting those influences. The 
corporation, and the competitive process that we have perceived as 
freedom-producing, may be better understood as a freedom-curtailing 
486. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 133. 
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magician. Consciously and, more often, unconsciously, commercial 
entities alter the situation to their advantage through many of the 
same invisible processes that we associate with the marketplace. 
1. The Situational Magician 
We must emphasize that the "magician" schema may be as 
misleading as it is revealing. While it is true that some individuals 
sometimes deliberately attempt to manipulate other peoples' 
conceptions and, in turn, their behavior, rarely do those individuals do 
so in a conscious attempt to advance corporate interests. And rarer 
still do they do so malevolently. The magician operates off the radar of 
human consciousness. In that sense, the "magician" we speak of is less 
the sleight-of-hand artist, whose goal it is to trick people. The winner 
of the competition for the situation is better understood as a 
situational magician - a product of the combined effects of the 
participants in the competition. As we have argued, every relevant 
portion of the situation will be the subject of competition and capture. 
Our focus in this project is on the shared schemas within our 
commercial, consuming, and policymaking systems. 
Such shared schemas - that they exist and how they operate -
have recently been the focus of a new field of social psychology known 
as cultural psychology. Culture, according to that scholarship, is 
defined as 
the set of ideas that coordinate the actions and construct the meanings of 
a group of people. More often than not these ideas are implicit and 
automatic, guiding our practices, structuring our institutions, and 
generally infusing the everyday business of our lives. As people engage 
with a culture's practices, artifacts, and institutions, their thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors come to reflect the culture's values and beliefs.487 
Embedded as seeming natural elements of our culture, our schemas 
are easy to miss. Yet they are as powerful as they are invisible, 
exerting great influence over what we see and how we behave, even at 
times in which we are most careful in our assessment of the world. The 
meta script of policymaking and the macro script of corporate law can 
be understood as "cultural schemas" that serve those cultural actors 
who can best shape them. 
Psychologists have documented the many ways in which culture 
and our schemas are intertwined.488 Schemas that seem very natural in 
487. Alana Conner Snibbe, Cultural Psychology: Study in More than the Exotic Other, 
16 AM. PSYCHOL. Soc'Y OBSERVER (Dec. 2003), at http://www.psychologicalscience.org/ 
observer/getArticle.cfm?id=l444 (last visited Oct. 1 1 ,  2004). 
488. See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas & Michael H. Bond, Cultural Influences on the 
Perception of Interaction Episodes, 11 PERSONALITY. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 75 (1985); 
Joseph P. Forgas, Person Prototypes and Cultural Salience: The Role of Cognitive and 
Cultural Factors in Impression Formation, 24 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 3 (1985); Joan G. 
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one culture are completely foreign in others. Individuals in some 
cultures, for example, are more aware of the situation, more easily 
appreciate its influences, and therefore are less likely to miss the 
situational magician.489 Individuals primed with the schemas of other 
cultures, such as our own, are more susceptible to the situational 
magician's invisible hand - and the trend on that score is not 
promising. The now-pervasive meta schemas of policymaking and 
macro schemas of corporate law are likely to make us even more 
vulnerable over time, fulfilling the very schemas upon which they are 
based.490 Those schemas not only influence our behavior; they also 
legitimate our behavior491 - for ourselves and others - as well as any 
bad effects that result.492 
Thus, the situational manipulation is more complex than we are 
accustomed to imagining or capable of identifying, at least without 
looking hard for it.493 The situational magician can perhaps be best 
Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1984). 
489. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 255, at 532. 
490. For example, researchers have documented the self-fulfilling behavioral 
consequences of educational priming in the economic approach to policymaking. Studies 
have shown that increased exposure to economic training - a process that primes students 
with "role schemas" infused with expectations of self-interested behavior - results in 
increased propensity to act out of self-interest and behave noncooperatively. The more 
individuals had been primed with these schemas, the more their actions conformed to them. 
See, e.g., John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 171, 177 (1991); Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit 
Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 170-71 (1993); Robert H. Frank et al., Do Economists 
Make Bad Citizens?, 10 J.  ECON. PERSP. 187 (1996); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E.  Ames, 
Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, 
IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 309-10 (1981). 
491. The primacy of profit and removal of morality is one example of this phenomenon. 
Acceptance of such a schema makes acceptable the actions of corporate agents who pursue, 
without regard for others, corporate profits in every field - from consumer markets to 
lobbying. See also supra text accompanying note 208 (describing the RJR Nabisco Chief 
Executive Officer's view that we "shouldn't be drawing a moral judgment about a business 
our country says is perfectly legal"). The schema thereby makes capture more palatable and 
thus more possible. 
492. There are a variety of ways in which the schemas of corporate law help us to ignore 
or legitimate externalities. If, for instance, it is profit-maximizing to pollute and our schemas 
assure us that other constituencies are adequately protected, then there is little reason to 
refrain from polluting. If de-beaking chickens is likely to increase profits, and your job is to 
make a profit, then you do it. If schemas tell you to pursue profit within the law, then it 
follows that you would even work to change the law and the perceptions of those who apply 
it. See, e.g., John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in 
CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (David M. 
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunel eds., 1996); George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory 
and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT: 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 214 (David M. Messick & Ann E. 
Tenbrunel eds., 1996). This separation of the bottom line from all other considerations 
allows for greater capture and greater profits. 
493. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8 (discussing dispositional and 
situational magic). 
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understood as a dynamic amalgam of, among other things, commercial 
entities intentionally and unintentionally pursuing their shared 
interests within a system that, with the aid of schemas and categories 
(1) provides those interests a competitive advantage in influencing 
that system; (2) denies, ignores, or downplays that advantage in 
influencing that system; and (3) otherwise legitimates the outcomes of 
that system. Yet the situational magician has not emerged through 
some sort of blatant and well-crafted conspiratorial design, but 
through a process that is better likened to an invisible hand. 
2.  The Magician's Invisible Hand 
Ironically, the supposed originator of the invisible hand metaphor, 
Adam Smith, provides some of the most compelling evidence for the 
existence of a situational magician. Today, scholars and policymakers 
who celebrate the wisdom of Adam Smith and his "invisible hand" 
metaphor appear to have construed his metaphor to confirm their 
schemas - further evidence of the effects of knowledge structures. 
But a few scholars and commentators have begun to see another side 
of the invisible hand metaphor and of Adam Smith's famous work. 
Jonathan Schlefer calls the "invisible hand" metaphor "one of the 
most often distorted passages in economic literature."494 According to 
Schlefer, the passage "makes Smith sound as if he thought that the 
invisible hand always leads individuals who are pursuing their own 
interests to promote the good of society. He did not."495 
More recently, economic historian Emma Rothschild devoted a 
chapter of her book to the beginnings of the "invisible hand imagery." 
According to Rothschild, there are good reasons to believe "that 
Smith did not especially esteem the invisible hand."496 By researching 
the contemporaneous "invisible hand" metaphors that Smith was 
probably familiar with, Rothschild discovers that they tended to have 
negative, sometimes gruesome, connotations.497 Reexamining his work 
494. Jonathan Schiefer, Today's Most Mischievous Misquotation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Mar. 1998, at 16. 
495. Id. 
496. EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT 116 (2001). 
497. In addition to other evidence, Rothschild points to three examples of the invisible 
hand that likely influenced Smith's use of the imagery. Describing the first, Rothschild 
writes: 
The earlier intellectual history of invisible hands turns out to be generally grim. The most 
famous invisible hand in Anglo-Scottish literature is that of Macbeth's providence. "And 
with thy bloody and invisible hand," Macbeth apostrophizes the night in Act III, in the scene 
immediately before the banquet and Banquo's murder; he asks the darkness to cover up the 
crimes he is about to commit: 
Come, seeling night, 
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with that meaning in mind, she concludes that " [t]he image of the 
invisible hand is best interpreted as a mildly ironic joke."498 It is little 
wonder that the situational magician has been missed. Seeing an 
"invisible" hand is challenging enough. But because that hand is, 
through conventional schemas, presumed to be good, we have been 
primed to see magic where we might otherwise have seen illusion. 
No matter what Adam Smith may have intended with his 
metaphor, those who claim to be his intellectual descendents have 
ignored one of his strongest admonitions. Smith cautioned that, with 
the emergence of large, wealthy, and single-minded corporate entities, 
the invisible hand could be dangerous.499 Smith lamented the 
tremendous power of such enterprises and the situational forces to 
which they were subject, writing that " [n]o other sovereigns ever were, 
or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent 
about the happiness or misery of their subjects [as] the proprietors of 
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day, 
And with thy bloody and invisible hand 
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond 
Which keeps me pale. 
ROTHSCHILD, supra note 496, at 1 18-19. Rothschild argues that Smith "is likely to have 
known Macbeth well," having "lectured on Shakespeare's use of metaphor." Id. at 1 19. 
Similarly, she writes: 
Smith was a great admirer of Voltaire's tragedies, and Voltaire, too, invokes several invisible 
and disagreeable hands . . . .  In Act IV, Oedipus recounts the memorable day in Corinth 
when, as he arrived at a temple with offerings to the gods, the altar began to shake, a 
terrifying voice was carried to him by the winds, and "an invisible hand pushed away my 
presents." 
Id. Third, Rothschild explains: 
Id. 
There is an earlier invisible hand which is even more unpleasant, and which Smith probably 
also knew; it appears in one of Ovid's Metaphorphoses, in which the hero (the warrior 
Caeneus, who is at the time surrounded by centaurs, one of whom is taunting him because he 
had been born a woman, Caenis), "twisted and plied his invisible hand, inflicting wound 
within wound." The hand is invisible here because it is behind the victim's back; in the 
edition of Ovid which Smith owned there is an illustration, as a frontispiece to this particular 
book of the Metaphorphoses, of a gloved hand stabbing a soldier between the shoulder 
blades with a long spear. 
498. Id. at 1 16. 
499. See L. ROBERT HEILBRONER, THE WORLDL y PHILOSOPHERS 38-39 (1953) 
(emphasizing Smith's nuanced view of human behavior and the world at large, as evidenced 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759). When Adam Smith wrote, the 
prototypical seller was a small merchant who privately owned his own means of production 
and who looked much like the typical consumer, except for his specialized tools and skills. 
SMITH, supra note 78, at 37. The large corporate form that today is the norm among sellers 
(at least as measured by percentage of revenues) was barely on the scene. It is for that 
reason that Smith understood something that seems to have been forgotten since. He saw 
that the question of whether resources are allocated via markets or regulations was different 
from the question of whether market actors should be corporations pursuing only profit. But 
the emergence of entities such as the "East India" and "Hudson's Bay" companies made a 
strong impression on Smith - and a very bad one. Id. at 641, 741-53. 
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such a mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. "500 Smith 
accordingly admonished readers to beware the distorting influence of 
those corporate entities across the socio-economic landscape: 
The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes 
from this [mercantile] order, ought always to be listened to with great 
precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and 
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most 
suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is 
never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an 
interest to deceive and even to oppress the publick, and who accordingly 
have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.501 
Smith's point, as we might make it, is that commercial interests, 
particularly large corporations, are likely to promote illusion in the 
form of self-serving laws and regulations disguised as in the public 
interest. Indeed, according to Smith, such behavior is "necessary," as if 
profit-maximizing firms are led by an invisible hand to "deceive and 
even oppress the public." 
3. The Emergence of the Magician 
We have argued that the legitimacy of our system is built upon the 
credibility and coherence of the meta script of policymaking and the 
macro script of corporate law. 502 Our hypothesis is that the schemas 
500. SMITH, supra note 78, at 752. 
501. Id. at 267; see also id. at 644 ("It is the industry which is carried on for the benefit of 
the rich and the powerful, that is principally encouraged by our mercantile system. That 
which is carried on for the benefit of the poor and indigent, is too often, either neglected, or 
oppressed."). 
502. Until now, we have done little to put our arguments in context. In this section, we 
take a step back to consider the larger situation of the dominant schemas by examining the 
historical context in which those schemas arose. 
But even with that, we are barely scratching the surface of the situation of our schemas. 
This Article, despite its heft, reflects the cognitive miserliness that hampers most human 
analyses; it pursues closure within a limited amount of space and time and relies on 
simplifying - and often oversimplifying - schemas to do so. This section attempts to add a 
little more context, more situation, and to suggest some of the many ways in which our 
analysis is still too narrow. The role of schemas is much broader than we've suggested thus 
far, and there are clearly more schemas and scripts at work than we have thus far identified. 
Thus, although this Article attempts to add context and situation to the debate over 
corporate Jaw, it has likely left in the shadows more situations than it has illuminated. Future 
work - by us and others - will provide further light on aspects of the situation that we have 
been unable to focus on here. 
There are, for instance, numerous schemas and scripts that exert important influences on 
corporate law that we have not explored in this Article. Consider some of the 
complementary legal schemas that reinforce the schemas we have examined. At the meta 
level, another key script that helps to inform our approach to all areas of law is the 
conclusion that legal rules should pursue efficiency, and not distributional, considerations. 
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 
(2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994). That script is quite 
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similar to, and seems to provide independent support for, the other meta script (that 
markets, associated with efficiency, are good and regulation, associated with distribution, is 
bad) and the corporate macro view (that corporate law should focus on maximizing wealth, 
associated with efficiency, and disregard "other" considerations, associated with 
distribution). We alluded to the existence of such a meta script earlier. See supra Section B. 
Like the "markets are good, regulation is bad" script, the hardening belief that the proper 
focus of legal rules is efficiency and that distributional considerations are best left to the tax­
and-transfer system, has played a pivotal role in influencing our understanding of all areas of 
law, including corporate law. See Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, supra 
note 10. Seeing shareholder primacy as an "efficiency" consideration, and social 
responsibility as "distributive," a meta script that counsels a singular focus on "efficiency" is 
bound to lend credence to a macro script that seems also to adopt such a focus. And that 
distribution-efficiency lens is only one instantiation of a macro phenomenon we describe 
below in which our focus in all areas of law has shifted away from seemingly difficult-to­
target, complicated considerations for which little consensus exists, and toward more easily 
targeted and focused maximands. The distribution-efficiency meta script is sure to make the 
separation of those two types of considerations seem more natural, neutral, and correct, and 
to legitimize the displacement of more difficult-to-grasp (that is, situational) concerns. 
See id. 
Dynamics at the macro level mirror those at the meta level. While the meta script of 
policymaking has influenced the macro script of corporate law, each likely reinforcing our 
willingness to accept the other, macro scripts in other areas of law also have influenced and 
reinforced our now-dominant approach to corporate law. For example, at the same time that 
corporate law's focus has narrowed to shareholder primacy, the schemas of tort law have 
followed a similar path, reflecting the power of the distribution-efficiency meta script as well 
as the "markets are good," "regulation is bad" script, and mirroring the narrowing focus on 
shareholder primacy in corporate law. The dominant approach to tort law now directs a 
focus on minimizing the costs of accidents and maximizing wealth and the notion that 
products liability should serve solely the interests of consumers. The "consumer sovereignty 
norm," as it is commonly referred to, removes from the table many traditional conceptions 
of justice in favor of a singular focus on seemingly easy-to-target efficiency considerations. 
See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 713-67 (summarizing and exemplifying the focus 
on cost-minimization or wealth-maximization in the products liability debates); Benforado & 
Hanson, supra note 7, passim (describing the trend in legal theory away from more 
situationist, toward more dispositionist, analyses of tort law). 
Like the schemas of corporate law and tort law, the schemas of legal ethics over the past 
three decades have also experienced a revolution. Again there has been narrowing of focus 
on a single constituency - client interests above all - in place of the difficult-to-see, 
impossible-to-target moral considerations that once dominated the ethical codes. The 
elements of the script that have fueled that transformation bear an uncanny resemblance to 
their counterparts in corporate law. See, e.g., Ronald Chen, Client Primacy, supra note 10; 
Ronald Chen, The Illusion of Ethics: The Legitimating Schemas of Legal Ethics (work in 
progress) (on file with authors). While our approach to corporate law has surely reinforced 
our willingness to accept similar approaches in other areas of law, so too have those other 
approaches reinforced the legitimacy of the "shareholder primacy" macro script. There is 
much more to say on these topics, but for now our goal is only to emphasize that the 
dynamic is far more complex, and the situation far more encompassing, than this Article has 
thus far suggested. 
On top of the complementary meta and macro scripts we've just described, there is a 
more fundamental schema: dispositionism. Dispositionism is a self schema (a schema with 
which we attempt to make sense of ourselves and others) and an attributional schema (a 
schema with which we make attributions of causation, responsibility, and blame). It 
presumes that human behavior results from preference-driven, free choices and that 
outcomes reflect those choices. Dispositionism is at the heart of our legal system and forms 
the foundation for most laws and legal theories in the United States. For a discussion of 
dispositionism and some of its influence on laws and legal theories, see Hanson & Y osifon, 
The Situation, supra note 4, passim; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra 
note 4; Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon Broken Scales, supra note 10, passim. The 
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dispositionist view of the human actor is integral to the "markets are good and regulation is 
bad" meta script and the "profits are good and social responsibility is bad" macro script of 
corporate Jaw. See Hanson & Wright, supra note 86. 
Another broad category of the situation that this Article has neglected is a group of 
schemas that we call metaphorical schemas - metaphors that have facilitated (or not) our 
acceptance of both the meta script of policymaking, the macro script of corporate Jaw, as 
well as many complementary legal schemas. We have already alluded to some of the most 
prominent metaphorical schemas earlier in this Article. Specifically, we noted how 
evolutionary schemas have bolstered the "markets are good" side of the meta script by 
drawing upon a positive view of competitions and tournaments and also the way in which the 
corporate form, as the inevitable outcome of an evolutionary process, was heralded as 
naturally triumphant in that process. 
In other work, we describe in more detail the way in which the evolutionary schema has 
biased our view of the outcome of competitions over corporate law at the state and global 
levels. See Chen & Hanson, False Starts, supra note 29. As that work reveals, those primed 
with the evolutionary or tournament schemas are more likely to interpret what was once 
seen as a "race to the bottom" for corporate Jaw as, in fact, a "race to the top." See id. But 
the evolution and competition scripts have many effects on these sorts of debates. For 
instance, it is easier to accept shareholder primacy as the macro goal of corporate Jaw when 
we are told that shareholder primacy has emerged victorious following a global competition 
among numerous competitors. Relatedly, when we conceive of corporations as engaged in a 
competition or tournament, it is easier to accept the idea that there should be just a single 
measure of success (like points on the scoreboard or numbers in the win column). In that 
way, the competition metaphor helps to legitimate single measures of success at every level 
of Jaw. The competition notion likewise influences our perceptions of the debate itself, 
priming us to look for a clear winner or loser (for example Berle & Means versus Dodd) 
between scholars or business forms. The idea that we have reached some "end of history" is 
itself a manifestation of the notion we have witnessed a competition of ideas, business forms, 
and Jaws in which the best form wins. 
Other metaphorical schemas abound. In the distribution-efficiency debate noted above, 
the metaphor of a pie-making - that legal rules should focus on maximizing the size of the 
pie, while job of slicing it up should be left to the tax-and-transfer system - has a significant 
influence on how scholars see the issue. See Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, 
supra note 10. Similarly, we have described the role of the invisible hand metaphor, just as 
we have ourselves been promoting our own metaphor of illusion. The metaphor of capture, 
likewise, has a long history and is employed on both sides of many debates. And the 
metaphor of the corporation as a person has shaped the corporation and corporate Jaw 
significantly. These metaphors and many more like them play a more significant role in our 
thinking and in our Jaws than most of us realize. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, 
supra note 5, at 1211-15. 
The role and power of metaphorical schemas, as well as some of the most influential 
metaphorical schemas, are detailed in the fascinating work of cognitive linguist George 
Lakoff. Examining the metaphorical schemas through which conservatives and liberals see 
the world, Lakoff concludes that conservatives tend to see the world through a "Strict 
Father" model while liberals tend to rely mo�e on a "Nuturant Parent" metaphor. See 
GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS 64, 65, 108 (2d ed. 2002); Jith Meganathan, Judges as 
Political Actors: Cognitive Linguistic Evidence 21-26 (work in progress); see also id. 
(providing an intriguing application of Lakoff's insights to legal decisionmaking). The Strict 
Father model - or metaphorical schema - is based on a view that "[p]eople, left to their 
own devices, tend simply to satisfy their desires. But, people will make themselves do things 
they don't want to do in order to get rewards; they will refrain from doing things they do 
want to do in order to avoid punishment." LAKOFF, supra, at 67. "Children," the view holds, 
"must never be coddled, Jest they become spoiled; a spoiled child will be dependent for life 
and will not learn proper morals." Id. at 66. Thus, the metaphor of the "Strict Father" who is 
most effective when he teaches his children through discipline and punishment nicely 
complements the view of individual choice embodied in the dominant meta script and 
echoed in the dominant macro script of corporate Jaw. 
Not all schemas are complementary. Although we have been focusing primarily on the 
"winning" or dominant participant in the competition for situation, there are schemas of 
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themselves not only reflect the power of the corporate form, but also 
help to amplify that power. It is, we believe, illuminating to return to 
the origins of the corporate form and to examine how thoughtful 
observers reacted to its emergence prior to the creation and wide 
acceptance of the schemas legitimating its power. Our hypothesis, 
which already finds some confirmation in a closer reading of Adam 
Smith,503 suggests that these observers, uninfluenced by modern 
schemas, would have been more aware and suspicious of the 
various types that are employed by those who today are critical of the meta script of 
policymaking and the macro script of corporate law. Indeed, as the historical overview in this 
section demonstrates, many people throughout history - long before the Doddian view we 
discussed earlier - held a very different script than the one that dominates today. 
Similarly, the schemas supporting the dominant view are not today without challengers. 
For example, there exist alternative metaphorical schemas that support alternative 
conceptions of the corporation. The metaphorical view of the government as a Strict Father 
competes with the Nurturant Parent view. LAKOFF, supra, at 64, 65, 108. The latter provides 
cognitive fuel for critics of the dominant schema by highlighting the role of the parent "to 
nurture children and to protect children from external dangers." Meganathan, supra, at 22. 
"[U]nlike the Strict Father model - where parents must observe strict noninterference 
towards mature children - adult children [in the Nurturant Parent model] and their parents 
retain ties of interdependence." Id. at 23. The "ties" are the very responsibilities to 
"children" that the Doddian view promotes. Thus, just as there are always in existence 
alternatives to the dominant scripts, so, too, are there likely to exist alternatives to the 
schemas - metaphorical and otherwise - that support those scripts. The connection of the 
Strict Father metaphor to dispositicnism and the Nurturant Parent metaphor to situationism 
is explored in Benforado & Hanson, supra note 7. 
Another metaphorical schema demonstrates the way in which two conflicting schemas 
may co-exist. Various groups, books, articles, and even movies have promoted and continue 
to promote to this day the alternative schema, which, at the extreme, likens corporations to 
an experiment gone horribly awry, a man-made Frankenstein loose on the landscape 
destroying everything in its path. Drawing upon that metaphor, the script primes us to be 
concerned about the possibility that big business, which was created by humans, is now 
beyond our control, and even controls us. That metaphor is central in the documentary THE 
CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 2004), available at www.thecorporation.com. In the legal 
ethical realm, the alternative script has the Frankenstein, not only running roughshod over 
society, but devouring lawyers in the process. See, e.g., George W. Bristol, The Passing of the 
Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590, 613 (1913) ("The lawyer . . .  is being devoured by his 
own Frankenstein."); Ronald Chen, The Illusion of Ethics: The Legitimating Schemas of the 
Legal Profession (work in progress). Similarly, tort law's critics commonly borrow from the 
Frankenstein script by highlighting the well-meaning utopian goals of those responsible for 
expanding tort law and the "out of control" tort system that is now purportedly doing 
significant damage in our culture. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 412. 
But the Frankenstein metaphorical schema is also an example of the way in which our 
schemas are flexible and may be manipulated. For, as the alternative script promoted the 
idea of the corporation as Frankenstein, the counter script drew upon the same metaphor, 
transforming the Frankenstein into a misunderstood monster for which our fears were 
unfounded. The Frankenstein was not, as the critics suggested, a monster devoid of 
humanity, but was, rather, a "person" with a "soul" - sensitive and compassionate. See, e.g., 
ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC 
RELATIONS AND THE CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS (1998). 
Similarly, we have already seen the ways in which the metaphors of capture and the invisible 
hand are employed to advance different sides of the same debate. Thus, not only are there 
competing meta and macro scripts, but there are also contradictory means of applying the 
same schemas and scripts. 
503. See supra text accompanying notes 491-495. 
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situational magician than most legal scholars are today. This Section 
not only provides some support for that hypothesis, it also suggests 
some of the situational forces that helped to promote corporate 
power, even as many influential policymakers expressed concerns and 
attempted to limit that power. 
a. Early American Corporations. The history of the American 
corporation can be traced back at least as far as old English law.504 It 
was the (mostly bad) experience with the English joint stock 
companies as much as the influence of English laws, however, that 
shaped how corporations were initially regulated in America.505 
504. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW 16-17 (2000); Andrew L. 
Creighton, The Emergence of Incorporation as a Legal Form for Organizations 34 (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author). 
505. Prior to the sixteenth century, the English common law and the King delegated to 
public institutions the powers of incorporation. Corporations were "quasi-governmental 
bodies, existing largely independent of the state, with broad political, taxation, and coercive 
powers." Creighton, supra note 504, at 34. By definition, corporations posed a threat to the 
state's power. 
Toward the late sixteenth century, the state centralized its powers, HARRIS, supra note 
504, at 17, and the King attempted to gain the upper hand on corporations and to exploit 
their ability to tax by giving himself the sole power to incorporate and control corporations. 
Creighton, supra note 504. The King's goal was to create profit-making entities from which 
he could derive income so as to "close the gap between [his] declining land revenues and . . .  
growing military and civil expenses." HARRIS, supra note 504, at 41 .  During this period, the 
monarchy had lost much of its taxation powers because of reforms based on the principle of 
"no taxation without representation" (i.e., no taxation without parliamentary oversight). Id. 
The King used his new powers to control and tax previously unregulated companies engaged 
in foreign trade as well as those he sent to manage persons in foreign lands and colonies. By 
creating corporations, the King helped to align the economic and political interests of 
shareholders (usually rich merchants) with the King instead of Parliament. The King 
exercised control through the use of charters; he used judicial writs to dissolve and forfeit 
charters if there was any abuse. HARRIS, supra note 504, at 18; see also Harold J. Laski, The 
Early History of the Corporation in England, 30 HARV. L. REV. 561, 587 (1917) (noting that 
if the corporations engaged in profit-seeking to the detriment of the public, the King could 
drag the officers of the corporation to court). 
By the end of the sixteenth century, large corporations were in decline as a result of 
several different factors, including the ability of government to raise income from other 
sources (e.g., excise and custom taxes), the political wrangling between King and Parliament, 
the failure to protect the corporate monopolies from competition, and the inefficiencies of 
monopolies. HARRIS, supra note 504, at 50-51 .  
Just as the number of corporations generally began to decrease, however, a few that held 
influence over public finance were gaining in power. Those survivors, called "moneyed" 
corporations, took on national debt in exchange for some of their stock. Frenzied 
speculation in the stocks of those companies, especially the South Sea Company, inflated a 
major price bubble. The bubble eventually popped once huge amounts of national debt were 
held in stock and once investors eventually came to realize that the corporations behind that 
stock were never going to deliver the sorts of profits originally touted. A brief history of the 
South Sea Bubble and many stock market crashes since can be found at http://www.stock­
market-crash.net/index.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) . Connected to those events, 
Parliament passed the Bubble Act of 1720, which, among other things, prohibited certain 
"corporate" actions without royal charter. See S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware 
Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 ,  2 (1976) . The Bubble Act led to a decline in the use 
of corporations for pure profit motives and shifted profit-seeking entrepreneurs to 
unincorporated partnerships for roughly the next century of British history. 
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Business corporations did not figure on the Colonial American 
landscape. The early corporations tended to be devoted to education, 
trade, land, religious, and military purposes.506 The rise in business 
corporations was, in part, a result of the American Revolution, which 
removed the royal monopolization of incorporation and the British 
corporations' taxation of Americans.507 A strong distaste for British 
corporate control united two disparate interests: domestic American 
businessmen and political activists. The latter perceived "corporate" 
entities, in general, as a corrupting influence on the British 
government. The former were less worried about the corrupting 
influence of the corporations on British policy than they were about 
the corrupting influence of British policy on traditional business 
practices. British corporate powerhouses, such as the East India 
Company, were given special privileges in conducting business in 
America.508 The monopolization of the tea trade by the East India 
Company and excise taxes imposed on the Americans due to the 
influence of that joint-stock company were some of the most 
significant mobilizing factors behind the war - as the Boston Tea 
Party famously illustrates. Political activists and businesspeople509 alike 
Conventional histories hold that the Bubble Act represented the state's effort to prevent 
regulatory capture by corporations through the stock-for-debt exchange. Historian Ron 
Harris has recently upended the received wisdom, however, by demonstrating that the Act 
itself was the brainchild of the South Sea Company, the corporation that, more than any 
other, stoked the overheated speculation and, thus, inflated the bubble. See HARRIS, supra 
note 504, at 68, 77-78 (describing "[t]he third explanation"). Among other methods, the 
South Sea Company sought to achieve influence by giving stock to many of the King's 
mistresses. Id. at 70. Harris documents the numerous links between the Parliament and the 
South Sea Company and describes the South Sea Company's "well-planned full-scale 
operation for manipulating Parliament." Id. at 69-70. More specifically, Harris explains how 
the South Sea Company managed to insert into the legislation clauses designed to protect 
itself and some of the other major corporations - including several insurance companies 
and the East India Company. Id. at 67. According to Harris, the South Sea Company hoped 
to corner the "bubble market" and thus prompted the state to regulate the other "smaller" 
bubbles. Id. at 68 ("The South Sea directors believed, justifiably or not, that the 'traffic [in 
bubbles] obstructed the rise of the South Sea stock."'). 
506. HARLAND PRECHEL, BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE: HISTORICAL TRANSITIONS 
AND CORPORATE TRANSFORMATION, 1880s-1990s 26 (2000). Two prominent examples are 
Dartmouth College and the state of Georgia. See 1 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN 
THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 35 (1917) (discussing the charter for 
the state of Georgia). 
507. Importantly, the American slogan of "taxation without representation" was the 
main motivation for the British court to authorize corporations that dominated their 
colonies - the court through corporations could tax foreign nationals, like Americans, 
precisely because they had no representation in Parliament 
508. As noted above, the 1720 Bubble Act prohibited certain "corporate" actions from 
occurring without royal charter. See supra note 505. Consequently, American business 
enterprises were, in effect, prohibited from competing with the English monopolies. 
509. During the war, American merchants focused more on aiding the Revolution than 
they did on profits (though they were to profit handsomely from the demise of British 
economic control). See 1 DAVIS, supra note 506, at 394-95; see also id. at 371-72 (describing 
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had something to protest; and, to both, the British corporation 
comprised a major part of the problem.510 
The pre-revolutionary experiences and the realization of 
independence combined to stir a momentous debate over whether to 
allow incorporation in the newly founded nation. Participants in the 
Constitutional Convention declined to grant "the explicit power to 
incorporate" in order to improve the document's prospects of being 
ratified.511 And "the torrent of opposition that greeted Congress's 
incorporation of the first Bank of the United States in 1791 served to 
establish the states as the primary creators of American corporations 




Concerns about the potential power of the corporation and the 
pre-revolutionary experiences remained central in the minds of many 
of the most influential leaders and policymakers. For instance, in 1817 
President James Madison, upon his retirement from office, reflected 
on the nation's situation during and after the Revolution in an 
undated essay entitled Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, 
Ecclesiastical Endowments.513 The essay's main concern was the power 
of religious corporations to coalesce a majority of persons in efforts to 
control other smaller religious "corporations" and accumulate massive 
William Duer's corrupt dealings with, and resultant influence over, the Revolutionary 
government). 
510. See Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West 
India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution, 40 HIST. J. 71, 71 (1997) 
(noting that the West Indies lobby influenced British policy and war strategy with respect to 
the American colonies). The coupling of the revolutionary war and its anticorporate 
message has been repeated throughout American history. See Seema Sohi, The People's 
Bicentennial Commission and the Construction of the Public Memory, 10 UVM HIST. REV., 
Dec. 1999, at http://chipmunk.uvm.edu:6336/dynaweb/histrev/hrvollO-/@Generic_BookText 
View/712;cs=default;ts=default (reviewing the use of the Revolutionary War as analogy to 
the 1970s and the rise of large corporations). Franklin D. Roosevelt made the same 
comparison, stating that: 
It was natural and perhaps human that the privileged princes of these new economic 
dynasties, thirsting for power, reached out for control over Government itself. They created 
a new despotism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction. In its service new mercenaries 
sought to regiment the people, their labor, and their property. And as a result the average 
man once more confronts the problem that faced the Minute Man. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency (June 
27, 1936), at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/pppus.php?adrnin=032&year=1936&id=82. 
511. See Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 
WM. & MARY Q. 51, 52 (1993). 
512 Id. (emphasis added). 
513. For a history, reprint, and annotations for this essay, see Elizabeth Fleet, Madison 's 
"Detatched Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 551 (1946). 
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economic power in comparison to other institutions such as the 
state.514 Madison warned that 
there is an evil which ought to be guarded against in the indefinite 
accumulation of property from the capacity of holding it in perpetuity by 
ecclesiastical corporations. The power of all corporations, ought to be 
limited in this respect. The growing wealth acquired by them never fails 
to be a source of abuses.5 15 
A year earlier, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "I hope we shall . . .  crush in 
[its] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare 
already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid 
defiance to the laws our country."516 
The concerns expressed by those leaders were reflected in the laws 
of their day. The process of incorporating typically required that "a 
private bill be introduced in the state legislature, be considered by the 
legislative committees, pass by both houses, and be signed by the 
governor.517 And to achieve that end required making a plausible case 
that the entity seeking incorporation be one that would serve the 
public interest. It was in part for that reason, that business enterprises 
were among the last associations to get incorporated.518 
b. The Rise of the Modern American Corporation. During the first 
half of the 19th century, the convergence of two separate groups -
merchants and politicians - slowly diverged into pro-charter and anti­
charter groups.519 In the early 19th century, commercial interests 
514. Id. at 554-55. His essay analogized corporations to copyrights: a person or group of 
persons is given the privilege of monopoly by the state in exchange for bringing their 
invention or services to the public. See id. at 551. 
515. Id. at 556. 
516. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 44 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
517. JAMES D. Cox ET AL. , CORPORATIONS 29 - 30 (1997). 
518. Creighton, supra note 504, at 37. As Creighton notes: 
The emphasis on puhlic benefit may account for the order in which charters of incorporation 
came to be issued: churches and schools are thought to have received incorporation first, 
then gradually canals and other business organizations of obvious and direct benefit to the 
public, and finally charters are issued to organizations where the public benefit is more 
removed and general. 
Id. at 38. Businessmen eager to establish some permanency for their private associations and 
private interests had to frame their enterprise as serving the public even when doing so 
stretched the meaning of the category considerably. Creighton, supra note 504, at 38-39. The 
framing was simplified inasmuch as lawmakers believed "that they [business corporations] 
were vital for economic growth." See George D. Smith & Davis Dyer, The Rise and 
Transformation of the American Corporation, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 28, 
37 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). 
519. Cf Cathy Matson & Peter Onuf, Toward a Republican Empire: Interest and 
Ideology in Revolutionary America, 37 AM. Q. 496 (1985) (describing the "interest" of 
merchants during the Revolutionary War). 
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pushed to deregulate the corporate form, citing the need to aggregate 
capital in order to advance the "progress" associated with 
industrialization.520 Consequently, 
the period from 1800 to 1850 saw substantial changes in the law of 
corporations. From its early form as an ad hoc organization that was as 
much a vehicle for conferring monopoly privileges on a small group of 
investors as it was a legal form for conducting business, the corporation 
evolved into a distinctive entity legally available to all, which could be 
shaped to suit the needs of particular businesses with few restrictions on 
entry, duration, or management.521 
After 1835, numerous states began to permit entrepreneurs to 
incorporate their businesses through standardized processes. "With 
the arrival of general incorporation laws, in contrast to incorporation 
by special act, businessmen could with certainty and efficiency gain the 
benefits of corporate status for their businesses."522 
The increasing liberalization of corporate law "did not occur 
without opposition."523 President Martin Van Buren, in his first State 
of the Union address to Congress (1937), expressed grave concerns 
about the increasing dependence of states on local banks for financing 
and the growing influence of corporations, mostly banks, over public 
finance: "I am more than ever convinced of the dangers to which the 
free and unbiased exercise of political opinion - the only sure 
foundation and safeguard of republican government - would be 
exposed by any further increase of the already overgrown influence of 
corporate authorities."524 More generally, political commentators 
worried that the corporate form 
would in time come to dominate the social landscape. This possibility was 
deeply upsetting to the egalitarian sensibility of the Jacksonian 
Democrats of the early to mid 19th century. One critic in 1833, for 
example, published the view that "Against corporations of every kind, 
the objection may be brought, that whatever power is given to them, is so 
much taken from either the government or the people. . . [T]he very 
existence of monied corporations is incompatible with equality of 
rights."525 
520. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS 
AND PROBLEMS 5 (3d ed., 1994). 
521. Id. at 6. 
522. Cox ET AL., supra note 517, at 31.  
523. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 520, at 5. 
524. Martin Van Buren, First Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1837), at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/showdoc.php?id=681&type=l&president=8&mth=12 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
525. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 183 (quoting WILLIAM M. GOUGE, SHORT 
HISTORY OF PAPER MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STA TES 17 (2d ed. 1835) ). 
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Such concerns slowed, but did not stop, the growing power of 
corporations and the growing liberalization of corporate regulations.526 
With corporations' growing wealth and power527 came greater 
corruption. By the 1850s, many large corporations, created in part 
through federal subsidies, were securing political favors and were 
frequently caught up in public scandals.528 Near the conclusion of the 
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln, writing to a friend about the 
trends he had been witnessing, offered this lament: 
[W]e may all congratulate ourselves that this cruel war is nearing its 
close. It has cost a vast amount of treasure and blood. The best blood of 
the flower of American youth has been freely offered upon our country's 
altar that the nation might live. It has indeed been a trying hour for the 
Republic; but I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves 
me and cause me to tremble for the safety of my country. 
As a result of this war, corporations have been enthroned and an era of 
corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the 
country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the 
prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands, and 
the Republic is destroyed. I feel at this moment more anxiety for the 
safety of my country than ever before, even in the midst of war. God 
grant that my suspicions may prove groundless.529 
The efforts to tame the American corporation continued. For instance, 
the Sherman Act and rail regulations were passed in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.530 And m response to concerns that 
526. The debate was partially over schemas. Competing conceptions of corporations as 
"public" or as "private" had its early beginnings in the early 1800s where laws governing 
municipalities diverged with laws governing business enterprises. The categories were 
routinely manipulated by both businessmen and their critics alike. MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 1 1 1-114 (1992). Businessmen, for 
instance, argued that corporations were public when they needed state protection from 
"competitive injury," id. at 1 1 1, and as private when they needed independence from "state 
interference," 1 DA VIS, supra note 506, at 47. Similarly, there were and still are debates 
about whether the corporation is or is not a "person." 
527. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 24 (1988). "In 1890, Justice Stephen Field estimated that three­
quarters of the wealth of the United States was controlled by corporations." HORWITZ, 
supra note 526, at 71. 
528. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 512-13 
(2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW]. For a classic example 
of this combination of subsidy to, and capture by, corporate interests, see Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the case in which the United States Supreme 
Court created the "public trust" doctrine. But see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois 
Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (offering a fascinating and compelling challenge to 
the conventional wisdom regarding Illinois Central). 
529. EMANUEL HERTZ, 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A NEW PORTRAIT 954 (1931).  
530. Criticisms leveled against corporations at this time were that monopolistic practices 
were inefficient and changed patterns in the "distribution of wealth and power." OLIVIER 
ZUNZ, MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE 1870-1920, at 33-36 (1990). Critics wanted the state 
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corporations were too often misleading shareholders, the "trust 
doctrine,'' which announced management's fiduciary duties to 
shareholders (and creditors), emerged in various states.531 
Those attempts to rein in corporations had limited effect, in part 
because of other factors that heightened corporate power. In 1886, the 
Supreme Court indicated that a corporation is a "natural person" in 
the eyes of the U.S. Constitution.532 That opinion, though ambiguous 
on its face, was to be interpreted in a way that gave corporations many 
of the same rights and protections as other natural persons under the 
Bill of Rights.533 In the name of "free speech," for instance, corporate 
persons were given the right to attempt to influence government 
policies, laws, regulations, and public opinion.534 In the ensuing years, 
corporations used that right to lobby state legislatures535 to loosen the 
reins further by, for example, eliminating the requirements that 
corporations serve the "public good,'' live for a finite period, and not 
own stock in other corporate "persons," and also by instituting the 
risk-reducing privilege of limited liability for corporate investors.536 
to regain the power to limit and regulate corporate activity through special charters. Naomi 
R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits on Contractual Freedom in U.S. 
History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE 
AMERICA 29, 39 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004); see also Creighton, supra 
note 504, at 101 (describing study of the content of charters and noting that charters for "for 
profit" entities more often contained special provisions that limited duration, and details of 
governance structures.) 
531. See generally FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 528, at 514-17. 
For an example of this "trust language," see Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875). 
532. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The significance of this 
case is detailed in HORWITZ, supra note 526, at 66-107. This debate continues today. See, 
e.g. , David F. Linowes, The Corporation as Citizen, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILffiES 345 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992) (arguing that 
corporate personhood means corporate responsibilities as citizens). 
533. See S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also John Dewey, The Historic 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Morton Horwitz, 
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 ( 1985); 
Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Arthur W. 
Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911); Gregory A. Mark, The 
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 
(1987). 
534. See, e.g., J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970); David Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. 
535. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that state legislatures competed with one 
another to win corporate registrations (and the benefits that accompany them). See Chen & 
Hanson, Legitimating Schemas II, supra note 10. 
536. For a brief, but illuminating historical overview of how limited liability gradually 
developed as a defining feature of corporations, see Mendelson, supra note 181, at 1208-17. 
As Mendelson explains, "limited liability for corporate shareholders . . . .  arose separately 
from and apparently later than the other characteristic corporate features," and "was far 
from fully established until the early part of the twentieth century." Id. at 1209, 1211 (citing 
HORWITZ, supra note 526, at 94). Consistent with our story, Mendelson points out that, 
although the trend toward limited liability was justified as a means of encouraging the 
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Again, the growing power of corporations occurred despite serious 
fears on the part of many policymakers and commentators about the 
potentially harmful effect of corporations. As legal historian Lawrence 
Friedman explains, " [t]he triumph of the corporation as a form of 
business was neither painless nor noiseless. "537 Grover Cleveland, in 
his State of the Union in 1888, reacted with fear to the Supreme 
Court's actions in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co. 538 and the growing power of corporations: 
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the 
existence of trusts, combinations, and monopolies, while the citizen is 
struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death beneath an iron heel. 
Corporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the 
law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people's 
masters. 539 
So what explains the increasing laxity of corporate regulation and 
the ultimate "triumph of the corporation"? Probably the most 
significant forces contributing to the transition of the American 
corporation have been the dynamics of federalism and the need felt by 
certain individual states for financial relief, particularly following the 
Civil War. 
The Civil War, after all, wreaked havoc on many Northern state 
budgets, which had been drawn down to advance the Union cause. As 
states began looking and competing for ways to raise funds, several 
came to see that they could, in effect, sell laws to corporations.540 New 
Jersey's legislature fast became a leader in that competition by 
"'small-scale entrepreneur' and companies with public functions," id. at 1210, it was "large­
scale industrialists [who] pressured the political process for limited liability." Id. at 1210-11 
(citing Phillip I .  Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 592-
93 (1986)). 
537. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 528, at 171. 
538. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
539. Grover Cleveland, Fourth Annual Message (First Term) (Dec. 3, 1888), at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showdoc.php?id=731&type=l&president=22&mth=12 {last visited 
Oct. 28, 2004). He said right before this quote: 
We discover that the fortunes realized by our manufacturers are no longer solely the reward 
of sturdy industry and enlightened foresight, but that they result from the discriminating 
favor of the Government and are largely built upon undue exactions from the masses of our 
people. The gulf between employers and the employed is constantly widening, and classes 
are rapidly forming, one comprising the very rich and powerful, while in another are found 
the toiling poor. 
Id. He was worried about the capture of corporations on institutions and the increasing 
plight of the unemployed and rising poverty levels. 
540. CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 23, 25 (1993); see also FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 528, at 524-25 (noting that New Jersey incorporated 1366 corporations just 
in the first six months of 1866, including the most notorious corporations such as the 
"Whiskey Trust"). 
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charging corporations - including those whose economic base was 
outside of the state - a chartering fee to incorporate in New Jersey. 
Of course, New Jersey was not getting something for nothing. To 
attract buyers, the New Jersey legislature promulgated particularly 
liberal corporation laws and lowered the hurdles to groups who 
wished to obtain a corporate charter.541 The effort paid off, as New 
Jersey quickly became a favorite place for businesses to incorporate. 
It is worth noting that, although the New Jersey legislature passed 
the requisite enabling laws, the actual innovator was James Brook 
Dill, an ex-counsel for Standard Oil, who had strong financial dealings 
with the New Jersey administration.542 Equally influenced by 
corporate interests and similarly in need of funds,543 Delaware soon 
rose to challenge New Jersey.544 New Jersey blinked when its 
Governor, Woodrow Wilson, pushed through more restrictive 
corporation laws on his way to the White House.545 In his Inaugural 
Address, Wilson noted: 
If I may speak very plainly, we are much too free with grants of charters 
to corporations in New Jersey . . .  . I would urge, therefore, the 
imperative obligation of public policy and of public honesty we are under 
to effect such changes in the law of the State as will henceforth 
effectually prevent the abuse of privilege of incorporation which has in 
recent years brought so much discredit upon our State. 546 
New Jersey's temporary withdrawal from the corporate-law 
competition launched Delaware into the lead, where it remains today 
without meaningful rivals.547 
541. GRANDY, supra note 540, at 43. These "general incorporation laws" allowed any 
group to obtain a corporate charter, so long as they fulfilled certain minimal requirements. 
See Lamoreaux, supra note 530, at 33. 
542. GRANDY, supra note 540, at 40. Horwitz tells a similar story. Several corporation 
lawyers connected with Cromwell's firm "were among those active in the drafting of this 
amendment," and, as Alfred D. Chandler has written, "[t]he New Jersey legislature quickly 
obliged." HORWITZ, supra note 526, at 83. 
543. Members of the DuPont family were delegates to the constitutional convention and 
executives held positions on important committees. PRECHEL, supra note 506, at 38. 
544. GRANDY, supra note 540, at 79 (explaining how small states close to capital 
markets such as New Jersey and Delaware were attractive states because they depended so 
heavily on corporations for revenue that they were "held hostage" to the corporations). 
545. Id. at 81-84. As Grandy notes, under the "tutelage of Louis Brandeis," Wilson's 
position on corporations changed when campaigning for the presidency. During his 
governorship, he was against the managerial excesses of corporations (the agency problem 
argument); while during his presidential campaign, he was against the "monopolistic 
practices of firms" (the efficiency, anticompetition argument). 
546. Id. at 81. 
547. Some believe Delaware's dominance is the desirable outcome of a neutral 
"market" and "federalist" experimentation. We take up that argument and the larger "race 
to Delaware" debate in work now in progress. See Chen & Hanson, False Starts, supra 
note 29. 
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In 1933, Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis summarized the 
history of the American Corporation this way: 
The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this 
generation to . . . accept the evils attendant upon the free and 
unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism as if these evils were the 
inescapable price of civilized life and, hence to be borne with resignation. 
Throughout the greater part of our history a different view prevailed. 
Although the value of this instrumentality in commerce and industry was 
fully recognized, incorporation for business was commonly denied long 
after it had been freely granted for religious, educational, and charitable 
purposes. It was denied because of fear. Fear of encroachment upon the 
liberties and opportunities of the individual. Fear of the subjugation of 
labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that the absorption of capital by 
corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring evils . . . .  There was a 
sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, 
particularly when held by corporations. So, at first, the corporate 
privilege was granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed 
necessary in order to procure for the community some specific benefit 
otherwise unattainable. The later enactment of general corporation laws 
does not signify that the apprehension of corporate domination had been 
overcome . . . .  The general laws, which long embodied severe restrictions 
upon size and upon the scope of corporate activity, were, in part, an 
expression of the desire for equality of opportunity.548 
According to Brandeis, the law was often liberalized to advance 
corporate interests, not for lack of concern, but rather for lack of 
meaningful choice.549 The relaxation of corporate restrictions was 
based on the "conviction that it was futile to insist on them; because 
local restriction would be circumvented by foreign incorporation. "550 
548. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
Brandeis elaborated the corporate limitations as follows: 
Limitations upon the amount of the authorized capital of business corporations was 
long universal. The maximum limit frequently varied with the kinds of business to be 
carried on . . . .  
Limitations upon the scope of a business corporation's powers and activity were also long 
universal. At first, corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited 
number of purposes - usually those which required a relatively large fixed capital, like 
transportation, banking and insurance, and mechanical, mining, and manufacturing 
enterprises. Permission to incorporate for "any lawful purpose" was not common until 1875; 
and until that time the duration of corporate franchises was generally limited to a period of 
20, 30, 40, or 50 years. All, or a majority, of the incorporators or directors, or both, were 
required to be residents of the incorporating state. The powers which the corporation might 
exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly conferred and strictly construed. Severe 
limitations were imposed on the amount of indebtedness, bonded or otherwise. The power 
to hold stock in other corporations was not conferred or implied. The holding company was 
impossible. 
Liggett, 288 U.S.  at 550-56 (footnotes omitted). 
549. Cf supra Part IV.C.4. 
550. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 557. 
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From the perspective of any given state, it was better to give 
corporations what they wanted and try to keep them in-state, than to 
have them achieve the same ends elsewhere. Situation, not free choice, 
dictated the outcome.551 
That legal trajectory, in the face of widespread anxieties, became 
the wellspring for some of the most famous legal-academic debates of 
the twentieth century - debates that were fundamentally about the 
proper purpose, not just of corporations, but of corporate law in 
general. That is where Adolph Berle picked up the discussion and 
where, particularly when Milton Friedman joined the debate, the 
corporate commentators began to lose sight of the situational 
magician.552 
D. Protecting the Illusion and the Magician 
With those claims about the illusion, the tricks, and the magicians 
in place, it is revealing to return to Friedman's seminal argument for 
shareholder primacy. As it turns out, he provided important clues at 
the outset that, indeed, the macro script was offered as an illusion to 
be employed by the magician. 
Friedman, recall, begins his analysis by claiming that the then­
prevalent Doddian notion that businesses owe a responsibility to 
society was perilously wrong. The undemocratic misuse or theft of 
shareholder assets in the name of "social responsibility" poses an 
immense threat to our social freedoms. Of course, any such threat to 
shareholders is only as significant as it is feasible. So it might seem that 
Friedman's concern was based on an underlying belief that directors 
had actually been misusing shareholder property. But look closer. 
Scrutinizing Friedman's entire argument, one discovers that the 
purported threat is, according to Friedman, mooted by the various 
551. See Chen & Hanson, False Starts, supra note 29 (discussing the situational 
influence of the race for corporate chartering); see also Mendelson, supra note 109, at 1232 
n.115 (providing situational reasons why limited liability might be the dominant approach, 
even if not the most efficient - e.g., conformity with other states; collective action problem 
stemming from fact that benefits of corporations tend to be internalized to state while costs 
are externalized; corporate/shareholder interests better represented than potential tort 
victims in competition over regulation). 
552. In fact, it had begun well before then. Brandeis's critical assessment was 
exceptional even then. By the 1890s, corporations were widely understood as having a 
personal right to incorporation and a right to personal wealth. And, thus, the seeds of 
shareholder primacy and the meta scripts of the late twentieth century were taking root. See 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, at 33 (1991) 
(quoting Christopher Tiedeman who wrote in 1900 that "an act of incorporation simply 
guarantees to the incorporators the right to act and do business as a corporate body, subject, 
of course, to the laws of the land, and the legitimate control of government"). And so it was 
that President Coolidge noted in the 1920s that "[t)he business of America is business." Carl 
Kaysen, Introduction and Overview, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 3 (Carl 
Kaysen ed., 1996). 
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situational forces that constrain the decisions of corporate directors. 
As Friedman puts it: 
[W]hether he wants to or not, can he get away with spending his 
stockholders', customers' or employees' money? Will not the 
stockholders fire him? (Either the present ones or those who take over 
when his actions in the name of social responsibility have reduced the 
corporation's profits and the price of its stock.) His customers and his 
employe[e]s can desert him for other producers and employers less 
scrupulous in exercising their social responsibilities.553 
In other words, Friedman, given his view of markets, ultimately 
concedes that managers have no choice but to maximize profits. A 
manager is not "free to choose" social responsibility, or at least not 
more than once. The situation of markets eliminates that freedom.554 
Thus it is here that Friedman's argument begins to reveal some of its 
deepest tensions and flaws - and, in that way, provide its clearest 
confirmation of our law-as-illusion hypothesis. If managers cannot, in 
practice, pursue "socially responsible" policies that are not 
simultaneously profit maximizing, then why is Friedman so upset? 
The claim that boards are making "undemocratic" (non-profit­
maximizing) policies fails for several reasons. First, board decisions 
cannot be, according to Friedman's logic, undemocratic. After all, 
directors were voted into office by the shareholders, and any decision 
that shareholders don't like will be the basis of the directors' "firing." 
So there is a democratic process in place, according to Friedman, that 
reveals shareholder consent to existing policies.555 Indeed, that fact 
should lead Friedman to conclude that the talk of "social 
responsibility" and the investments made by corporate directors 
purportedly to advance that interest must be efficient, as proven by 
the fact that the directors, who made those goals explicit, are still in 
office! Second, Friedman's own logic shows why any policy that is not 
553. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 122. 
554. See supra text accompanying notes 370-391 (discussing illusion of freedom). 
555. One might argue that Friedman meant by "democratic" to exclude arrangements 
that are nongovernmental. He does, at one point, go out of his way to emphasize that 
governmental arrangements are carefully designed to serve social welfare: "The imposition 
of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are governmental functions. We have 
established elaborate constitutional, parliamentary and judicial provisions to control these 
functions, to assure that taxes are imposed so far as possible in accordance with the 
preferences and desires of the public." Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 122. 
But such an argument would contradict Friedman's primary views, which see governmental 
institutions as second-best options to markets. Here, the fact that the market has generated a 
voting mechanism for shareholders and that, in addition, shareholders have the option to 
exit by selling their shares would seem to make clear that shareholder democracy is more 
reliable than its governmental counterpart. Friedman certainly provides no reason to think 
otherwise. Furthermore, the basic claim that governmental institutions and policies are 
based on reasonably reliable attempts to satisfy the "preferences and desires of the public" 
flies in the face of a basic presumption of Milton Friedman and many who accept the 
neoliberal script that government policies fail miserably at that task. 
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profit maximizing will be disallowed by other situational (that is, 
market) forces, assuming shareholder disapproval is not enough. 
Now we know that Friedman is upset about, not the practice, but 
the preaching of social responsibility. Since the "preaching" does no 
real direct harm to shareholders, and indeed can be to their benefit, 
we cannot help but wonder what is bothering Friedman. His worry 
cannot be with managerial discretion - there is none. What really 
seems to be troubling Friedman is that "influential and prestigious 
businessmen" speak publicly about "the nonsense" of social 
responsibility.556 The problem is not that corporate decisionmakers 
will use their position to pursue the public interest at a cost to 
shareholders. The problem is that the accepted script, which 
businesspeople use in the belief "that they are defending free 
enterprise,"557 suggests that the unbridled pursuit of profit may be bad 
for society. Such speechifying, Friedman stresses, has the exact 
opposite effect, threatening "the possible survival of business in 
general"558 and encouraging the extension of "the political mechanism 
to every human activity."559 His concern, then, is that the script might 
not be in the interests of the magician. 
Friedman's primary audience, it seems, is not corporate law 
scholars or policymakers, but the businesspeople who are spouting this 
dangerous antibusiness script. Friedman's principal purpose is to 
admonish them to be less "short sighted[]"560 and to work more 
effectively toward their collective, long-term (that is, macro) interest: 
This [talk of social responsibility] may gain [businessmen] kudos in the 
short run. But it helps to strengthen the already too prevalent view that 
the pursuit of profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed and 
controlled by external forces. Once this view is adopted, the external 
forces that curb the market will not be the social consciences, however 
highly developed, of the pontificating executives; it will be the iron fist of 
Government bureaucrats. Here . . .  businessmen seem to me to reveal a 
suicidal impulse.561 
So, let's review. In response to the argument of many 
businesspeople that business might have an obligation to "social 
ends," Friedman argues that their only obligation is to maximize 
profits within the laws and that doing otherwise is "unadulterated 
socialism," because they are spending shareholder money without 
shareholder consent. But, because markets would punish, and 
556. Friedman, Friedman Doctrine, supra note 3, at 124. 
557. Id. at 33. 
558. Id. at 124. 
559. Id. at 126. 
560. Id. at 126. 
561. Id. at 126. 
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shareholders would oust, managers who were not maximizing profit, 
Friedman's real concern is not that directors would actually attempt to 
serve the public interest. Rather, he believes that by accepting the 
then-conventional corporate-responsibility script (of the sort that 
Dodd advanced), businesspeople were legitimating governmental 
intervention in private affairs. Friedman is thus concerned foremost 
with the power of scripts and importance to business of adopting a 
script that is in their shared interest562 - that is, one that would 
maximize markets (or "the invisible hand") and minimize regulation 
(or the "iron fist"). 
In other words, Friedman was advising business leaders that their 
livelihood, like that of professional magicians, depends on creating 
and maintaining illusion.563 As this Article helps demonstrate, they 
have heeded that advice. And that is the problem. As Friedman 
himself elegantly warns: "We have been forgetting the basic truth that 
the greatest threat to human freedom is the concentration of power, 
whether in the hands of government or anyone else."564 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As this Article suggests, the revolution of ideas that has shaped 
policymaking and corporate law in recent decades reflects the 
predictable outcome of a predictable competition over schemas. 
Recognizing this, the words of Adolph Berle seem eerily prophetic, 
providing a fitting summary, as well as a sense of the enormity of what 
our schemas and scripts have accomplished. In 1965, not long before 
the revolution of ideas would capture the minds of policymakers, 
Berle wrote the following about corporations: 
[W]henever there is a question of power there is a question of legitimacy. 
As things stand now, these instrumentalities of tremendous power have 
the slenderest claim of legitimacy. This is probably a transitory period. 
They must find some claim of legitimacy, which also means finding a 
562. Note that here Friedman seems to be conceding that the laws are not exogenous, 
but are, in fact, influenced by something as abstract as "rhetoric." His real point is, like ours, 
that scripts matter a great deal in policy analysis and policymaking. And, in the end, he has 
not made an argument that social interests should not be taken into consideration at all. 
Indeed, he emphasizes that that is a job for government to pursue through it policies. 
Ultimately, he is complaining, not about the practice of corporate social responsibility, but 
the rhetoric of corporate executives that might make governments more willing to pass laws 
that harmfully interfere with corporate interests (even though passing such laws is, according 
to Friedman, the proper domain of government). See supra text accompanying note 171. 
563. In such a way, Friedman was serving the same function as the World Alliance of 
Magicians. See Chen & Hanson, Theorizing Illusion, supra note 8 (discussing efforts by the 
World Alliance of Magicians (WAM) "to preserve the wonder and amazement of the 
Magical Arts for the general public, to protect the secrets of the magic profession from 
exposure and to reinforce the positive contributions of the Magical Arts to society."). 
564. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE, supra note 46, at 309. 
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field of responsibility and a field of accountability. Legitimacy, 
responsibility, and accountability are essential to any power system if it is 
to endure. They correspond to a deep human instinct.565 
With new schemas and scripts, the transitory period is now 
complete. The battle has been won; the war of ideas is over. Or at least 
that's the way some experts see it. As Hansmann and Kraakman 
recently pointed out, the dominance of the macro summary script of 
corporate law is evident in its 
acceptance by a worldwide network of corporate intermediaries, 
including international law firms, the big five accounting firms, and the 
principal investment banks and consulting firms - a network whose 
rapidly expanding scale and scope give it exceptional influence in 
diffusing the standard model of shareholder-centered corporate 
governance.566 
That once revolutionary schemas and scripts now seem so natural, 
even obvious, is a testament to the power of illusion. And the fact that 
this illusion has so long been mistaken as magic is a testament to the 
power of the situational magician. This Article should serve as a 
warning to all of us that, rather than marvel at the converging 
approaches to policymaking and corporate law, we should be 
suspicious of them. As Berle understood, "whenever there is a 
question of power there is a question of legitimacy." This Article has 
pursued that question and found, not magic, but the illusion of law. 
565. A.A. Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society, in THE CORPORATION TAKE­
OVER 86, 98-99 (Andrew Hacker ed., 1965). 
566. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 152, at 449. 
